thority to enter further orders in the case and remove the receiver; and (2) if it had not such authority, whether the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari. All the cases from Ex parte Thatcher, 2 Gilm. 167, down to the present time, hold that a perfected appeal operates to stay any further proceedings by the court rendering the judgment or decree appealed from. The only exception to this rule we know of is, that in divorce cases, after an appeal has been perfected, the trial court may make a further order as to alimony. But this is expressly authorized by the statute, (Hurd's Stat. 1916, chap. 40, par. 15,) and in Elzas v. Elzas, 183 Ill. 160, and Jenkins v. Jenkins, 91 id. 167, it was said that this statute created an exception to the rule depriving the court rendering the decree of jurisdiction to enter further orders in the case after an appeal was perfected. In the Jenkins case the court said it would have no hesitation in holding that in the absence of the statute the court rendering the decree would have no jurisdiction, after the appeal was perfected, to make any further orders in the case. It is contended by relator that the decree expressly reserved jurisdiction in the circuit court to make further orders in relation to the receivership and the settlement of his accounts, and that paragraph 54 of chapter 22 of Hurd's Statutes authorized the action of the court in removing the receiver. The statute referred to provides that where application is made for the appointment of a receiver, the court may, in lieu of appointing one, permit the party in possession to retain such possession upon giving bond with such penalty and such security and upon such conditions as the court may order and approve, "and the court may remove a receiver and restore the property to the possession of the party from whom it was taken upon the giving of a like bond." The authority conferred by this statute could only be exercised by the court in a case pending before it. It was never intended to authorize the entry of orders in a case where an appeal had been perfected depriving the court of further jurisdiction. Neither could the paragraph of the decree referred to give the court authority to enter orders in the case after the appeal from the decree was perfected. Section 8 of the Appellate Court act provides that Appellate Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction, only, but section II authorizes them to issue the writ of mandamus to cause a proper record to be certified or to cause any act to be done to enforce the due administration of justice in all matters, suits and proceedings which could or might by appeal or writ of error be brought within their jurisdiction, “and the said Appellate Courts, respectively, may also issue writs of certiorari, error, supersedeas and all other writs not prohibited by law, which may be necessary to enforce the due administration of justice in all matters within their jurisdiction." It would seem clear the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari or any other writ not prohibited by law, necessary to protect or aid its appellate jurisdiction and to enforce the administration of justice in cases in which said courts have jurisdiction. The Appellate Court had jurisdiction, by appeal, of the case of Levi vs. Beadles. When it acquired jurisdiction by the perfecting of the appeal the circuit court lost jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the case by the Appellate Court carried with it the right to issue necessary writs to protect its appellate jurisdiction. People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186. Objection is also made by relator to the form of the writ. This objection could properly have been made in the Appellate Court by motion to quash. The demurrer to the answer is overruled and the writ denied. Writ denied. (No. 11113.) THE PEOPLE ex rel. Mike Ljubisich, Petitioner, vs. Opinion filed December 21, 1916. HABEAS CORPUS-coroner cannot require witness at inquest to recognize with sureties. Sections 16 and 17 of the Coroners act, requiring the coroner to recognize a witness to appear at the next term of the circuit court if his testimony at the inquest implicates any person as the unlawful slayer of the deceased and to commit the witness to jail if he does not enter into the recognizance, do not give the coroner authority to order the witness to recognize with sureties, and a warrant of commitment based on a failure to comply with such unauthorized order is void. ORIGINAL petition for habeas corpus. J. T. & S. R. KENWORTHY, for petitioner. Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: The coroner of Henry county required the petitioner, who was a witness at an inquest, to recognize with two sureties for his appearance at the November term of the circuit court to give. evidence. Upon the petitioner's failure to enter into such recognizance he was committed to jail, where he remained from June 28 until the October term of this court, when he presented his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and upon the return of the sheriff to the writ was discharged. The statute requires the coroner, upon holding an inquest, if the evidence of a witness implicates any person as the unlawful slayer of the person over whom the inquest is held, to recognize such witness to appear at the next term of the circuit court to give evidence of the matter in question, and if the witness refuses to enter into such. recognizance, to commit the witness to the common jail of the county. (Rev. Stat. chap. 31, secs. 16, 17.) This is the measure of the coroner's power. He has no authority to require the witness to recognize with sureties. His warrant of commitment, based upon the petitioner's failure to comply with such unauthorized order, was void, and the petitioner was properly discharged. Petitioner discharged. (No. 10793.) PHOEBE MARSHALL, Admrx., Defendant in Error, vs. THE CITY OF PEKIN, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed December 21, 1916. I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-when Industrial Board has no power to award compensation. The Industrial Board has no power to award compensation under the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913 where the act does not apply to the injured employee and to the employer or the accident in question does not come within the provisions of the act. 2. SAME-rule where employer conducts extra-hazardous business. Where it is sought to hold an employer under the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913 because he conducts an extrahazardous business and has not elected not to come under the act, it must also appear that the employee was engaged in such extrahazardous occupation and was injured while in the course of that employment. 3. SAME-cities and villages are employers within meaning of the Workmen's Compensation act. Cities and incorporated villages are employers within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913, but they have the same right of election as other employers with reference to coming under the act and are governed by the same rules respecting extra-hazardous occupations as are applied to other employers. 4. SAME when injury is not within Workmen's Compensation act. The fact that a city operates a free wagon bridge does not render it liable under the Workmen's Compensation act for an injury received by a policeman, caused by a bullet from his revolver, which was discharged when it fell from his pocket while he was stooping over his desk in the city hall, in the performance of his duties as desk sergeant. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. J. M. NIEHAUS, Judge, presiding. J. P. ST. CERNY, Corporation Counsel, (W. B. COONEY, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. PRETTYMAN, VELDE & PRETTYMAN, for defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff in error is a municipal corporation organized as a city under the general Incorporation act, and had adopted and was acting under the commission form of government on and prior to Saturday, December 6, 1913. On that day Harry Marshall, the husband of Phoebe Marshall, while acting as a special policeman for plaintiff in error, was accidentally killed in the city hall as he stooped over his desk, by the discharge of his own revolver, which was fired by falling out of his pocket and striking the edge of a cuspidor. His regular duty in which he was at that time employed was to act as desk sergeant, his hours on duty being from six o'clock P. M. on Saturdays to six o'clock A. M. on Sundays. He was employed by the chief of police with the consent and approval of the mayor and commissioner of public health and safety of plaintiff in error, but the appointment was never ratified or approved by the council of plaintiff in error, unless the payment of salary or wages by the warrants of plaintiff in error on its order constituted a ratification by it, and he never took any oath of office or filed any bond as such special policeman. He was paid for his services to the city as desk sergeant and special policeman the sum of $326,-a little more than two dollars per day for the time he was actually employed,—from July 1, 1912, to November 1, 1913. For years prior to the accident plaintiff in error was maintaining within its limits a free wagon bridge across the Illinois river, but it has never given any notice of its intention to provide and pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation act. The mayor learned of the accident within a few hours thereafter, and the city council passed a resolution of condolence |