is inadequate to provide drainage of the waters from the lands of the district, their powers are not exhausted, notwithstanding they have secured from the land owners the right of way for the ditches. It is, of course, true that the release of the right of way for the outlet originally adopted would not authorize taking or damaging land for an open ditch outlet, but the right to construct the open ditch must be secured by release or condemnation. It is the mandatory duty of the commissioners to provide an outlet of ample capacity for the waters of the district, and the performance of this duty can be compelled by mandamus. (Langan v. Drainage District, supra.) The statute expressly confers authority upon the commissioners to correct errors committed in locating or constructing the ditches, or any of them, if it is found that the system adopted is for any cause inadequate to drain or protect the lands of the district. The bill concedes that the outlet adopted by the commissioners in this case is inadequate and that some other or further provision is required to be made. The power to determine what provision shall be made to correct the error in the original plan is a power that is to be exercised within the discretion of the commissioners, and their exercise of that power will not be controlled by a court of equity unless it clearly appears that it is proposed to exercise it in a fraudulent and oppressive manner. While the bill alleges the construction of an open ditch will be a gross fraud upon and injustice to the appellants, no facts are alleged in this case from which it appears that any such exercise by the commissioners of their powers is proposed, and a court of equity will not, in the absence of fraud or oppression, undertake to determine the relative merits of two proposed systems. That must be left to the lawful determination of the authorities charged with that duty.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(No. 10842.)

THE CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, Appellee, vs. CARL J. VOGEL et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916-Rehearing denied Feb. 7, 1917.

I. PRACTICE-the appellant will not be prejudiced by failure of judge to sign bill of exceptions within required time. If a bill of exceptions is presented to the trial judge in time to be filed within the time allowed by the order of the court, the appellant will not be prejudiced by the failure of the judge to sign the bill until after the time fixed for filing has expired, and if it is signed after the expiration of such time it may be filed at once without the entry of an order nunc pro tunc.

2. SAME signature of the judge to bill of exceptions authorizes the bill to be filed. Where the signature of the judge is attached to a bill of exceptions which has been presented in time the signature must be regarded as authenticating the bill in the manner required by law and authorizing it to be filed, and the act of the judge in signing amounts to a direction to file the bill.

3. SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-engineer's estimate need not contain detailed statement of amount and character of material. It is not essential that the engineer's estimate of the cost of the proposed improvement contain a detailed statement of the amount and character of material that will be necessary to construct the improvement.

4. SAME-engineer's duty is merely to estimate the cost of improvement described. It is not the duty of the engineer, in making the estimate, to determine the character of the material to be used but merely to estimate the cost of the improvement described in the resolution, and he is required only to itemize the estimate to the satisfaction of the board of local improvements.

5. SAME when the estimate is sufficiently itemized. The engineer's estimate is sufficiently itemized, so far as the property owners are concerned, if it is specific enough to give them a general idea of the estimated cost of the substantial component elements of the improvement.

6. SAME-details of the work may be left to the board of local improvements. A substantial compliance with the Local Improvement act is all that is necessary, and the improvement ordinance need not set forth in minute detail every particular of the improvement and every circumstance of the work, as some discretion as to the details must necessarily be left to the board of local improvements.

7. SAME-whether particular work is a local improvement is a question of fact. What is a local improvement is a question of law, but whether the facts in the particular case bring an improvement within the definition so that it may be regarded as a local improvement is a question of fact.

8. SAME whether particular improvement is local must be determined by a consideration of the evidence. Whether a particular improvement is a local one must be determined by a consideration of the evidence as to the nature of the work, the situation of the improvement and the surrounding conditions, and the Supreme Court cannot determine that question if the evidence is not in the bill of exceptions.

9. SAME―when city cannot introduce evidence of benefits from other previous improvements in other parts of the city. On the hearing as to benefits the city cannot introduce evidence to prove that other parts of the city not affected by the improvement in question had been improved in years past and had been benefited an amount equal to or greater than they had been assessed, where the circumstances under which such previous improvements were made and the character of the improvements are not shown.

