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case the form of your verdict may be, to-wit: 'We, the jury, find that the premises of the following named objectors is assessed for more than each will be specially benefited, and we further find that each should be assessed for the amount set opposite each respective name, viz.: Names, amount it should be assessed.'"

It was not error to refuse this instruction. There are no assessments against individuals, and the verdict should not be for certain amounts set opposite the names of owners but for certain amounts against the respective tracts. The jury were properly instructed as to the form of their verdict by other instructions.

The appellants asked an instruction in regard to the view of the premises which the jury had during the trial, the last sentence of which was as follows: "The purpose of permitting you to inspect the territory subject to assessment was primarily that you might have some knowledge of the character of the land assessed and then to hear the further testimony of witnesses as to how much, if at all, it will be specially benefited immediately upon the completion of said improvement." The court modified the instruction by striking out the words, “immediately upon the completion of the improvement." The object of the instruction was to advise the jury as to the purpose of the view and the effect which they should give it. The jury had already been informed in previous instructions as to the time with reference to which the benefits should be assessed, and it was therefore not error for the court to eliminate this clause from the instruction.

The judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair county will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

(No. 11049.)

CLARA G. BARTHOLOW et al. Appellants, vs. Lillian E. DAVIES, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916-Rehearing denied Feb. 9, 1917.

I. ADOPTION-the right of adoption is statutory in its origin. The adoption of one person by another was unknown to the common law, and the right of such adoption is entirely statutory in its origin.

2. SAME the statute authorizes the adoption of such children, only, as are minors. Although in the statute on adoption the word "minors" does not occur, it is manifest that the intention of the legislature was to authorize the adoption of such children, only, as are minors, and nowhere in subsequent legislation is a purpose apparent to depart from, enlarge or restrict this intention.

3. SAME when word “child” ordinarily means a minor. While the meaning of the word "child," so far as age is concerned, depends upon the context, yet when the word is used generally and without reference to the relation of parent and child it will ordinarily be held to refer only to a person of immature years.

4. SAME-order of county court ordering adoption of an adult is void. Where a petition for adoption shows on its face that the person proposed to be adopted is an adult the county court has no jurisdiction to make any order on the petition, and the order of adoption, if made, is void and subject to attack by any person at any time; nor, in such case, does the doctrine of laches have any application.

5. PRACTICE what action is unnecessary after court sustains an objection to offered evidence. Where the court sustains an objection to a material question put to a witness, and, after counsel has stated what he was offering to prove, announces that no evidence on that subject will be received, it is not necessary, in order to preserve rights depending on the establishing of such proof, to call all the witnesses on the subject and attempt to interrogate each one of them.

6. STATUTES-effect of revision of act upon the construction of the former act. In the revision of statutes neither an alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the later statute will be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former act, and courts will authorize a change of construction only where the intention of the legislature is clear or the language used in the revised act plainly requires it.

DUNCAN, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALDWIN, Judge, presiding.

FREDERICK A. BROWN, and RAYMOND S. PRUITT, for appellants.

OLIVER & MECARTNEY, and JOHN S. BROWN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: James U. Borden, a bachelor ninety-five years old, died intestate on July 11, 1914. A bill in equity was soon after filed by the appellants in the circuit court of Cook county against Lillian E. Davies, which was afterward amended joining a number of other defendants. The amended bill. alleged, in substance, that the complainants and the defendants, except Lillian E. Davies, are the heirs of James U. Borden; that he was of unsound mind continuously for the last fifteen years of his life; that Lillian E. Johnston lived in his home for many years and by cunning devices obtained an ascendancy over his mind in his declining years, and for the purpose of securing his property brought about the filing of a petition by him in the county court of Cook county, on May 28, 1909, while he was of unsound mind, representing that he desired to adopt Lillian E. Johnston, “a female child of about the age of thirty years;" that an order of adoption was entered on such petition; that the said Lillian E. Johnston, in furtherance of her schemes to obtain his property, obtained from him, while he was insane, conveyances of property, both real and personal, to the value of $100,000, the exact amount, nature and description being unknown to the complainants, and that she afterward married and is now known as Lillian E. Davies. The bill describes certain real estate alleged to have been obtained by Mrs. Davies from Borden without consideration while he was of unsound mind, and alleges that she holds the title to

other pieces of property which she purchased with funds obtained from Borden while he was of unsound mind and without consideration; that because of Borden's insanity the order of adoption should be declared void and Mrs. Davies should be ordered to restore to the estate of Borden the property which she obtained from him, and prays that she shall be deemed to hold all of said property in trust for the heirs of Borden, and for a discovery of all the property and money which she obtained from him. Lillian E. Davies answered the bill, denying that the complainants and defendants, or any of them, are heirs of James U. Borden but alleging that she is his only heir by virtue of the order of adoption; that the complainants knew of the adoption proceedings long before the death of Borden and acquiesced therein, and by reason of their delay and laches are not entitled to any relief against them. She denies that Borden was of unsound mind, admits that she lived at his home for many years and that she acquired the title to certain pieces of property described in the bill from Borden, and denies that the conveyances were procured by any arts or fraudulent devices while Borden was of unsound mind or without a valuable consideration. A replication was filed to this answer and the cause came on for a hearing. The complainants offered evidence in regard to the physical and mental condition of Borden about the time when the decree of adoption was entered, to which the defendant objected, upon the ground that the adoption decree is binding on the parties and cannot be collaterally attacked, and the court sustained the objection on that ground. Thereupon, on motion of the defendant's solicitor, the court excluded all the evidence of the witnesses upon the ground that the testimony tended to impeach the decree of the county court in a collateral proceeding and dismissed the bill for want of equity, and the complainants appealed.

It is manifest that if the decree of adoption is valid the complainants would have no right to the relief prayed for

in the bill, because Lillian E. Davies would be the sole heir of James U. Borden and the complainants would have no interest in his estate. It appears from the petition for adoption and the decree that the person proposed to be adopted was thirty years old. The appellants insist that under the statutes of this State the county court had no jurisdiction to enter a decree of adoption of an adult by another person.

The adoption of one person by another was unknown to the common law. The right of such adoption is entirely statutory in its origin. The first statute on the subject in this State was an act of the legislature passed in 1867, entitled "An act to provide for the adoption of minors," (Laws of 1867, p. 133,) which is here set out:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly: That any person desirous of adopting a child, so as to render it capable of inheriting his or her estate, may present a petition to the circuit or county court of his or her residence, setting forth the name, age and sex of such child; and if such person desires the name changed, stating the new name, also the name of the father, or, if he be dead, or has abandoned his family, the mother, and if she be dead, the guardian, if any, and the consent of such father or mother to the act of adoption. And if the child has no father or mother, then the consent of no person shall be necessary to said adoption. It shall be the duty of the court, upon being satisfied of the truth of the facts stated in the petition, and of the fact that such father, mother or guardian has notice of such application, and being further satisfied that such adoption will be to the interest of the child, to make an order declaring said child to be the adopted child of such person, and capable of inheriting his or her estate, and also what shall be the name of such child; and thenceforward the relation between such person and the adopted child shall be, as to their legal rights and liabilities, the same as if the relation of parent and child existed between them, except that

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