that he was the best of men, with a countenance of the least promise; and that though his understanding was of the common level, his soul was so truly great, that he performed noble actions with a simplicity which indicated, that he had no suspicion what those actions would have cost any other person than himself.

We have lately had a curious instance of the union of genius, elegance, and vulgarity. In whom? Lord Byron. He raked the cemetery of his ancestors for a skull! he caused it to be mounted in silver; and then, after the manner of the Scandinavians, used it as a cup at banquets and carousals. Quaff,' such was the inscription :

'Quaff, whilst thou canst; another race,
When thou and thine like me are sped,
May rescue thee from earth's embrace,

And rhyme and revel with the dead.'

Heroes, and even statesmen, occasionally exhibit, either in their motives, their sentiments, or their actions, contrasts at once curious and decisive. Who is there, living in the recollection of ancient Greece, but remembers Epaminondas, not only with admiration, but with reverence? Diodorus gives him every virtue; yet his aggression on Arcadia must, I fear, be associated with some of the worst deeds of Sparta.

Who has not admired the patriotism of Timoleon? yet he was guilty of many acts of injustice, and some cruelties, to which we may even apply the ignominious epithet of atrocious.

As to the Athenians, the picture of Parrhasius of Ephesus truly personified them as a combination of

contrasts ;-brave and cowardly; proud and humble; corrupt and honest; elevated and mean. Perhaps Demades may be said to have represented them: for he sailed along, and, in part, directed the popular phrenzy in the pay of Philip; and yet he it was, who reproached him for his levity at the battle of Chæronea.

Lollius, so much celebrated by Horace, was a severe and just judge at Rome; yet a sordid and rapacious governor in the distant provinces. Lucullus, though proud, cruel, and austere in command, was, in private, humane, polite, and compassionate.

Who knows not the political merits of the celebrated French minister, Colbert? As a man, he is described as having been of a stern aspect, of an air gloomy, and of a mien low and dejected. Who could have imagined that one, so characterized, could ever have been an honest encourager of the arts, and, at the same time, the master of many mistresses ?— What a chimera is man!' exclaims Pascal, what a confused chaos! 'what a subject of contradiction! a professed judge of

all things, and yet a feeble worm of the earth! the 'great depository and guardian of truth; and yet a mere 'huddle of uncertainty! the glory and scandal of the < universe.'

CLXXIV.

WHO JUDGE OTHERS BY THEMSELVES.

If we judge mankind, en masse, by ourselves, we shall often err; but if we judge individual man from what we

know of aggregate man, we shall not err so often. To judge all by ourselves is hazardous; frequently unjust; and now and then fatal. The motives of men are compounded differently in all; and we must not disguise, that while some give too much latitude to wrong constructions, others are too apt to deceive themselves by subtleties, half-knowledge, and false refinements. As to our judgments in respect to the dead, beautifully has it been said,' walk lightly over their graves.'

The subject of my chapter reminds me of the father of Tasso. The mind of man,' said that excellent person, in a letter to Tassi, has so many caverns in ' which to hide itself, that it is difficult to discover them all. I measure others by my own; nor am I willing to believe of others that which I am not able to prove ' in myself.'

No method of judging can be more effective in some instances; none more fallacious and delusive in others; hence the custom, which most men adopt in respect to its application, is one prevailing cause why we have so many false judgments and erroneous appreciations. It is not for the good of mankind, that every one should erect a court of judicature in his own mind, as it were, and act therein not only as jury and judge, but as witIf men would take an accurate measure of themselves, there might be great justice in judging others by themselves, in a variety of cases; but they do not.

ness.

Dr. Ferguson says *, and very justly, that no error can be more fatal than to rest our own choice of good qua

*Inst. p. 169. 3rd Ed.

lities on the supposition, that we are to meet with such qualities in other men; and he extends the remark by observing, that it is an equal error to suppose, that a want of merit in our fellow-creatures can justify us in dispensing with that justice and liberality of conduct, which all men ought to maintain.

Herodotus makes a shrewd remark :- This I know,' says he, speaking of the Argians and Spartans*, that if all men were to bring their domestic disgraces together, for the purpose of exchanging with their neigh'bours, they would no sooner have inspected those of

others, than they would all, most willingly, take back 'their own.' This is doubtful; but if applied to personal foibles, it may, perhaps, be esteemed, for the most part, correct. But if it is correct, how can the parties be fit judges of other persons? Dugald Stewart is, nevertheless, correct in asserting, that it is only by re'tiring into ourselves that we can obtain a key to the 'characters of others; and it is only by observing and comparing the characters of others, that we can thoroughly understand and appreciate our own.'

This is, certainly, the only way: all I contend for is, that men, for the most part, do not do this with accuracy. They mistake themselves, as often as they mistake others. And here we may remember with advantage a passage in Pascal's discourse on the Misery of Man:

- All our endeavours after greatness,' says that excellent person, proceed from nothing but a desire of 'being surrounded by a multitude of persons and affairs,

* Lib. vii.

.

· that may

hinder us from looking into ourselves, which is a view none of us can bear.' This is true; we cannot bear such a depth of insight: hence the justice of Plato's observation *, that every one being at war with himself; the greatest, first, and best victory he can obtain, is that which he gains over himself.

It frequently happens that none are so ignorant of themselves as those who boast, inordinately, of selfknowledge. Few knew mankind better than Johnson; yet how little even Johnson knew of himself, we may, in no small measure, judge by what he said of himself:'No man knows the rules of true politeness better than 'I do; and no man more attentively practises them.' Could an Indian of Massachusetts have made a greater mistake? If a man like Johnson could be thus selfignorant, what right have we to expect the general mass of mankind to be better informed?

CLXXV.

WHO JUDGE MEN BY THEIR COUNTENANCES.

I.

If we lay our hand upon the frame of a violoncello, we can distinguish the manner in which it vibrates, as to gravity or acuteness, without exercising the faculties either of hearing or seeing. We recognize by the touch.

By geometry we acquire the art of measuring surfaces, and finding the contents of all figures: by means

* De Legibus.