Martin v. State. on such stipulation. We find also that Dailey was absent. If this was a special meeting it certainly was necessary to notify him of the proposed meeting, and such notice should appear on the face of the record. The case does not differ materially in that respect from People v. Peters, 4 Neb., 254; Russel v. State, 13 Neb., 70. At common law, where a public duty is confided to several persons, it may be performed by a majority of them; but all must meet or confer or have notice of the meeting. Parrott v. Knickerbocker, etc., Co., 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.), 234. 38 How., 508. Plymouth v. Plymouth County, 16 Gray, 341. Schenck v. Peay, 1 Woolw., 175. People v. Nostrand, 46 N. Y. (1 Sick.), 375. Queen v. Wake, 8 Ell. & Bl., 384. People v. Coghill, 47 Cal., 361. North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Swepson, 71 N. C., 350. Matter of Gardner, 41 How. Pr., 255. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts tending to show that the mayor was present. It is conceded in the majority opinion that his presence was necessary. I have carefully examined the stipulation of facts, but have failed to find anything from which it could be inferred that the mayor was present. It does appear that councilman Burks introduced the resolution, and on motion of councilman Burks the resolution was adopted, the votes for and against being set out, but the name of the mayor, or any one presiding, does not appear. Nor in fact does it appear that there was a presiding officer, which leads the writer to infer that eleven of the councilmen simply met together, without being in lawful session. In revoking a license the action of both the mayor and council is required. The act of revocation is that of two agents, one the city council, and the other the mayor, and the rule is well established that where an authority is given to two or more agents to do an act, the act is valid only when all of them concur in doing it; for the authority is strictly construed, and the power is joint and not several. Story on Agency, § 42. Inhab. of Parrish in Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick., 232. Damon v. Inhab. of Granby, 2 Pick., 345. State v. McMillen. Kupfer v. Inhab. of South Parrish in Augusta, 12 Mass., 185. Low v. Perkins, 10 Vt., 532. Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy M'f'g Co., 12 N. H., 226. Woolsly v. Tompkins, 23 Wend., 324. Johnston v. Bingham, 9 Watts & Serg., 56. Heard v. March, 12 Cush., 580. Cross r. The United States, 24 Bos. Law Rep., 224. Rollins v. Phelps, 5 Minn., 463. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilcox, 57 Ill., 180. This revocation was sought to be accomplished by a resolution. This would not seem to be sufficient. A license is granted by an ordinance, and it would seem to be necessary to revoke it in the same way. The mayor and city council constitute the legislature of a city, and, within the limits prescribed by law, may pass ordinances and regulate the affairs of the city. Suppose the legislature of the state should pass a resolution reciting certain facts, and declaring that thereby some law should be repealed. Would such a resolution, upon its passage, even if signed by the governor, have the effect to repeal the law? No one will so contend, nor does the passage of a resolution by a city council have the effect to repeal an ordinance. 23 385 31 708 23 385 36 354 THE STATE, EX REL. DE FORREST RICHARDS, V. HIRAM The Elections: RESIDENCE AS A QUALIFICATION FOR OFFICE. 23 385 52 785 State v. McMillen, ORIGINAL action in nature of quo warranto. Thurston & Hall, for relator, cited: State v. Murray, 28 Wis., 96. State v. Trumpf, 50 Id., 111. Privett v. Bickford, 26 Kan., 52. A. Bartow (0. P. Mason and Charles E. Magoon with him), for respondent, cited: State v. Smith, 14 Wis., 539. COBB, J. This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto by De Forrest Richards, who claims to be the county treasurer of Dawes county, by an election held November 3, 1885, against Hiram G. McMillen, incumbent, by virtue of an election first held on the organization of said county, June 27, 1885. There is no question made in the pleadings or papers, and it may be stated as admitted by the parties, that the relator was a candidate for county treasurer at the annual election of 1885; that he received the highest number of votes cast for that office; that a certificate of election was duly delivered to him; that he gave a sufficient bond as county treasurer, which was approved by the county commissioners; and that he took the necessary oath of office and demanded the records, papers, and other property of the office, of incumbent, which were refused. It is also admitted that the respondent was lawfully elected to the office at the first election, held on the organization of the county, June 27, 1885; that he was regularly qualified, and entitled to hold the office until the next general election for the same office to be held in other counties, as provided by law then in force, and until his successor should be duly elected and qualified. His tenure was fixed by authority of the provisions of Sec. 14 of Art. II., Chap. 17, Compiled Statutes, that: "All county and precinct State v. McMillen. officers elected at the first election as herein provided shall continue to hold their respective offices until the next general election held for the same offices in other counties, as provided by the election law in force at that time, and until their successors are elected and qualified." The salient question presented is, that of the legal qualification of the relator as a citizen and elector at the date of his said election. Was he competent to be elected to the office, having six months' consecutive residence in this state, within the meaning of the election laws? Sec. 64, Chap. 26, of the election law, provides: "The election of any person to any public office, the location or relocation of a county seat, or any proposition submitted to a vote of the people, may be contested. First. For malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of the judges of election in any precinct, township, or ward, or of any board of canvassers, or any member of either board, sufficient to change the result. Second. When the incumbent was not eligible to the office at the time of the election," etc. Sec. 1 of Art. VII. of the constitution of this state, provides that: "Every male person of the age of twenty-one years, or upwards, belonging to either of the following classes, who shall have resided in this state six months, and in the county, precinct, or ward for the term provided by law, shall be an elector. First. Citizens of the United States," etc. The relator in this proceeding now becomes the incumbent, under the second provision of Sec. 64, above quoted, and it is assumed, from the words of the statute, that the grounds of contest there provided were intended to be sufficient grounds of removal, if apparent on evidence, and that the relator therefore must have resided in this state six months consecutively at the time of the election, to have been eligible to the office. It is established from evidence that the relator was for State v. McMillen, merly a resident of the state of Alabama; that in the last week of May, 1885, he left that state with his family, with the intention of making a permanent residence elsewhere, if he formed a partnership in business with certain parties in Wyoming territory, which was then contemplated. This intention he made known to others prior, and subsequent, to leaving Alabama. Upon his arrival at or near Cheyenne, in Wyoming territory, and meeting the parties mentioned, he formed the contemplated partnership with them and settled in the county of Dawes, Nebraska, as a business residence. In pursuance of this intention he came into Dawes county June 2, 1885, and going thence to Spearfish, in the territory of Dakota, on a temporary visit. to his mother, left his family there, and returned to Dawes county for the purpose of completing his business arrangements, where, with the exception of a trip of two weeks to Chicago for supplies for his business, he remained till August 1st, following, on which day he had erected a house in the new town of Chadron, and on August 2d opened and entered on his present business of banking, under the firm of Richards Brothers & Brown, in which, it is believed, he has continued hitherto. His family, consisting of his wife and two children, remained in Dakota at his mother's until September following, when they joined him at Chadron, remaining there one or two months, when they went thence back to her mother's, in Alabama, to spend the winter. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the relator was an elector, a qualified voter, or a citizen, within the meaning of the laws of this state, at the date of his election. His residence was continuous for five months only, at that date, and the place where his family then sojourned was at their former residence in Alabama. And granting that his domicile, for legal purposes, was continuous in Dawes county from June 2, 1885, and that his family's absence was temporary and for transient purposes, he had then |