10. SAME when convenience of travel may be considered. While convenience for public travel cannot be the basis of an assessment for benefits for a paving improvement where the only advantage derived is such as is shared with the general public and is not of special benefit to the property assessed, yet if the additional convenience, by reason of the location of the property or otherwise, gives a special increased value to the property which is a benefit over and above that enjoyed by the public generally, then such convenience may be taken into consideration.

II. SAME when property additions not adjoining the improved street may be assessed. Property additions tributary to but not adjoining the street to be paved, which is the main thoroughfare by which the inhabitants of such property may reach the city, thus giving them a special interest in the street different from that of the general public, are specially benefited by the improvement and may be assessed.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. M. R. SULLIVAN, Judge, presiding.

D. E. KEEFE, JAMES A. WATTS, J. R. MCMURDO, JAMES G. MCHALE, and E. J. VERLIE, for appellants.

THOMAS L. FEKETE, JR., City Attorney, (A. H. Baer, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court:

The city of East St. Louis filed its petition in the circuit court of St. Clair county for an assessment of benefits by reason of a certain street improvement and the ascertainment of just compensation to be made for property taken for or damaged by the improvement. An assessment roll was filed, to which various property owners filed objections. From the judgment confirming the assessment roll some of the objectors have appealed.

A motion has been made by the appellee to expunge the bill of exceptions from the record on the ground that it was not signed, sealed and filed within the time fixed by the order of the court for that purpose.

The cause was tried at the January term, 1916, and by various orders of court the time for filing a bill of exceptions was extended until July 12, 1916, when the last extension expired. The bill of exceptions was presented to the trial judge on July 7, was signed by him on July 31 and was filed in the office of the circuit clerk on the same day. At each extension of time the appellee excepted to the allowance of the extension and objected to the signing of the bill of exceptions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the extensions of time were not properly granted, but it is insisted that the bill of exceptions not having been signed and sealed by the judge and filed by the clerk within the time allowed by the order of court should be stricken from the record. It has been frequently held that if a bill of exceptions is presented to the trial judge at such time that it could be filed within the time provided by the order of the court, the party will not be prejudiced by the neglect or delay of the judge to sign the bill until after the time fixed for that purpose. (Underwood v. Hossack, 40 Ill. 98; Magill v. Brown, 98 id. 235; Hawes

v. People, 129 id. 123; Hall v. Royal Neighbors, 231 id. 185; Hill Co. v. United States Guaranty Co. 250 id. 242; People v. Rosenwald, 266 id. 548; Illinois Improvement and Ballast Co. v. Heinsen, 271 id. 23.) The bill of exceptions was presented to the trial judge, in strict conformity with the order of the court, five days before the expiration of the extension of time. It was retained by the judge without his signature until July 31, when he signed it, and it was immediately filed in the office of the clerk. It could not have been filed sooner, and the appellants could do no more than they had done when they presented the bill of exceptions to the judge within the time fixed by the order of the court.

It seems to be thought that the bill being signed after the expiration of the extension of time, an order to file the same nunc pro tunc was necessary. No such order was required. If the party presenting the bill had complied with the order of the court he had done all that was necessary to entitle him to file the bill. The delay caused by the failure of the judge to sign the bill at once could not prejudice the party. When the signature of the judge was attached to the bill it must be regarded as authenticating it in the manner required by law and authorizing it to be filed. The act of the judge in signing amounted to a direction to file the bill of exceptions, and the bill was properly filed and became a part of the record. In the case of Hall v. Royal Neighbors, supra, the bill of exceptions was stricken from the record. It was signed by the judge seven days before the expiration of the time allowed for that purpose but was not filed until twenty-one days later,-two weeks after the expiration of the time,—and the failure to file it was not due to any neglect or delay of the judge but was the neglect of the party. In Hill Co. v. United States Guaranty Co. supra, on June 15, 1908, the time for filing the bill of exceptions was extended sixty days from June 27. The bill was presented to the judge for signature on June 25, was