1772.

his father to conduct all operations, not military, connected with the expedition. CHAP. IV. They arrived, having met with no opposition, at Ramnadaporam, the capital of the greater Marawar on the 28th. The batteries were opened in the morning of the 2d of April, and a practicable breach was effected before the evening. This time a bargain had been made with the Nabob, that he should not forestall the wishes of his allies, by the precipitate conclusion of a peace. Terms were, however, offered both by Omdut ul Omrah and the General; which, notwithstanding their inadequate means of resistance, the people of the Polygar refused. The fort was assaulted the same evening, and carried with the loss of only one European and two sepoys killed. The Polygar, a minor of only twelve years of age, with his mother, and the Duan, were taken in the place; and soon reduced to a situation which extorted the compassion of Englishmen. The Nabob bargained for the plunder by a sum of money to the troops.

Marawar

The Nabob's troops, before the 15th of June, were put in possession of all the Ruin of the forts in Great Marawar; and on the 16th, the army begun its march toward the chiefs. other principality of that name. The polygar had betaken himself to a strong hold, named Kala-Koil, or Carracoil, surrounded by thick woods, which they approached on the morning of the 23d. An English officer, with a detachment of the army, was sent to approach by a road on the opposite side; with a hope, either of drawing off some of the enemy's attention; or of finding an opportunity to enter by surprise. In the mean time submissive offers arrived from the Polygar. To guard against any stratagem to amuse, the advance of the troops was not interrupted till the morning of the 25th, when Omdut ul Omrah gave the General notice, that peace was concluded, and requested that orders might be sent to stop the detachment. The orders, it seems, were entrusted to the Polygar's vakeels; the Polygar's vakeels, it is said, used not the requisite diligence; at any rate, the sending of the orders was unhappily if not criminally mismanaged; the detachment advanced; found the Polygar reposing upon the security of the treaty, and totally off his guard; with scarcely any resistance it entered the place; and the Polygar was killed, while endeavouring to escape at one of the gates. The Nabob, here too, gave a sum of money in redemption of the plunder. And these sums became the subject of immediate animosities and disputes, among the parties by whom pretensions to a share of them were advanced.+

The settlement of the territory was rendered difficult, by excess of mis

* Papers, ut supra, p. 1081-1083, and 998.

Ibid. p. 1083-1085, 1006, 1037.

1773.

Book V. government. The people of the country, who had facilitated the conquest by remaining at their ploughs, and who expected equal indulgence under one despot as another, were turned out of their lands, and took arms all over the country. "I must represent to you," said the English officer, who was left to support Omdut ul Omrah, (these are the words of a letter addressed to the Council), "that the settling this country in the manner expected by the Nabob, requires extremities of a shocking nature. When we are marching, we find all over the country most villages abandoned by the men, there remaining in them only women and children, who, likely, if the Nabob persists in this undertaking, must, with other poor innocents, become a sacrifice to this conquest: For, if any of our baggage remain behind, it is usually taken; our parties and stragglers are attacked. This is done by the inhabitants of some village or other. Those villages being pointed out to me, I cannot pass the outrage without punishment; and not finding the objects on which my vengeance should fall, I can only determine it by reprisals; which will oblige me to plunder and burn those villages; kill every man in them; and take prisoners the women and children. Those are actions which the nature of this war will require: For, having no enemy to encounter, it is only by severe examples of that kind, that we may expect to terminate it, so as to answer the end proposed." *

The Nabob, desiring the final subjugation of Tanjore,

moves for

another war.

Complaining, that they were left without any specific instructions by the Court of Directors, that they were commanded generally to support the Nabob in all his pretensions, that they were blamed as not having given him sufficient support, that they were bullied by the Plenipotentiaries to support him more than they could believe was either expedient or safe, the Governor and Council alleged that they were led on by that friend and ally from one step to another, without knowing where to stop, and without being able to make those reservations in favour of the Company, which the interests of the Company appeared to require. In this manner had Tanjore been humbled and fleeced: In this manner the two Marawars had been conquered, and delivered up as a dominion to the Nabob. It must be allowed, that except for a little time, when he first demanded the attack on Tanjore, the Presidency had shown themselves abundantly forward to second, or rather to excite the Nabob's ardour for conquest of the minor states. The Nabob had only one scruple, the fear of their conquering for themselves. The declarations, however, of the Presidency, of the Directors, and the King's minister plenipotentiary; the interpretations of the

treaty of Paris, and especially the recent example in the surrender of the Ma- CHAP. IV. rawars, raised up in his Highness hope that the time was at last arrived when the long desired possession of Tanjore might be fully acquired.

In a conference with the President about the middle of June, 1773, the Nabob brought complaint, that there was now due from Tanjore about ten lacs of rupees, that the Rajah had applied to the Mahrattas and to Hyder for a body of troops, and had encouraged the Colleries to ravage part of the Carnatic territory: " and intimated his intention of subduing him; all which he desired the President to consider of." *

After a few days, at another conference," the Nabob expressed his earnest desire that the expedition should be undertaken; spoke much of his friendship to the Company; and to show his regard for them was willing, in case of success, to give them ten lacs of pagodas." †

As the question immediately occurred, what, in case the expedition was undertaken, was to be expected from, or done with, their neighbours Hyder and the Mahrattas; a curious change appeared in the sentiments of the Nabob. A friendship, he said, must be established between him and Hyder; for notwithstanding all that he had done to procure for the Mahrattas the benefit of English assistance, " yet he found they were not fair and open towards him at Poonah ; ‡ and that whether he reduced Tanjore or did not reduce it, they would still come against him when it suited their affairs; that by God's blessing, however, if he and Hyder were joined, they would, with the assistance of the English, keep the Mahrattas effectually on the other side of the Kistnah." §

1773.

which the

Presidency

desires.

