fhew that, in his proceedings against quondam friends, he had been actuated by no other principle than a love of justice.

"I wish to preferve my mind in a ftate conformable to nature," fays Epictetus," and I fhall not preferve it fo, if I am out of humour at any thing that may happen." This, it may be obferved, is the ground-work, the foundation of ftoical virtue. He, however, who can fit down to Sport with adverse fortune, must be poffeffed of a ftill greater fhare of philofophy than the celebrated Porygian himself, or none at all:-he muft either be little folicitous with regard to worldly matters, or wholly infenfible to good and ill. That Mr. Keate is not of the latter clafs of men, every one who has perufed his writings will readily believe, and every one who has the pleasure of his acquaintance muft certainly know. How happens it then,-it may perhaps be asked, that Mr. K. has been fo long involved in a litigious and expenfive fuit? The reafon is fufficiently obvious. A man may patiently endure the loffes which he could not prevent, but he will fcarcely be willing to pay for what has never been done; for work that has not been executed. This, however, if we miftake, not, has been required at the hands of our poet; and this, and this only, has led him into litigation and difpute.

Mr. Keate has reprefented his cafe by a very pleafing allegory. He is fuppofed to have deferted the Mufes, to whom he had formerly facrificed, and to have confined himself entirely to the Atudy of Nature, whom he profeffes to worship, and in honour of whom he purposes to erect a temple

Where he in elegant array

Her various wonders might difplay,
Exhibit the mysterious chain
Which links her complicated reign,

And fpread on each illumin'd fide

What mines conceal, and oceans hide.'

The daughters of Jove are highly incenfed at the revolt of the Poet. They prefer their complaint to Apollo, who tells them-This truant, who fo falfe a wretch is,

Shall fhortly rue his profe and Sketches *`;
We'll of his Temple foon bereave him,
Then fee if NATURE can relieve him ;-
It would not fuit my laurell'd crown,
With my own hand to dafh it down:
But, better to attain this end,
I'll do it by his bofom friend-
'Twill give a keener pang befides,
If wounded where he most confides.

Mr. K. is author of a work intitled Sketches from Nature :' fee Rev. vol. 1xi. p. 111.

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A very

A very forty one, you'll fay,

But worfe fince then have come in play,
And of the art I've underflood

Enough, to do more harm than good:
From better heads ideas ftealing,
To plan a frieze, or form a cieling;
I'll hint the means while the work's doing,
To make his edifice a ruin;

And he fhall find his fchemes defeated,
Before his building is completed.
There is befide, in this great town
A dame of infamous renown,

Whofe great delight is to embarrass,
Torment the weak, the manly harass,
And by her dark malignant arts
Aims to disturb ingenuous hearts:
Living the plague of half the nation,
Mifchief her trade, her name VEXATION;
In our own fcheme her aid we'll join,
And thus complete the great defign.'
The above are fpirited and pointed lines we would willingly
tranfcribe a greater number, but this our limits will not admit.
Suffice it to obferve, that Vexation effects the business in which
fhe had engaged; and that the celestial Maids are accordingly

content.

Cicero, in fpeaking of certain of our fpecies, obferves-Mira funt alacritate ad litigandum. We leave it to the Reader to determine whether Mr. Keate is to be included in their number, or not.

ART. VII. Boethius's Confolation of Philofophy. Tranflated from the Latin, with Notes and Illuftrations, by the Rev. Mr. Philip Ridpath, Minifter of Hutton, Berwickshire. 8vo. 5s. Boards. Dilly.

TH

THE fubject of morals has been fo thoroughly inveftigated, and treated with fuch a degree of accuracy and perfpicuity, by the moderns, that there is little occafion to have recourfe to ancient moralifts for inftruction in the principles of this fcience. To fay the truth, though the writings tranimitted to us from antiquity abound with beautiful fentiments and excellent maxims, we no where find, amongst theie valuable remais, an entire fyftem of Ethics, founded on experience, and adapted to general ufe: we meet with no mafter, in all the fchools of Greece and Rome, whofe do&rine is not, in many respects, obfcure, extravagant, or impracticable. This was fo much the cafe, particularly with the doctrine of the Stoics, that it is much to be regretted, that this philofophy was fo foon mixed with the pure morals of Chriftianity, and that many c

the

the most eminent men among the early Chriftians, were, in reality, as much difciples of Plato and Zeno, as of JESUS.

