nance. (City of Chicago Heights v. Angus, 267 Ill. 628.) There has been no deviation in the decisions from these propositions, but there seems to be some confusion in regard to the question where and how the particulars required for the information of property owners must appear. The view of counsel for the appellee is that the estimate was sufficient under the decision in City of Chicago v. Underwood, 258 Ill. 116, where it was held that the estimate of cost is sufficiently specific if it gives to the property owners a general idea of the estimated cost of the substantial component parts of the improvement. In that case the court distinguished the engineer's estimate of cost from the resolution of the board of local improvements, but it was not held in that case or any other that the property owners are not entitled to be informed of the nature, character and description of the proposed improvement. By the statute the improvement must originate with the board of local improvements, and it is the province of the board to determine the material and the nature, character and kind of the improvement. The purpose of the engineer's estimate is to advise property owners of the probable cost of the improvement originated by the board of local improvements. It has no other purpose, and in the case cited the court said: "It is no part of the estimating engineer's duty to determine the character of material that will be necessary for the improvement, but it is his business merely to estimate the cost of the improvement that is described in the resolution." That is plainly true, because the purpose of the estimate is to advise property owners as to what the improvement will probably cost, itemizing it sufficiently to show, separately, the cost of the substantial component elements. Accordingly it was held, following Hulbert v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 452, Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 217 id. 352, and other cases, that an engineer's estimate of cost is sufficiently specific if it gives property owners a general idea of the cost of the several items of the improve ment. It is not the province of an engineer to determine the nature, character or kind of improvement, but if the resolution fails to furnish such information and the estimate of the engineer supplies the omission and is adopted by the board of local improvements and made a part of the resolution, the end contemplated by the statute is accomplished. The resolution and estimate are to be read together, and, as was said in Ziegler v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 61, by the report of the engineer the property owner is advised of the total estimated cost of the improvement, and by the resolution and the estimate he is advised of the nature and character of the improvement and the kind of materials which will enter into it, with the cost of each item. Having this before him, he may consent to the improvement, object to its suitability or that the cost is too great and will exceed the benefits resulting, or may propose modifications or changes. Unless the kind and character of the improvement, with the material to be used, are shown by the resolution the engineer's estimate must show the same. In any event, it must be so specific as to give the property owner a general idea of the cost of the different elements of the improvement. (Doran v. City of Murphysboro, 225 Ill. 514.) In this case the resolution of the board gave no description whatever of the improvement or of its different parts or of the materials to be used. The resolution was as follows: "That a cast-iron water supply-pipe, with all necessary special castings, and with fire hydrants, valves and brick valve-basins, be constructed and laid in a system of streets, as follows: The east side of Stony Island avenue from East Eighty-sixth street to East Eighty-seventh street; both sides of East Eighty-seventh street from Stony Island avenue to McFarlane avenue; the east side of McFarlane avenue from East Eighty-sixth street to East Eighty-seventh street, and each of the streets, to-wit, East Eighty-sixth street and East Eighty-sixth place from Stony Island ave nue to McFarlane avenue, the estimate of the cost of said improvement as made by the engineer of the board being $12,506." This was followed by the estimate of cost made by the engineer, in which he stated the cost of different parts of the improvement, but neither the resolution nor estimate contained any sufficient description of those parts of the improvement to which objection was made. Under the resolution and estimate, taken together, any kind of four-inch double-nozzle valves, with any kind of six-inch connecting pipes, or any kind of gate valve of the size mentioned, or any size or depth of brick valve-basins, might be supplied in making the improvement. The information required by the statute was not before the property owners in any form at the public hearing, and the court erred in overruling the objections. In making out a prima facie case it was alleged by the appellee that the original assessment roll was lost, and the court permitted to be filed an alleged copy, together with an affidavit of the superintendent of special assessments that the paper was a correct copy of the original roll, and this was objected to. The estimate of the engineer was dated March 11, 1916, which was the date of the passage of the ordinance, and which showed that there could not have been a public hearing on that estimate. To meet the objection the city was permitted to introduce a resolution of the board of local improvements dated February 25, 1916, an estimate dated February 23, 1916, and proceedings fixing March 10, 1916, as the date for a public hearing. It is contended that the court erred in permitting the copy to be filed without proper proof, and also erred in allowing evidence of the resolution with the estimate and order for the hearing, but these questions will not arise in the future and the objections will not be considered. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded. (No. 10905.) THE DECATUR RAILWAY AND LIGHT COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, vs. THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al. Defendants in Error. Opinion filed December 21, 1916-Rehearing denied Feb. 8, 1917. 1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION—what is principal consideration to distinguish employee from independent contractor. The right to control the manner of doing the work is the principal consideration which determines whether the worker is an employee or an independent contractor. 2. SAME what does not show that injured person was an independent contractor. The fact that a day laborer employed by a street railway company and belonging to its hospital association makes an oral contract with the company's engineer to unload coal at the plant at five cents a ton, using the company's tools but hiring his own help, does not show that he was an independent contractor and not an employee, where his work was to be done under the direction of the head fireman and he was subject to discharge without notice, and where the company continued to retain his hospital dues from his pay, furnished free medical services and gave him a pass, which was a favor given employees, only. 3. SAME when an employee is injured in the course of his employment. If there is evidence that an employee whose business was to unload coal at his employer's plant was sometimes sent to the railroad yards to see about getting cars of coal switched to the plant and that on the occasion of his injury he had gone to the yards for that purpose, then his act in getting upon the rear step of a switch engine to communicate his business to the switchmen standing thereon is within the course of his employment, and if he falls or is thrown from the engine and is injured, the injury is one received in the course of his employment. 4. SAME-employer is liable for an injury to employee in the course of employment regardless of question of negligence. The liability imposed by the Workmen's Compensation act has no connection with the negligence of either the employer or the employee, and an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment creates the liability without any question of fault of either party. 5. SAME when amount of the award is properly determined on basis of full working year. If there is evidence that the men employed to do the work in which an injured employee was engaged worked substantially every working day in the year, the amount of the award is properly based on paragraph (d) of section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913 and not on paragraph (e) of said section. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Macon county; the Hon. WILLIAM K. WHITFIELD, Judge, presiding. CHARLES C. LEFORGEE, THOMAS W. SAMUELS, and GEORGE W. BLACK, for plaintiff in error. MCDAVID & MONROE, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: Arthur W. Mulverhill was run over by a freight train on the Wabash railroad and injured so that both of his legs had to be amputated. He presented a claim for compensation against the Decatur Railway and Light Company, and the Industrial Board, on a petition for a review of the award of the committee of arbitration, made an award of $2400, payable in weekly installments of $5.77, and a pension of $16 a month from the expiration of such weekly payments for the rest of his life. On certiorari from the circuit court of Macon county the award was confirmed, and this writ of error is prosecuted by the Decatur Railway and Light Company to reverse that judgment. The grounds urged for reversal are, that Mulverhill was not an employee of the plaintiff in error but was an independent contractor; that if he was such employee his injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment; and that the amount is excessive. In the summer of 1914 Mulverhill was in the employ of the plaintiff in error as a laborer on the streets at seventeen and one-half cents an hour, working ten hours a day. He belonged to the hospital association of the plaintiff in error's employees, and fifty cents a month was deducted from his wages by the company for the association. In Septem |