1770.

BOOK V. The King's Commissioner, measuring his own consequence by that of the master whom he served, and treating the Company and their servants as not worthy of much regard, on the score either of wisdom or of virtue, widened the difference between the partnership sovereigns of the Carnatic. The royal functionary assumed the character of protector of the Nabob; and appeared to interpose the royal authority, between an ally of the crown, and the oppression of the Com pany. The contempt which the Nabob saw bestowed upon the authority to which he had been accustomed to bend, and the dignity to which he appeared to be exalted as an ally of the British King, augmented his opinion of the injustice under which he appeared to himself to groan; and the letters of the Commissioner to the ministers in England were filled with accounts of the oppression exercised by the insolent and rapacious servants of a counting-house, over an independent and sovereign prince. The feeble discernment which has generally scanned the proceedings of the East India Company, and which has often lavished upon them applause where their conduct has been neither virtuous nor wise, has almost uniformly arraigned them for not accomplishing impossibilities, and uniting contrary effects; for not rendering themselves powerful and independent, without trenching upon the power and independence of princes, who would suffer their power and independence, only in proportion as they were deprived of those attributes themselves. Beside this fundamental consideration, it was not to be disputed, that, left to himself, Mahomed Ali could not maintain his possession of the province for even a few years; and that nothing but the power of the English could prevent it from falling a prey to the neighbouring powers, or even to its own disorganization. Though it is not disputed that the rapacity of individuals, who preyed upon the Nabob, may have added to the disorder of his affairs, it is true that the poverty of the Carnatic, and the wretched administration of the Nabob, enabled it not to fulfil the golden hopes of the English, or even to provide for its own necessities.*

The English courted for their assist

ance both by Hyder and the Mahrattas; and exposed to great dan

ger from both.

When the President and Council described themselves as on the brink of a war, the circumstances to which they alluded were these. In the second article of the treaty which was concluded with Hyder Ali, in 1769, it was agreed; "That in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out;" and the party in aid of whom the troops were employed, was to afford them maintenance at a rate which was mutually determined. This was a con→

*See Rous's Appendix, No. 17, passim.

any

1770.

dition so highly esteemed by Hyder, that of an accommodation with him, on CHAP. IV. other terms, all hopes, at the time of the treaty, were regarded as vain. Within a few weeks Hyder endeavoured to persuade the English of the great advantage which he and they would derive from uniting Janojee Bonsla with them, in a triple league. He also informed them of his intention to recover from Madhoo Row, the Peshwa, certain possessions which that invader had wrested from him two years before; and requested that they would send him a certain number of troops, no matter how small, merely to show to the world the friendship which now happily subsisted between the English and him. The Presidency, pointing out in what manner this, to which the treaty did not bind them, would be an act of unmerited hostility against the Mahrattas, declined compliance with his request.

Early in 1770, the Mahrattas invaded his country; and again he solicited assistance, if it were but a few troops, for the sake of the manifestation on account of which he had requested them before. If a more substantial aid was afforded, he professed his readiness to pay three lacs of rupees. It was not very easy for the English now to find a pretext. They evaded, procrastinated, and withheld rather than refused compliance with his desire.

The Mahrattas reduced Hyder to great difficulties, nay dangers; and seemed resolved to annex his dominions to their spreading conquests. During this period of his distress, in which he was obliged to abandon the open country, and to depend upon his forts, he endeavoured to persuade the English that their own interest was deeply concerned in combining with him against the Mahrattas, who would touch upon their frontier, and present them a formidable neighbourhood, if the barrier which he interposed were broken down.

The Mahrattas, too, very earnestly pressed for the assistance of the English. They had indeed, by weight of superior numbers, driven Hyder from the open country; but the protection of his strong holds enabled him still to hold out, and they saw the time rapidly approaching, when the exhausted state of the country would compel them to retire for want of the means to support their army. The skill, therefore, which enabled the English to subdue the strongest places with a rapidity which to them appeared like magic rather than natural means, they regarded as a most desirable acquisition. To attain this object, they endeavoured to work upon the fears of the Nabob; and in their communication with him threatened to invade the Carnatic, unless the English complied with their desires.

The difficulties on the part of the President and Council were uncommonly Amid the dif

ficulties of the

1770.

to stand neu

tral.

BOOK V. great. They state their view of them in their consultations, on the 30th of April, 1770. Their assistance would enable the Mahrattas indeed to prevail English rulers, over Hyder, but of all events that was, probably, the most alarming; the they resolve Mahrattas would in that case immediately adjoin Carnatic, with such an accumulated power, as would enable them to conquer it whenever they pleased; and what, when they had power to conquer, the Mahrattas would please, nobody acquainted with India entertained any doubt: If they assisted Hyder; that was immediate war with the Mahrattas, accompanied with all its burdens and dangers: It was not clear, that both united could prevail over the Mahrattas; and if they did, the power of Hyder would bring along with it a large share of the dangers to which they would be exposed from the Mahrattas, if sovereigns of Mysore: If they stood neuter, and thereby offended both parties; either Hyder or the Mahrattas, most probably the latter, would prevail; and in that case the victor, whoever he was, would wreak his vengeance on the rulers of Carnatic. Amid these difficulties they conceived it their wisest policy after all to remain neuter; to gain time, and take up arms, only when the extremity could no longer be shunned.

Mahomed Ali eager to form an alliance

rattas.