Among thefe we may reckon Boethius, a Roman, who lived in the latter part of the 5th century; and who was, for forty years, the most diftinguished character in Rome. He was a Catholic Chriftian, and wrote in defence of the doctrine of the Trinity, against the Arians, Neftorians, and Eutychians. This gave great offence to Theodoric, who was an Arian, and it subjected Boethius to perfecution. He was charged with attempting to reftore the liberty of the people and the power of the fenate; and, after having been ftripped of all his poffeffions, was caft into prifon. In this fituation he wrote his treatise, De Conflatione Philofophiæ, in five books. It is remarkable, that though, in this work, he exhausts every topic of confolation which the philofophy brought from the Grecian fchools could fuggeft, he takes no notice of the fupports which the doctrine of Chriftianity affords, under the troubles of life. It has been conjectured, that he intended to have added a fixth book on Chriftian topics; but this is a mere conjecture, unfupported by evidence: there is, therefore, reafon to believe that Boethius fet more value upon the confolations of philofophy, than upon thofe of Chriftianity, and that he was a better Stoic than Chriftian. However this was, his book abounds with the extravagances of ftoicifm, and is therefore more valuable as a remnant of antiquity and a specimen of the ftoical doctrine, than as a moral treatise.

Mr. Ridpath has prefented the Public with an English verfion of this work, of which we give the following paffage as a fpecimen, followed by the original, for the purpofe of comparifon :

As a faithful reprefentation of falfe happiness, and of the true felicity, has been reprefented to you, I fhall now proceed to explain, wherein the perfection of felicity confifts. In view to this, we ought frt to examine, whether there exifts in nature fuch a good as you have lately defined; that our imagination may not deceive us, in taking a mere chimera for a thing that is real, and has a being. But that the fovereign good does exift, and that it is the fource and centre of every other good, cannot be denied. In fact, when we call a thing imperfect, it is only to diftinguish it from fome other thing that is perfect. Hence, if any thing, of whatever particular clafs or kind of existence it be, appears to be imperfect; there must of neceffity be alfo fome other thing that is perfect in this very clafs for you take away perfection, imperfection ceafes to exist, and becomes a term quite unintelligible. Nature alfo doth not commence her operations by rude and unfinished productions: the forms, at firft, the best works, the pureft and most complete; but afterwards gives birth to things lefs perfect and efficacious. So that, if, as we have before fhewn, there is an imperfect felicity in this world, there must be alfo in it a folid and a perfect one. Your conclufion is moft juft and true. It will not now be difficult to difcover, continued the, where this true felicity refides. Every mind endowed with

if

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apprehenfion and judgment, finds in itfelf a proof that God, the author of all things, is good. For, as we can conceive nothing better than God, can we have any doubt but that he, who has no equal in goodness, is good? And reafon, while it thus demonftrates fo clearly that God is good, evinces at the fame time, that the fovereign good refides in him. For if this were not fo, God could not poffibly be, as he really is, the author of all things; for there would be fome other Being more excellent than he is, who poffeffes the fupreme good, and who must have exiled before him; because all perfect things plainly precede things that are lefs complete. That our reafonings may not therefore run on into infinity, we must confefs that the Supreme God comprehends in his nature a plenitude of perfect and confummate good but perfect good we have proved to be true felicity. It neceffarily follows, then, that true felicity refides in the Supreme Divinity. This must be admitted, faid I, as I can fee nothing that can be objected againt it. . . Now, fince men become happy by the enjoyment of Felicity, and as Felicity is the fame with the Divinity himself, it is manifeft, that they become happy by the enjoyment of the Divinity. But as by the participation of juftice, or of wildom, men become juft or wife; fo, by the participating of Divinity, they must neceffarily, and for the very fame reason, become Gods. Confequently, every happy man is a God; for though there is but one in effence, there is nothing to hinder but there may be many, by a participation of the Divine Nature.-I allow, faid I, that this corollary is admirable, and of infinite value. But what I am just going to add, faid fhe, is ftill more worthy of your admiration.-What is that?-As happiness appears to be an affemblage of many things, ought we not to confider whether thefe feveral things conflitute, conjunctly, the body of happiness? if I may fo express myfelf; or whether there is not fome one of these particular things that compofes its effence, and to which all the reft have a relation? -I wish, faid I, you would illuftrate this matter by examples.Do you not believe, added the, that happiness is a good ?—Yes, certainly, anfwered I; and the fupreme good.-You may fay the fame, continued the, of all the other goods; for perfect fufficiency is reckoned fupreme felicity; fo is fupreme power; fo likewife is an honourable rank, a fhining reputation, and a life of pleasure.- What do you conclude from all this?-Are all these things, answered she, fufficiency, power, reputation, and the reft, to be confidered as conftituent members, so to speak, of felicity? or, do they bear a relation to a good as their principal part?-I understand, faid I, what you propofe to investigate, and I am defirous to hear it made outAttend, faid fhe, and I will elucidate this matter. If all these things were members of felicity, they would differ from one another; for it is the property of members, or parts that differ from one another, conjun&ly taken, to compofe one body. But I have proved to you that these things are all the fame, and do in no refpect differ. They can by no means, therefore, be members of happiness; for if they were, happinefs might be faid to be made up of one member, which is abfurd, and cannot poffibly be.-All this is undoubtedly true, faid 1; but I wish to hear the fequel.-We know, replied fhe, the things we have so often mentioned, do all of them bear a relation to a good.

