vided it for him. This is his grand characteristical feature, as a moral being. His being capable of pleasure from having done one thing, and of remose from having done the contrary, is that, which establishes his rank, and raises him above other beings, who have, confessedly, no moral nature. Having premised this, as a definition of the term moral, I proceed to the further consideration of the subject.

To act morally, a man must have a perception of moral truth; and, having come to a view of it, must chuse or refuse it. The discovery of the object will be referred to the understanding, as the office of that faculty. To approve, or disapprove, to chuse or reject, will be reckoned the prov ince of the will. And here lies the right or wrong, the praise or blame, involved in the case. We never think of applauding a man, merely for seeing his duty, for perceiving what he ought to do; neither do we reproach, or condemn him, merely for his ignorance of what is proper, or for his not seeing, clearly, how he ought to behave. But, after his understanding is informed, if we see him chuse the good and refuse the evil, for this we give him praise, and so, vice versa. It is the state and the operations of his will, therefore, that must determine how far he is worthy of commendation. And this agrees with our text, which declares, "If there be first a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath,

and not ac

cording to that he hath not.”

The apostle

was treating upon the duty of alms-giving, of sending relief to indigent, afflicted, breth ren. That there is moral beauty and fitness in such actions, in such a disinterested, liberal conduct, he proves from the example of the compassionate Jesus, who, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor, that we, through his poverty, might be rich. But though he enjoins the bestowment of worldly substance, as a demand, in the name of Christ, from the naked and hungry; yet he does not make the virtue of the deed, nor the wickedness of the neglect, consist in the abundance, or scantiness, of the offering; but in the temper of the mind, or state of the will. He does not tell them, that they cannot be approved of God, unless they actually make out a gift to such or such an amount, and put it into the hands of some necessitous person. If they possess and can spare but little, that little is not the rate, by which their charity will be measured. the willing mind, that gives the subject his inoral stamp. If the will is in favour of right things, there is moral rectitude; if it is against them, there is moral guilt, or ill desert. Moral agency, we see, therefore, consists in exercises of will. But it will not hence follow, that all beings, possessed of will, are, therefore, moral agents. It is the will's being employed about moral objects, that renders it a moral exercise. The brute has a will in common with a man; but as he has no discernment of moral objects, his will

It is

cannot be exercised about them, and consequently there is no morality in it. All intelligences, who have the faculty of distinguishing right from wrong, of discerning rules of conduct, and knowing when they are conformed to, and when violated, together with the power of chusing or refusing, are moral agents. The actings of the mind towards things, which are eligible or not, on account of their moral qualities, as they are exercises of will, do bespeak the subject a moral being. Having voluntary exercises, upon subjects of a moral nature, is the only thing, of which I can possibly con-ceive, as giving one a right to be denominat-ed a moral agent. This is, certainly, as much as the terms imply.. The universal tenour

and style of the scriptures is in harmony with this idea. In these sacred writings God addresses mankind, as moral agents, and, as such, enforces moral obligation upon them. And how does he do it? By exhi biting a clear representation of truth, or mor-al objects in general, and then exhorting to a right choice. "I call heaven and earth to record against you this day," said Moses, " that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing therefore, choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." If scripture truth is calculated to move us to choose the good it offers, and this be the evident drift and design of the whole word of God, does it not strongly convey the idea, that our moral agency consists in choosing.

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the moral objects, which present themselves before us? Surely God would not teach us that, which is not moral, nor make any solemn addresses to us concerning it, either to lead us to it, or to withdraw us from it: neither would he omit to enjoin any thing of moral obligation, nor to warn us against any thing morally wrong. But all divine injunc tions and prohibitions are fulfilled, when we choose the good and refuse the evil. This is evidence, that moral agency consists in the choice of moral objects, and in nothing else.But says the objector

That must be a free choice, for which the subject is to be held accountable, and not the child of an eternal, uncontrolable necessity, which leaves him no room or chance, to act otherwise than he does.

So, then, it seems, it is not enough for a man to chuse God for his portion, but this choice must be free, or it can turn to no good account. And it is not enough to make one a sinner and expose him to the wrath to come, that he chooses a life of impiety and rebellion against God, unless this choice also be free. What then have we now to do, but to find out the difference there is be tween a choice, that is free, and one that is not? or to learn the proper distinction between will and free will? My hearers, I hope, will not think ill of me, if I recoil from this task, as too arduous to be undertaken. I would as soon attempt to point out a differ ence between four and twice two.

After

stating a choice, or mere exercise of will, and then comparing it with an act of free will, I should have no terms by which to show how the one is unlike the other. I know that, for a long time, a very free use has been made of the term liberty, in relation to moral exercises, as if there were such a thing, as moral liberty, in distinction from moral re straint. Accordingly, nothing is more common, than to speak of men, in regard to their moral exercises, as free agents. As these terms have been introduced and established by the most respectable authorities, it would be reckoned presumptuous, no doubt, to speak against them, as useless, impertinent, and unmeaning. But they should not be

allowed to hinder our search after truth. Liberty, applied to natural things, is very determinate and intelligible. No one can mistake its meaning. When a man is said to have liberty to walk abroad, it is understood, that he is not in prison, or under any forcible confinement. A liberty to act is, generally, understood to mean an exemption from all outward restraint, or limita tion; so that a person is not prevented acting out the whole of his inclination, or desire. If he has formed a resolution, and nothing without comes in his way to hinder his executing it, then he may be said to be free. Will any man say he is not free, so long as he is able to do whatever he wills? that is, meets with no insurmountable obsta cles to the fulfilment of his purposes ? Men