1780. Book V. by the district officers of the Nabob: As he advanced, his march became so much infested by parties of the enemy's horse, that all hope of any successful operation against the convoys was wholly cut off; and the danger which surrounded the detachment made it necessary to think of nothing but the means of re-uniting it with the army. A total want of intelligence reduced Colonel Cosby to mere conjecture in choosing his route; and he fell in with the army by accident, as it was retreating before Hyder, on the 12th of September near Chingliput. Progress of collect the army. Not only every day brought fresh intelligence of the conquest and devastation effected by Hyder; Madras itself on the 10th of August was thrown into alarm. A party of the enemy's horse committed ravages as near as St. Thomas's Mount; and the inhabitants of the open town began to take flight. Endeavours to On the 14th of August, the General was obliged to report, that the place of rendezvous, which he had persisted in recommending, was unfit; the want of bullocks to carry provisions rendering the march impracticable. On his recommendation, it was therefore agreed, that the troops should meet at St. Thomas's Mount; and there wait till eight days' provisions, and bullocks to carry it, could be procured. Hyder lays siege to Arcot. Colonel Brathwaite, after sending away from Pondicherry all the French officers capable of service, and taking an oath of fidelity from the principal Frenchmen that remained, commenced his march. He arrived at Carangoly on the 12th of August; and found it garrisoned by only a petty officer of the Nabob and twenty sepoys. They would have surrendered it, he was well assured, on the very first summons; and had it not, by a singular oversight, as it commanded the only road by which Brathwaite could proceed, been neglected by the enemy, who had a large body of horse in its neighbourhood, the most serious consequences might have ensued. The country through which he passed after leaving Carangoly would have rendered it so difficult for him to escape if attacked by the enemy, that he formed a very contemptible opinion either of Hyder's military skill, or his means of offence, when he allowed so favourable an opportunity to be lost. On the 18th, after a hazardous and fatiguing march, Colonel Brathwaite arrived at Chingliput, when he received orders to join the army at the Mount. After various speculations and reports respecting the plan of hostilities which Amuldars. Some of them, till my approach, were issuing orders six miles from this." First 1780. Hyder would pursue, uncertainty was at last removed, by his marching towards CHAP. V. Arcot, and taking ground before it on the 21st of August. The danger of that place excited no little interest and alarm. It was not only the capital of the province, but contained the principal portion of the very defective stores which the Nabob had provided; and afforded to Hyder a situation, highly convenient, both for the accommodation of his troops, and for spreading his operations over the province. From every quarter alarming intelligence arrived. The troops of Hyder were expected in the circar of Guntoor, which had neither forts nor soldiers sufficient to oppose them, and where the Zemindars were disaffected to the Company, and in correspondence with the enemy. An army of Mahrattas from Berar had marched into Cuttack, and brought into imminent danger the defenceless state of the northern circars. A body of Hyder's troops had united with the Nairs, and having driven the Company's troops from the island of Durampatnam, threatened Tellicherry, with all the British possessions on the coast of Malabar. The enemy had appeared on the frontier of Madura, and the admiral of the fleet communicated to the President and Select Committee, intelligence which he had received from Europe, and on which he relied, that a French naval and military force might soon be expected in India. which beset While pressed by dangers, thus extraordinary both in number and degree, the Difficulties Presidency found their treasury empty; they had endeavoured to borrow money the English Presidency. upon the Company's bonds with little effect, the loans of the Nabob bearing a better interest; they made' urgent applications to the Nabob for pecuniary and other supplies, and received from him a deplorable picture of his own poverty and necessities, of the wretched and unproductive condition of the whole country, and the oppressive load of his debts, principally, he said, produced by the money which he had expended and lost in the conquest of Tanjore: To a similar application made to the Rajah of Tanjore, he replied with a truth not liable to dispute, that from the total exhaustion of his country by the recent conquest, and by the oppressive administration of the Nabob for several years, he was wholly incapable of furnishing any considerable supplies. By desertion for want of pay, or disbanding for want of ability to pay, the Nabob's army was greatly reduced. Even that reduced army was mutinous from the length of its arrears, and a source of apprehension rather than of hope. On the 25th of August, the General left the Presidency, and joined the army The army which was encamped at St. Thomas's Mount. Of cavalry, there was one regi- the cunt to proceeds from ment, belonging to the Nabob, but commanded by English officers, and it Conjeveram. refused to march unless it received its arrears. The men were deprived of their ammunition and arms; and about fifty-six of them only consented to serve. 490 1780. BOOK V. The rest of the army consisted of the King's 73d regiment, one battalion of the Company's European troops, with the grenadiers of another, five battalions of sepoys, a company of marksmen, two troops of cavalry, and a large train of artillery, amounting, officers included, to 5209.* With the utmost difficulty as much rice had been provided as would serve the troops for eight days; the sepoys were obliged to be loaded with four days' supply; and the utmost efforts barely sufficed to procure bullocks to carry the remainder. The General, notwithstanding, insisted upon loading his march with a number of heavy cannon; of which, as he had no fortifications to attack, the use did not appear to be very remarkable. On the 26th, the army left the Mount, and, after a march of four days, reached the camp near Conjeveram. During the two last days, the rain had fallen with great violence, had broken the roads, and rendered the march, especially with heavy artillery, slow and fatiguing. The enemy's cavalry had pressed upon them in great numbers, and wounded and taken some of the men. The agent of the Nabob, who accompanied the army, and on whom the General depended to procure both provisions and intelligence, informed him that he had no power for procuring either the one or the other; and his only remaining resource was in the paddy in the fields about Conjeveram. The march of swelling of the rivers. It had been concerted that the detachment of Colonel Baillie should reach But tarded by the Conjeveram on the day after the arrival of