For

For if fufficiency is defired, it is defired because it is esteemed a good if power is fought after, it is for the fame reason; and upon this account likewife it is, that we defire to obtain refpect, glory, and pleasure. Good then is the motive and the end of all thefe wifhes for that which contains no good, either in reality or appearance, can never be defired. On the contrary, things that are not in their nature good, are wished for, because they have the appearance of being real goods. Hence, good is justly esteemed the motive, the foundation, and the end of all the defires of mankind: but, that which is the caufe of our defiring any thing, is itself what we principally want. For example; if a man mounts his horfe on account of health, it is not fo much the exercise of riding that he feeks, as its falutary effects. And as we have proved that thefe latter things are purfued from no other intention than to obtain happiness, it is happinefs therefore only that is fought after. Hence it clearly follows, that the good we have been reasoning upon, and happiness, differ in no respect, but are of one and the fame fubftance.-I fee no caufe, faid 1, to diffent from your opinion. But it has been proved, added the, that God and true happinefs are one and the fame thing.-It has fo. -We may therefore certainly conclude, faid fhe, that the fubftance of God is alfo the fame with that of the fupreme good.'

"Quoniam igitur quæ fit imperfecti, quæ etiam perfecti, boni forma vidifti: nunc demonftrandum reor, quonam hæc felicitatis perfectio conftituta fit. In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquid hujufmodi bonum, quale paulò antè definifti, in rerum natura poffit exiftere, ne nos præter rei fubjectæ veritatem cafla cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin exiftat, fitque hoc veluti quidam omnium fons bonorum, negari nequit. Omne enim quod imperfectum effe dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum effe perhibetur. Quo fit, ut fi in quolibet genere imperfectum quid effe videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid effe, neceffe fit. Etenim perfectione fublata, unde illud, quod imperfectam perhibetur extiterit, ne fingi quidem poteft. Neque enim à diminutis, inconfummatifque natura rerum cepit exordium, fed ab integris abfolutifque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effeta dilabitur. Quod fi, uti paulo ante monftravimus, eft quædam boni fragilis imperfecta felicitas, effe aliquam folidam, perfectamque, non poteft dubitari. Firmiffimè, inquam, veriffimèque conclufum eft. Quo vero, inquit, habitet, ita confidera. Deum rerum omnium principem bonum effe, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cùm nihil Deo melius excogitari queat, id quod melius nihil eft bonum effe quis du bitet? ita vero bonum effe Deum ratio demonftrat, ut perfectum quo. que bonum in eo effe convincat. Nam ni tale fit, rerum omnium princeps effe non poterit: erit enim eo præftantius aliquid perfectum poffidens bonum, quod hoc priùs atque antiquius effe videatur. Omnia namque perfecta minùs integris priora effe claruerunt. Quare ne in infinitum ratio prodeat, confitendum eft fummum Deum, iummi perfectique boni effe pleniffimum. Sed perfectum bonum veram effe beatitudinem conftituimus. Veram igitur beatitudinem in fummo Deo fitam effe, neceffe eft. Accipio, inquam, nec eft quod contradici ullo modo queat.' . . . Quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo verò eft ipfa divinitas, divinitatis adep

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