The views and wishes of the Nabob were exceedingly different. He was bent upon forming an alliance with the Mahrattas. In the first place he had a with the Mah- personal antipathy to Hyder Ali, which in a mind like his was capable of weighing down more respectable motives, and made him express extreme reluctance to join or see the English concur in any thing favourable to Hyder. In the next place the Mahrattas were successful in working upon the short-sighted ambition of the Nabob, with the promise of splendid gifts of territory, which, if they had the power of giving, they would also have the power of resuming at pleasure. But in the third place, he expected, according to the opinion of the President and Council, to place the English government by means of the alliance with the Mahrattas in a state of dependence upon himself; and that was what he valued above all other things. "Once engaged in the war," said they, we are at the Nabob's mercy, for we have no certain means of our own. Enter, we are told, into an engagement with the Mahrattas; engage to assist them in the conquest of the Mysore country, and they will cede to the Nabob the Ghauts, and all the countries dependent on Mysore on this side the Ghauts. If we enter into such a measure, utterly repugnant to every order and every idea that has been suggested to us by our employers, we cannot see any end to the consequences, but utter ruin; we must thenceforth follow the schemes of the Mahrattas and the Nabob, wheresoever they shall please to drag us, be it to

66

place the Nabob on the musnud of Deckan, or to subjugate the whole penin- CHAP. IV. sula."

1771.

Sir John Lindsay adopted completely the views of the Nabob with regard to Sir John Lindthe Mahratta alliance: nor was there any reproach, or exhortation, or threat, Robert Harwhich he spared, to entice or to drive the Presidency into that measure.

say and Sir land, his successor, sup

The ministry, it would appear, became in some degree alarmed at the accounts port the Nabob, and rewhich they received of the contentions which prevailed between the King's mini- proach the Presidency. ster plenipotentiary, and the servants of the Company in India; and they thought of an expedient, which was, to change the person and leave the authority. Sir John Lindsay was recalled, and Sir Robert Harland, with an addition to the marine force, was sent to exercise the same powers in his stead.

Sir Robert arrived at Madras on the 2d of September, 1771. Sir Robert took up the same ideas, and the same passions exactly, which had guided the mind of Sir John Lindsay; and the only difference was, that he was rather more intemperate than his predecessor; and of consequence created rather more animosity in his opponents.

The progress of the Mahrattas had become still more alarming. In the month of November, they were in the possession of the whole of Mysore, excepting the principal forts. They had advanced to the borders of Carnatic; and some straggling parties had made plundering incursions. They openly threatened invasion; and it was expected that about the beginning of January when the crops would be ready, they would enter the country. The Nabob was, or affected to be, in the utmost alarm; and Sir Robert Harland urged the Presidency to accept the terms of the Mahrattas, who bid high for assistance on the one hand, and threatened fire and sword on the other. In this trying situation the Presidency vent the most bitter complaints, at being left by the Court of Directors, totally without instructions.* Nevertheless," although we have not yet," say they, "had any answer from our constituents, to the repeated representations of the embarrassments we labour under for want of their clear and precise instructions with respect to our conduct in the present critical

* "It is with infinite concern the Committee observe that notwithstanding their repeated and earnest representations to the Court of Directors, of the very critical situation of affairs with respect to the Mahrattas and Hyder Ally, which were so fully and clearly explained in order to enable them to give us their sentiments and orders with respect to the conduct they would wish us to observe in so important and interesting a matter, we still find ourselves not only without orders, but without the least intimation of their opinion thereon." Select Consultations, 29th November, 1771; First Report, Committee of Secrecy in 1781, Appendix, No. 21.

1771.

Book V. situation of affairs; yet it is evident from the whole spirit of their orders for some years past, that they look upon the growing power of the Mahrattas with jealousy and apprehension." From this; fror an adoption of the same sentiments; from a regard to the treaty with Hyder, which rather required them to assist than allowed them to join in destroying that sovereign, and from a regard to the opinion of the other Presidencies, they determined not to comply with the exhortations or commands of Sir Robert. They would have thought it adviseable on the other hand to support Hyder as a barrier against the Mahrattas, had not the opposition of the Nabob, supported as he was by the minister of the King, placed it, for want of resources, out of their power. They determined, therefore, to remain neutral; and only to collect a body of troops in some central position, where they might best protect the country in case of an attack, and distress the enemy by cutting off their supplies.

The Mahrat

tas invade

The Mahrattas, notwithstanding their threats, had not, it would appear, any not Carnatic. serious intention of invading Carnatic; for in the month of January, 1772, the Nabob and Sir Robert, finding the Presidency inflexible against their project of alliance, found the means of prevailing upon them to promise a cessation of hostilities till the pleasure of the British King should be known.* The Mahrattas were afraid of provoking the English to join Hyder Ali; and they began now to feel their situation abundantly uneasy. The activity and capacity of that great leader were still able to give them incessant annoyance; and the country was so excessively ravaged and exhausted, that the means of subsisting an army could no longer be found. They became, therefore, abundantly desirous of an acwith Hyder. commodation; and in the beginning of July consented to a peace, for which however, they made Hyder pay very dear, both in territorial and pecuniary sacrifices.†

Make peace

If a judgment may be formed from this instance, the chance for good government in India, if the ministers of the crown were to become, and the East India Company cease to be its organ, would undergo an unfavourable change. The course into which the ministers of the crown would have plunged the nation bears upon it every mark of ignorance and folly; that which was pursued by the East India Company and their servants is eminently characterised by prudence and firmness.

* That they gave money, and gave largely, appears plainly from a letter in Rous's Appendix, p. 952.

+ See First Report, ut supra, p. 28, and Appendix, No. 20, 21, 22, 23; and the Papers published by the Directors in Rous's Appendix, No. 17 and 28.