People ex rel. v. Brown. (Dunn, J.)....... People v. Carr. (Craig, C. J.)....... PAGE. 186 329 People ex rel. v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. (Cooke, J.)... 407 People, for use, etc. v. May. (Cartwright, J.) 332 People ex rel. v. New York Central R. R. (Cartwright, J.).. 118 People ex rel. v. Noonan. (Cooke, J.)... 430 People ex rel. v. O'Daniel. (Cartwright, J.) 338 People ex rel. v. Pam. (Farmer, J.).. 181 People v. Starks. (Farmer, J.).. 157 People ex rel. v. Wabash R. R. (Carter, J.). 92 People ex rel. v. Wanmer. (Cartwright, J.) 460 Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. ads. Sholl Bros. (Craig, C. J.)... 267 Roeschlein ads. Feingold. (Craig, C. J.). Royal Colliery Co. v. Alwart Bros. Coal Co. (Dunn, J.). 388 S PAGE. Salisbury ads. Koeller. (Carter, J.).... Scholer v. City of Chicago. (Craig, C. J.) Sesti ads. Cohn. (Dunn, J.). . . . . . Shapiro v. City of Chicago. (Cooke, J.). Sholl Bros. v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. (Craig, C. J.)..... 267 230 544 78 533 VanMeter v. Malchef. (Craig, C. J.)....... 451 490 W Wabash R. R. ads. People ex rel. (Carter, J.). Wicks Stone Co. v. Dickason. (Farmer, J.). Wood v. Wood. (Dunn, J.)... Y Yeadon v. Clark. (Cartwright, J.). 92 563 460 416 590 II 164 424 CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. (No. 11064.) JOHN J. WOLF et al. Appellees, vs. Helen LawrencE et al. Appellants. Opinion filed December 21, 1916. 1. CONTRACTS—when oral contract is merged into the written agreement. Where a deed is executed and delivered and at the same time written agreements are entered into declaring the rights and obligations of the parties with reference to the transfer, all previous conversations and oral agreements concerning the subject matter of the transaction are merged in the written agreements. 2. FRAUD-fraud will not be presumed but must be proved as a fact. While fraud may be proved by circumstances without direct and positive evidence, still it will not be presumed but must be proved as a fact by such clear and convincing evidence as leaves the mind well satisfied that the allegations of fraud are true. 3. SAME motive of party charged with fraud is presumed to be honest. If the motives and designs of a party charged with fraud may be traced to an honest and legitimate source equally as well as to a corrupt one, the honest source must be preferred. 4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—when parol contract for conveyance will not be specifically enforced. A parol contract for the conveyance of real estate will not be specifically enforced unless it is clear, certain and unequivocal in its terms, and the acts claimed as part performance, including the taking of possession, have been done under the contract itself for the sole purpose of performing it. 5. SAME-specific performance cannot be demanded as a matter of right. Specific performance cannot be demanded as a matter of right but rests in the sound discretion of the court, to be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and if the contract is unreasonable or unjust it will not be enforced. 6. SAME-court may withhold specific performance unless complainant submits to such terms as court deems just. It is within the discretion of a court of equity to withhold specific performance unless the complainant will elect to submit to such terms and conditions in connection with the subject matter of the contract as the court may deem just and equitable. 7. SAME-court may order that deeds be executed by the parties, or, upon refusal, by a master in chancery. A court of equity having acquired jurisdiction to decree specific performance of a contract will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of giving relief and settling the whole matter and may order that the parties execute the deeds, and if they refuse, that the deeds be executed by a master in chancery. COOKE and DUNCAN, JJ., dissenting. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS G. WINDES, Judge, presiding. George P. MERRICK, and CLINTON MERRICK, for appellants. BEAUREGARD F. MOSELEY, for appellees. Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This was a bill filed in the circuit court of Cook county for relief in a certain transaction involving a contract for warranty deed for a house and lot in Chicago, a deed to a farm in Michigan and an alleged oral contract concerning the sale of said farm and disposition of the proceeds thereof. Appellant John P. Casey filed a cross-bill. After the pleadings were settled the cause was referred to a master in chancery, and his report was approved by the trial court over the objections of appellants and a decree entered dismissing the cross-bill and finding in favor of appellees, the costs, including master's and stenographer's fees, being adjudged against appellant Casey. Appellee Mary K. Wolf, on October 31, 1914, was the owner of eighty acres of farm land in Midland county, Michigan. John P. Casey was the owner of a house and lot in Grove avenue, Chicago. Mrs. Wolf's husband was a bricklayer by trade, and Casey had been in the real estate business but was desirous of closing out his interests in that line and devoting his whole time to the banking business. In the latter part of October, 1914, he called on the Wolfs with reference to selling to them this house and lot. After various conferences an agreement for warranty deed was drawn up. This agreement recites that it is made by Helen Lawrence, spinster, party of the first part, and John J. Wolf and Mary K. Wolf, his wife, party of the second part; that if the second parties will make the payments and perform the covenants mentioned, the first party will convey in fee simple the house and lot in question for $2500; that the second parties agree to pay the first party in manner following: $15 cash in hand, receipt acknowledged, and $1285 in monthly payments of $15, or as much more as second parties see fit, beginning December 1, 1914; second parties to assume a trust deed of $1200, and also to pay interest on the amount from time to time remaining unpaid; when $1300 of the purchase price is paid, also all interest, etc., first party is to deliver deed, subject to said $1200 trust deed. The contract also contains the usual clause that upon the failure to make payments it shall be forfeited and determined at the option of the first party, and she may retain the payments made in full satisfaction of all damages, etc. This agreement was signed by John P. Casey and both the Wolfs, and the name of Helen Lawrence was also signed to it. The evidence is that Helen Lawrence had been in Casey's employment in a clerical capacity, and that he had placed the title to this and other tracts of land in her name as a convenience in making trades. We understand from |