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they are not blamed for failing to recognize three persons in this one God. There is evidence in nature of one agent, but not a trace of evidence of any plurality or division, whether of persons, or substances, or characters. No trace can be found that the universe was created by one person through the agency of another.

We object, in the second place, to the doctrine of the Trinity, that it is inconsistent with itself, and is, moreover, a contradiction in terms, and therefore cannot be true. The Scriptures assert that God is a spirit. But if this doctrine be true, he is three spirits. Person, if it mean any thing, must mean a distinct mind, intelligence, having all the attributes of a person, that is, must have its own independent thoughts, may be thinking one thing while every other mind in the universe is thinking something else. A person must have a distinct will of his own, may be willing one thing, while every other person is willing another thing. It must have a distinct power of action, may be doing one thing, while every other person or mind is doing another. These are the attributes of personality. If you say that the three persons of the Trinity have these, and have them equally, then they are indeed three persons. But if you claim this, you must bid adieu forever to the unity of God. Each of these three persons, having distinct thought, will and action, and all equally possessing the attributes of divinity, are, to all intents and purposes, three Gods. If, on the other hand, they

have not these characteristics of personality, if they have not distinct thought, will, and action, then they become three different names merely, for one Person, one Intelligence, one mind and will; and the doctrine of the Trinity entirely vanishes and disappears. The three Persons are only one Person. Every action and quality which will identify each to be a distinct Person, possessing independently the attributes of God, will prove that Person to be a distinct and independent God. Each of these Persons, in order to possess full divinity, must comprehend and take in the whole being of God, must be identically the same being with God. Then they are identically the same with each other. They are not three Persons, but one Person. calling them three Persons is making a distinction where there is no difference. To make any ground of distinction between them, there must be something in one which is not in the others. That something cannot be a Divine attribute, or it would be common to them all. And a Divine Person cannot have an attribute which is not Divine, or which a Divine Person can exist without possessing. There cannot then, by any possibility, be any diversity or ground of distinction between three Persons, each comprehending the whole of the same Divine Being, and each possessing every attribute of God.

Then

We are not satisfied with the way in which the doctrine of the Trinity is usually attempted to be proved. It is usually endeavoured to show that

there are three Persons who have Divine attributes ascribed to them, and one as much as the other. What is the legitimate inference to be drawn from this? If each of these three Persons has independently all the attributes of God, then each of these three Persons is a God. And the proper conclusion is, that there are three Gods. For if each of these Persons has all the attributes of God, among which is independent and underived existence, then if two of them are withdrawn from existence, and from the universe, the third would still exist, and be competent to all the purposes to which three are. The legitimate conclusion then from the fact when made out, that each of the three Persons has all Divine attributes, is not that there are three Persons in God, but that there are three independent Gods. If you deny that they could exist independently of each other, just so far you deny them individually to be God. You wish to prove humanity of three men. You go over all the attributes of humanity and prove them to belong to each. But when you have done, and have proved each to be man, you have proved each to be a man, and the three to be three men, but not one man. Their partaking of the common attributes of humanity does not prove them to be one man. So three Persons each possessing all Divine attributes, such as underived and independent existence and power, are three Gods, not one God. But there cannot be three Gods, why? Because it is contrary to the nature of things that there should be three Gods. Then

it is equally contrary to the nature of things that there should be three Persons, each possessing independent Divine attributes. What is this, but saying you have gone through a course of argument, to prove that to be true, which when compared with first and self-evident principles, is found to be false, and cannot by any possibility exist? What are you then to do? You must either admit that there has been a mistake in your argument, or you must believe that contradictions in some mysterious sense may be true. By doing this, you abandon every means and all possibility of distinguishing truth from falsehood, and of course all ground of reasonable belief in any thing.

In order to prove each to be a Person, you must prove of each, separate action involving separate will, thought and consciousness, without these you cannot prove personality. But all these are equally conclusive to prove each to be a separate Being. The Sender must be a different Being as well as a different Person from the Sent. To send is the act of a separate Being, not of a Person without a separate Being, because it implies separate thought, will and action. To be sent is the act of a Being; not of a Person without a separate Being, because that likewise supposes separate thought, will and action. To hold intercourse together as the three Persons are said to have done, certainly involves three separate intelligences with separate thought and consciousness. This if it proves three Persons, must

likewise prove three Beings, and three Beings each possessing all Divine attributes, are three Gods.

In order still to sustain the Unity of God, it is not sufficient for you to say that there can be but one God, and therefore these three are one God. You must not only reconcile Trinity with Unity, but show them to be one God from the elements of their nature, as clearly as you proved them to be three Persons. In order to do this, you must prove them to be one Being. But in showing the three Persons to be one Being, you must deny of them the very attributes by which you proved them to be three Persons, such as separate action, consciousness and will. So that when, as you suppose, you have proved the Trinity, but find that it is inconsistent with the Unity, the proper conclusion is, not that they are both true, for that is impossible as they contradict each other, but that the Trinity is false and the reasoning which led to it fallacious. For the Unity is a first principle, self-evident and therefore cannot be false; the Trinity is a remote deduction, and therefore may not be true.

Every argument, such as separate action, involving consciousness and will, which can be brought to show that each is a Person, will be just as valid to prove that each is a separate Being. And every argument which is brought to prove that these three Persons are one Being, will be equally valid to prove that these three Persons are one Person under different names. So that every argument which goes to prove that God is three, disproves that he

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