Wiggenhorn v. Kountz. formation of land is thus imperceptibly made on the shore of a stream, by the force of the water, it belongs to the owner of the land immediately behind it, in accordance with the maxim, de minimis non curat lex. It is said that no other rule can be applied on just principles, for the reason that every proprietor whose land is thus bounded, is subject to loss by the same means which may add to his territory, and as he is without remedy for his loss in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain." In speaking of an avulsion, Washburn R. P. (4th Ed.), Vol. 3, p. 60, says: "Cases sometimes occur where considerable quantities of soil are, by the sudden action of water, taken from the land of one and deposited upon or annexed to the land of another. The difference between avulsion, as the latter process is called, and alluvion, consists in the one being done by imperceptible loss from the land of one, and increment to that of the other, and in the other, its being done suddenly, to an extent which can be ascertained and measured. In the case of avulsion the soil still belongs to the first owner, unless he shall have suffered it to remain in its new position until it cements and coalesces with the soil of the second owner; in which case the property in the soil will be changed and no right to reclaim it remain." If it be conceded, therefore, that the land so formed at the lower end of the island in question was formed suddenly, by washing the soil from the upper end of the island to the lower, the soil would still remain that of the owner of the island, and a person cutting trees on the land so formed would be liable for the same. The plaintiffs in error strenuously contend, in substance, that, as a grant of land on a stream not navigable includes all islands or parts of islands between the shore and the centre thread of the stream, that therefore the land on which the trees grew belonged to the owner of the mainland on the river adjacent to such islands. Wiggenhorn v. Kountz. There is no doubt of the rule that grants of land bounded upon a river not navigable carry with them the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the centre of the stream, unless the terms of the grant clearly denote the intention to stop at the edge or margin of the river, the rule of the common law being that proprietors of land adjoining public rivers not affected by the flow of the tide own the soil ad filum aquæ. 3d Kent's Commentaries, 427. In Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 4 Pick., 273, the supreme court of Massachusetts say: "The doctrine of alluvion and its consequences seems to be very clearly settled. That which is formed by gradual accretion belongs to the owner of the soil to which it adheres. The land which may be separated from a man's farm by a sudden change of the bed of the river may be reclained by him who lost it. Islands formed in the river, if altogether on one side of the dividing line, the filum aquæ, belong to him who owns the bank on that side: if formed in the middle of the river, they are appropriated to the owners on each side, not in common, but in severalty, according to their original dividing line, the filum aquæ, as it is where the waters begin to divide. Such is the civil law, and the justice of this appropriation cannot be questioned. If the filum aquæ divide itself, and one part take the east and the other the west, and leave an island in the middle between both fila, the one-half will belong to the one lord and the other to the other." In Trustees, etc., v. Dickinson, 9 Cush., 548-9, it is said: "In the case just now supposed, of an island arising in the middle of the river, it is divided by that line which was the thread of the river immediately before the rise of the island. But that line must thenceforth cease to be the thread of the river, or filum aquæ, because the space it occupied has ceased to be covered with water. But, by the fact of an island being formed in the middle of the river, two streams are necessarily formed by the original river dividing it into two branches; the island itself hav Wiggenhorn v. Kountz. ing become solid land, forms itself a bank of the new stream on the one side and the old bank on the main shore forms the other. And the same rule applies on the other side of the island. There must, then, be a filum aquæ to each of these streams, whilst the old filum aquæ is obliterated to the extent to which land has taken the place of water. But this island, having all the characteristics of land, may soon be divided and subdivided, by conveyances and descents, and all the modes of transmission of property known to the law, and thus become the property of different owners. Now suppose another island is formed in one of these branches, between the first island and the original main shore. It seems to us that it must be divided upon the same principle as the first; but, in doing it, it will be necessary to assume as the filum aquæ the middle line between the first island and the original river bank on that side." Where the main-land and an island have been separately surveyed and sold by the government to different parties, the grantees of the main-land do not by such grant acquire the island. In such case, the grant to each being separate and distinct, neither can claim beyond the calls of his entry and patent. The rule is, that where there is a clear reservation of islands in a grant of main-land adjacent to a river, either expressly or by necessary implication, such islands do not pass to the grantee, and the filum aquæ which bounds the grant is the centre thread between the shore and the island. In such cases, two fila aquæ are established, one on each side of the island. Stolp v. Hoyt, 44 Ill., 223. Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush., 544. People v. Canal Appraisers, 13 Wend., 355. Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo., 209. In the case under consideration, it is clearly shown that there is a well-defined channel of the river on each side, between the main-land and the island. The grant of the main-land, therefore, would, at the most, merely extend to Dixon County v. Halstead. the centre thread of the stream between the shore and the island, so that in no event could an owner of the main-land claim an interest in the island. Some objection is made that the evidence is not sufficient to justify a verdict against Clossen. There is but little doubt that Mr. Wiggenhorn was the party really benefited by the cutting of the trees, and apparently he should be liable for the damages resulting therefrom. This question, however, cannot be determined in this action, as the motion for a new trial is joint. There is no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COBB J., concurred. REESE, CH. J., having been of counsel in the subjectmatter of the suit, did not sit. DIXON COUNTY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. E. E. HAL STEAD, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. 2. UNITED STATES BONDS. United States bonds are not i Taxes: TION. : PURCHASE FOR PURPOSE OF EVADING TAXA Where a private banker, about a month before the time fixed by law for the assessment of property, converted his assets into United States bonds, Held, That if the change in the character of the funds was merely temporary-the object being to escape taxation-that such assets would be liable to be taxed, 23 697 57 679 3. Dixon County v. Halstead. and that the question of the bona fides of the transaction was one of fact for the jury to determine. Jones v. Seward Co., 5 Neb., 561. : ASSESSMENT: EQUALIZATION. A private banker, in returning a list of his property to the assessor, claimed as exempt from taxation certain United States bonds, giving their numbers and denomination, to which the assessor made no objection at the time, but after the 1st day of June of that year added the value of said bonds to the assessment list of said bank, and called the attention of the board of equalization to the fact. Notice was thereupon served on the bank, which appeared and contested the right to increase said assessment. Evidence was taken for and against said claim, and the increase in the assessment ordered by said board, which order was reversed by the district court. Held, That the charge made by the assessor was in the nature of a complaint, and made by a competent party, and that evidence was properly received in support of the complaint, but that the evidence did not warrant the order of the board of equalization. : ASSESSMENT. Where an assessment has been duly made and returned, the property owner may rest securely upon such assessment unless a complaint is filed against him before the board of equalization, and evidence given in support of the complaint tending to show that his assessment should be increased. ERROR to the district court for Dixon county. Tried below before CRAWFORD, J. W. F. Norris an 1 J. J. McAllister, for plaintiff in error. W. E. Gantt, for defendant in error, cited: Jones v. Seward County, 5 Neb., 561. Lynam v. Anderson, 9 Id., 376. Sumner & Co. v. Colfax County, 14 Id., 524. MAXWELL, J. In May, 1886, the defendant returned to the assessor of Ponca, Dixon county, "The amount of bonds and stocks of every kind, state and county warrants, and other municipal securities, and shares of capital stock of joint stock, or other companies or corporations held as an in |