General Munro and the army. on the 31st, a letter from Baillie gave information that he had been stopped about five miles north from Trepassore by a small river which the rains had swelled. On the same day, it was reported by some deserters that Hyder had left Arcot, was crossing the river Palâr, and marching with his whole army toward Conjeveram. On the 3d of September, the same day on which Baillie crossed the river by which he had been impeded, the enemy encamped at five miles distance in front of the army near Conjeveram. The continuance of the rains, and the necessity of collecting the rice in the fields, and beating it for themselves out of the husk, greatly incommoded and harassed the troops. On the 6th, the enemy moved his camp to the north-east; upon which the English advanced to a high ground about two miles upon the road towards Ballee and He is attacked Trepassore, having the enemy at a distance of about two miles upon their left. by the enemy. While this movement was performing, Hyder had sent forward his son Tippoo Saib with a large body of the flower of his army to cut off the English detachment with Colonel Baillie, who had now advanced to Peerambaucum, distant 184 European infantry, 294 artillery, 3,434 sepoys, thirty-two field pieces, four heavy cannon, and five mortars. 1780. from the main army about fifteen miles. Baillie made a disposition to resist CHAp. V. a prodigious superiority of force; sustained a severe conflict of several hours; and at last repelled the assailants. By a letter on the 8th, he informed Munro, that upon a review after the battle he found the movement requisite for the junction beyond the powers of his detachment; and intimated the necessity that the General should push forward with the main body of the army. The General now found himself pressed by dangers, to whatever quarter he turned. All his provisions consisted in a small quantity of paddy which he had been able to collect in a pagoda. If he moved, the enemy would occupy his ground, and cut him off from the means of subsistence. With the concurrence of his principal officers, he adopted an expedient of which the hazard was scarcely, perhaps, more worthy of dread; that of still further dividing his little army, by sending a strong detachment, which, joining Baillie, might enable him to proceed. About nine o'clock in the evening of the 8th, Colonel Fletcher marched with the flank companies of the 73d regiment, two companies of European grenadiers, one company of sepoy marksmen, and ten companies of sepoy grenadiers. The field pieces, which the General proposed to send with the detachment, Colonel Fletcher declined, as calculated to impede his march. The men left even their knapsacks, and marched with only two days' provisions. Being joined by this detachment, Baillie was instructed to move in the evening of the 9th, and march the whole of the night. On that night the tents of the main army were struck, and the men lay on their arms. About twelve o'clock some cannon and musketry were heard; but they presently ceased, and all was still. A little before day break, a heavy firing of cannon and musketry was heard at a distance. It was soon perceived that the enemy's army had moved: The General gave orders to march by the right in the direction of the firing. After proceeding about four miles, he ordered guns to be fired, as a signal of his approach; and after a mile and a half, repeated the signal. A great smoke was suddenly perceived, and the firing ceased. Supposing that Baillie had repulsed the enemy, the General led the army back into the road, in hopes to meet him. After marching about two miles, he met a wounded sepoy, who had escaped from the fight, and told him that Colonel Baillie was entirely defeated. The General concluded that the safety of the army depended upon its returning to Conjeveram ; where it arrived about six in the evening, and where the arrival of more wounded sepoys confirmed the report of the disaster. Baillie. While the English general was placed in so complete an ignorance of the pro- Defence of ceedings of the enemy, Hyder had intelligence of every transaction of the English camp: He was correctly informed of the route of Colonel Fletcher, the 3 R2 ! 1780. Book V. number and quality of his troops, the time of their march, and even the circumstance of leaving their cannon behind. He sent a strong detachment to intercept them. But the sagacity of Fletcher suggesting suspicion of his guides, he altered his route, and, by cover of night, evaded the danger. The junction of the two detachments, after the defeat by Baillie of so large a portion of the enemy a few days before, struck alarm into the Mysorean camp. Even the European officers in the service of Hyder regarded the junction as a masterly stroke of generalship, intended for the immediate attack of his army both in front and rear. Lally himself repaired to Hyder, and entreated him to save his army from destruction by a timely retreat. The resolution of Hyder was shaken, till two of his spies arrived, and assured him, not only that the English army at Conjeveram was not in motion, but that it was making no preparation to that effect. To his European officers this intelligence appeared so perfectly incredible, that they concluded the spies to be sold, and entreated Hyder not to incur his ruin by confiding in their report. Hyder immediately formed his plan. A difficult part of the road was enfiladed with concealed cannon; and large bodies of the best part of his infantry were placed in ambush on either side; a cloud of irregular cavalry were employed to engage the attention of the English main army in the direction of Conjeveram, while Hyder, with the main body of his army, lay to watch the attack. Colonel Fletcher joined with his detachment at half an hour after six in the morning of the 9th. They reposed during the day; and after the parade in the evening, Colonel Baillie gave orders to be in readiness to march. Between eight and nine o'clock, the men moved off toward the left by way of Subdeverim. The enemy began immediately to discharge their rockets; but from the vigilance of the flanking parties, did little execution. A little after ten o'clock several guns opened on the rear. The detachment countermarched, and formed in-line with the front toward Perambaucum. The enemy keeping up an incessant, though not very destructive fire, and discovering no inclination to advance, Colonel Baillie ordered his men to face to the right, and march into an avenue, which they had passed a few minutes before. The enemy's cannon began to do great execution; when Baillie detached a captain, with five companies of Sepoys, to storm their guns. Though a water-course, which happened at that time to be unfordable, prevented this detachment from performing the service on which they were commanded, the intelligence of their march, which was immediately communicated to the enemy, threw their camp into alarm; their guns were heard drawing off towards the English front, and their noise and irregular firing resembled those of an army under a sudden and dangerous attack. A strong |