On the 22d of June, the question underwent deliberation in the Select Com- Motives on mittee. As to the complaint about the moneys unpaid, the Committee pass it over as a matter of slight importance. And as to the other complaint, that the gratify his Rajah was looking to the neighbouring powers for support against the Nabob, of which they had before them no satisfactory proof, they are constrained to confess, that, if it were true, he would not be to blame. "That the Nabob," they say, "has constantly had in view the design of conquering Tanjore, will not admit of a doubt. We are firmly persuaded, that his chief motive for concluding

• Papers, ut supra, p. 1107.

+ President's Report to the Select Committee, Ibid. 1108.

His not getting for them assistance from the English, he represented as the cause of their want of friendship, since they believed (of course he had told them) that "he had got the entire control of the whole English nation, and could make them do as he pleased." Ibid.

Ibid.

1773.

BOOK V. peace with the Rajah, at a time when our troops were upon the point of getting possession of the place, arose from his jealousy lest the Company purposed at a convenient opportunity to take the country from him. By that expedition, however, he obtained what he earnestly wished for, namely, the removal of that restraint which he thought himself under, by the Company's guarantee of 1762." The Committee next record a solemn declaration, that the treaty, which was then concluded, left the Rajah at the mercy of the Nabob, and bound by a sense of self preservation, to seek for protection against him in every quarter. "We then expressed our firm opinion, that the peace, concluded without the intervention of the Company, would not be considered by the Rajah as any security to him; and that he would avail himself of the first opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob. The intelligence communicated to us by the Nabob of the Rajah's application to the Mahrattas and Hyder Ally for assistance, is, in some measure, confirmed by the advices transmitted to us by Mr. Mostyn from Poonah: * Neither is the conduct of the Rajah, in this instance, to be wondered at. The apprehensions he before had have been increased by the publication of the Nabob's intention of reducing him; which has gained credit all over the country. He knows that, in our present situation, we cannot interfere, in the disputes between him and the Nabob; that the Nabob did not even allow his vakeel to visit the late President. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising, that the Rajah should endeavour to strengthen himself, by every means in his power, to enable him to withstand any attempts of the Nabob against him." †

That the Presidency had reason to pass over in silence, or at least with neglect, the complaints of the Nabob, respecting the payment of the Rajah's debt, sufficiently appears from the statement of the facts. Of fifty lacs, exacted as the compensation for peace, twelve lacs and a half were paid down. By mortgaging jewels and land, to the Dutch at Negapatnam, and the Danes at Tranquebar, he had contrived to pay the remainder, together with eight lacs for the peshcush of two years, leaving a balance of only ten lacs upon the whole. ‡

* The author of the Defence of Lord Pigot (Introd. p. 63) says, that by the Nabob people were employed to personate the Rajah's vakeels at Poonah; that letters were fabricated; and all sorts of artifice employed to mislead the Company's servants. The Presidency are often complaining that the Nabob's letters of intelligence state always a set of facts exactly calculated to support the point whatever it is, which the Nabob is at that moment driving.

+ Papers, ut supra, p. 1117.

See the Letter from the Dutch to the Nabob (Ibid. 1273;) Defence of Lord Pigot, Introd 64.

1773.

Notwithstanding the absence of criminality on the part of the Rajah, the CHAP. IV. Presidency resolved that they ought to destroy him. "It is evident," they say, "that in the present system,* it is dangerous to have such a power in the heart of the province: for, as the Honourable Court have been repeatedly advised, unless the Company can engage the Rajah to their interest, by a firm promise of support in all his just rights, we look upon it as certain, that, should any troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the French or a country enemy, and present a favourable opportunity of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob, he would take part against him, and at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in the south. The propriety and expediency, therefore, of embracing the present opportunity of reducing him entirely, before such an event takes place, are evident.” †

Never, I suppose, was the resolution taken to make war upon a lawful sovereign, with the view of "reducing him entirely," that is, stripping him of his dominions, and either putting him and his family to death, or making them prisoners for life, upon a more accommodating reason. We have done the Rajah great injury: We have no intention to do him right: This constitutes a full and sufficient reason for going on to his destruction. Such is the doctrine: The practical improvement is obvious. Do you wish a good reason for effecting any body's destruction? First do him an injury sufficiently great, and then if you destroy him, you have, in the law of self-defence, an ample justification!

In the opinion of the Presidency, no danger attended the operations required for the destruction of the Rajah: As to Hyder, he had too much business on his hands, and knew his own interests too well, to make the English just now his enemies on account of the Rajah: With regard to the Mahrattas, they were sure to invade the Carnatic, whenever they could expect to do so with any success; and that would happen neither sooner nor later on account of the reduction of Tanjore.+

The next point to consider was, the conditions upon which the Nabob should be accommodated with the destruction of the Rajah and the complete transfer of his dominions. The first was, that the Nabob should advance cash or good bills sufficient for the expense of the expedition. The second was, that all sorts of necessaries, excepting military stores, should be amply provided by the Nabob. The third was, that instead of paying for 7,000 sepoys, he should henceforth

* By present system, they mean the orders from England to support the Nabob, as absolute sovereign, in all his pretensions; which held their hands from interfering to protect the Rajah. Papers, ut supra, p. 1117. Ibid.