< and did not consider, nor indeed know, the whole 'system of the queen's measures.'

Most men judge, and therefore argue, after a similar manner. They stand, as it were, under one of the minor buttresses of a great building; and, with all the solemnity of oracles, insist that the architect has consulted neither taste, durability, nor proportion. Wherefore?-Because the small buttress, under which they stand, exhibits some slight symptoms of disproportion and decay. Man, however, loves knowledge;

'And the beams of truth

More welcome touch his understanding's eye,
Than all the blandishments of sound his ear,
Than all of taste his tongue.'-Akenside.

Others are

That is, some men love true knowledge. so warped by prejudice, interest, or enthusiasm, that they shut their eyes and ears so closely, so absolutely, and with such entire determination, that if we attempt to open either, they are almost ready to cast us on the earth. Hence the difficulty they have in seeing the propriety of any thing. They scarcely know the difference between pleasure and happiness. They cannot appreciate wisdom even from learned, much less unlearned, lips; and finding obstructions even in discriminating virtue from vice, or two mixed lines from two parallel ones, they remind us, every now and then, of Pope's opinion of lexicographers, whom he would allow to know the meaning of two single words, but not of two words put together. And here we may again resort to our masters,—the noblest we have!—the poets.

One part, one little part, they dimly scan

Through the dark medium of life's feverish dream; Yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan,

If but that little part incongruous seem.'

Beattie, Minstrel.

So impatient, are they in their judgments! To see things on one side only is the characteristic of the multitude; to comprehend in one view all parts of a subject, or of an object, being the fortunate characteristic of a few,—a very few! The former measure heights as ants measure a pyramid; and gauge depths as guillemots sound the ocean. In all their appreciations, too, they seize the wrong side of the tapestry.

We may sometimes illustrate arguments by references to subjects of natural philosophy. The refraction of the atmosphere, for instance, causes the sun, moon, planets, satellites, and fixed stars, to appear more elevated above the horizon than they really are: we do not see them in their true places. And is it not well known to astronomers, that what are called fixed stars become less and less the more they are attempted to be magnified? When we know not the design of an agent, can we strictly decide on the use of his action? and how can we appreciate for good or for evil, unless we know the extent of men's hopes and fears, and the thousand and one circumstances by which they are surrounded, connected, excited, or restrained? It is impossible! We can only assert, we know-something!

XCVI.

WHO APPRECIATE ACCORDING TO THEIR MENTAL

ANALOGIES.

JOHNSON called Sir Robert Walpole a fixed star; Chatham a meteor. The judgment is applicable to neither.

We appreciate, when we appreciate honestly, according to the analogy, or the want of analogy, which exists between our minds and those of the persons and things that we criticise. This is the cause why Heinsius preferred Lucan to Virgil; why Malherbe valued the latter poet more than Statius; why Scaliger preferred him to Homer; and why the same critic celebrated Juvenal at the expense of Horace. This is the cause why Longinus had so little esteem for Euripides; why La Harpe expressed a contempt for Milton; and why Johnson disclaimed the 'Fleece,' and disregarded Gray.

This is the cause that one order of mind prefers Æschylus, another Sophocles, another Euripides, another Anacreon, Catullus, Petronius, and Secundus; another Plutarch, another Epictetus, another Cæsar's Commentaries, another Bacon, and another Bourdaloue, Massillon, Tillotson, and Barrow. This, too, is one great cause why men possess various learning, and are yet devoid of taste; and why some possess both, and are yet deficient in the more sublime attributes of genius.

All manners take a tincture from our own;

Or some discoloured through our passions shown;

Or fancy's beam enlarges, multiplies,

Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes *.'

Men, for the most part, are more disposed to be dazzled by splendour and brilliancy than to be charmed with qualities that adorn, fructify, and humanize the heart. In fact, as some eyes are so defective, that they never enable their possessors to appreciate with correctness either form, texture, or colour, how shall they appreciate enlarged combinations of all?

XCVII.

WHO JUDGE MEN LESS CRITICALLY THAN MAN.

WE may instance Adam Smith. The portrait shall, however, be drawn by a friend who knew him, with precision.

'The enlarged views of human affairs, on which his ⚫ mind habitually dwelt, left him neither time nor inclination to study in detail the uninteresting peculiarities of ordinary characters; and accordingly, though intimately acquainted with the capacities of the intellect and the workings of the heart, and accustomed in 'his theories to remark, with the most delicate hand, the nicest shades, both of genius and of the passions; yet, in judging of individuals, it sometimes happened 'that his estimates were in a surprising degree wide of 'the truth t.' It is, in fact, more easy to know mankind in general, than it is to get at the characters of some men in particular.

The portrait above drawn is strictly characteristic of many persons, bred and vegetating in a college. Let us turn to what has been said of Dr. Parr.

6

Though possessing the wonderful power of reading ' a character at a glance, yet when his own prejudices, or the artful insinuations of others, interposed, he very ' often misjudged men strangely. He sometimes with'drew his confidence from those who had not ceased to ' deserve it, and bestowed it upon those who were not worthy to receive it. He was sometimes the dupe of 'the ill-designing, and sometimes the unconscious in'strument of promoting the ends of the evil-minded.'

This was certainly the truth; yet who ever lived that considered himself more infallible in point of penetration than Dr. Parr? If Adam Smith erred in his judgment, he had, at least, the grace of modesty ; whereas Parr,-Mercy, I cry you mercy!

XCVIII.

WHO JUDGE BY RESULTS.

"Natura omnes fecit judices, paucos artifices *.'

THE smallest of causes may disconcert the best concerted of plans; yet most men judge by results. With the vulgar every man is wise, discerning, cowardly, valiant or a fool, pure or a villain, as circumstances

turn out.

'My lord!

Human condition always censures things

Of all the mottoes I ever met with, this one, writ over a 'water-clock at Clene, pleased me best.'-Locke's Letter to Mr. Molineux, Feb. 22, 1696-7.