District was organized under the Levee act on June 2, 1913, and that Kelly lane is, and has been for more than fifty years, a public highway on the line between the towns of Danville and Georgetown; that the ditch in question is the main drainage ditch of the district and that the towns of Danville and Georgetown were both assessed for benefits by reason of its construction. The cause was heard without a jury by the court, which made a finding of fact that the ditch was constructed across the highway in the line of a natural depression, channel or water-course, and that the highway is a public township road. The court held as a proposition of law that under the Levee act, where a ditch, as a part of a combined system of drainage located by the report of the drainage commissioners and confirmed by the court, is constructed on the line of any natural depression, channel or water-course across a public township road, the corporate authorities of such road are required, at their own expense, to construct any bridge or other work of such road. The issues were found for the defendants and a judgment was rendered denying the writ and dismissing the petition at the petitioners' costs, to reverse which a writ of error has been sued out.

There was evidence to sustain the court's finding that, the ditch was constructed across the road in a natural depression, channel or water-course. In such case section 55 of the Levee act requires the corporate authorities of the road to construct the bridge at their own expense. The plaintiffs in error insist that this requirement is in conflict with sections 9 and 10 of article 9 of the constitution, which provide that municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, and that the General Assembly shall not impose taxes upon municipal corporations, or the inhabitants or property thereof, for corporate purposes. These sections prohibit the legislature from compelling a town to incur a debt without its consent and from granting the right of corporate tax

ation to any other than the corporate authorities, who are the municipal officers directly elected by the people to be taxed or appointed in some mode to which the people to be taxed have given their assent. These propositions are stated in Morgan v. Schusselle, 228 Ill. 106, and many cases are cited to sustain them. In that case the court had under consideration section 40% of the Farm Drainage act, which empowers drainage commissioners to construct bridges or culverts which may be deemed necessary for the use or protection of the work of the district, in public highways of the town, to be paid out of the road and bridge tax, and this requirement was held to violate sections 9 and 10 of article 9 of the constitution. In that case it was assumed that there was a distinction between it and the case of Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, 193 Ill. 439. In the latter case the court had under consideration the third proviso of section 55 of the Levee act, which is the statute relied on here, and the proviso was held not to be a violation of sections 9 and 10 of article 9 of the constitution. The fact that in the earlier case the drainage district was organized under the Levee act and in the later case under the Farm Drainage act is of no importance, for like provisions in the two acts must be governed by the same rule. Neither does the fact that in the earlier case the ditch over which the bridge was constructed was a natural water-course and in the later case was artificial constitute any valid distinction, though it appears to have been so regarded. The destruction of a part of the highway, requiring its repair, the cost of which can be met only by taxation of the town, is not different in character whether the place of such destruction is at a natural water-course or not. Such destruction necessarily imposes a burden on the town and cannot be authorized by the legislature at the cost of the town against its will. While the destruction of the road is not the levying of a tax, the law which attempts to authorize it imposes an obligation on the town against its will, which the con

stitution prohibits. The legislature has imposed the care of roads and the construction, maintenance and repair of bridges upon the various towns throughout the State, and the municipal officers, through whom the townships act, are the highway commissioners elected in each town. They possess the only authority conferred by law for levying a tax or incurring a liability for road and bridge purposes. No debt can be imposed upon the town by any authority for such purposes against its will, and no tax can be imposed for such purposes except by the proper corporate authorities, the highway commissioners. The drainage district here is composed of parts of the towns of Danville and Georgetown. Its territory is not conterminous with either or both of those towns. The drainage commissioners are elected not only in a different territory, but for a different purpose and by a different body of electors from the highway commissioners. They are in no sense corporate authorities of either town and under the constitution have no authority to impose a debt upon either town. While the drainage commissioners are not authorized by section 55 to construct the bridges in public highways at the cost of the town, that section purports to authorize them to remove such bridges if in their judgment they find it necessary, and thus indirectly impose upon the township the cost of their replacement. The legislature is without power to do this.

The decision in the case of Heffner v. Cass and Morgan Counties, supra, holding that the legislature had the power to authorize drainage commissioners to remove bridges on public highways without payment of damages to the public road authorities, is inconsistent with that of Morgan v. Schusselle, supra, and was, in effect, overruled by the latter case. It is now expressly overruled.

It is argued that the benefits which the Levee act authorizes to be assessed do not include the construction or repair of any bridge or other work in any road. This, however, is because of the proviso of section 55 which we have

just held to be unconstitutional. The preceding sections authorize the levy of assessments to an amount equal to the estimated total cost of the improvement, which will include the cost of any bridge which the district may be required to build in any road in constructing the improvement. The restoration of the road by the drainage commissioners to a condition fit for public travel may be compelled without a statute expressly authorizing it. The right of the owner of a dominant heritage by ditches and drains to collect the surface water falling on his estate and discharge it into a natural water channel, even if the quantity of water cast upon a servient estate is thereby increased, is not involved. The existence of such right does not give the land owner the right to enter upon and cut through a highway without incurring any liability and impose upon the town the obligation to repair it.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded, with instructions to grant the peremptory writ.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 11061.)

THE PEOPLE er rel. Theodore Block et al. Appellants, vs. SAINT J. MOFFITT et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed December 21, 1916.

This case is controlled by the decision in People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. FRANKLIN H. BOGGS, Judge, presiding.

LOUIS A. BUSCH, State's Attorney, and DOBBINS & DOBBINS, for appellants.

WILLIAMSON & BROWDER, for appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the

court:

Pursuant to leave granted, the People, upon the relation of Theodore Block and others, appellants, filed an information in the nature of quo warranto in the circuit court of Champaign county against Saint J. Moffitt and others, appellees, requiring them to show by what right or authority they claimed to have and exercise the franchises, privileges and corporate powers of officers and members of the board of directors of an alleged high school district known as Sidney Township High School District No. 58 in Champaign county, and by what right or authority they claimed. that any such high school district existed. Appellees filed a plea setting up the steps taken in the organization of the alleged high school district and their election as president and board of directors of such district. Appellants demurred to the plea, the demurrer was overruled, and this appeal followed.

The high school district in question was organized under section 6 of the act of June 5, 1911. (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 2361.) Among other points raised by the demurrer to the plea and the assignments of error was the constitutionality of said section 6, it being contended by appellants that it is a local or special law and contrary to the provisions of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution of 1870. This same question was passed upon and decided by this court in People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, and for the reasons given in that opinion the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign county will be reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the plea.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.