cles, all his commands become principles, there needs no other proof of what He says, but that He said it; and there needs no more than to read the inspired books to be instructed."

Having thus shown that miracles are possible; that under certain circumstances their reality may be ascertained; that when accompanied by other circumstances, which we have also mentioned, they are connected with a definite end, and connect themselves with the Divine mission of those who perform them, and with the truth of their doctrine; that as facts they are the subjects of human testimony, and that credible testimony respecting them lays a competent foundation for our belief in them, and in those revelations which they are clearly designed to attest,-the way is pre-existence of things depending upon a chain of necessary pared for the consideration of the miracles recorded in Scripture.

no more influence in effectuating, or making certain any event, than human foreknowledge in the degree in which it may exist; there being no moral causality at all in knowledge. This lies in the will, which is the determining acting principle in every agent; or, as Dr. Samuel Clarke has expressed it in answer to another kind of objector, "God's infallible judgment concerning contingent truths does no more alter the nature of things and cause them to be necessary, than our judg ing right at any time concerning a contingent truth makes it cease to be contingent, or than our science of a present truth is any cause of its being either true or present. Here, therefore, lies the fallacy of our au thor's argument. Because from God's foreknowing the causes, it follows that the existence of the things must needs be necessary; therefore from God's judging PROPHECY is the other great branch of the external infallibly concerning things which depend not on evidence of a revelation; and the nature and force of necessary but free causes, he concludes that these that kind of evidence may fitly be pointed out, before things also depend not upon free but necessary causes. either the miracles or prophecies of the Bible are exa- Contrary, I say, to the supposition in the argument; mined; for by ascertaining the general principles on for it must not be first supposed that things are in their which this kind of evidence rests, the consideration of own nature necessary; but from the power of judging particular cases will be rendered more easy and satis- infallibly concerning free events, it must be proved that factory. things, otherwise supposed free, will thereby unavoidNo argument a priori against the possibility of pro-ably become necessary." The whole question lies in phecy can be attempted by any one who believes in the this: Is the simple knowledge of an action a necessiexistence and infinitely perfect nature of God. tating cause of the action? And the answer must be in the negative, as every man's consciousness will assure him. If the causality of influence, either immediate or by the arrangement of compelling events, be mixed up with this, the ground is shifted; and it is no longer a question which respects simple prescience. This metaphysical objection having no foundation in truth, the force of the evidence, arising from predictions of events, distant, and out of the power of human sagacity to anticipate, and uttered as authentications of a Divine commission, is apparent. "Such predictions, whether in the form of a declaration, description, or representation of things future," as Mr. Boyle justly observes, "are supernatural things, and may properly be ranked among miracles."(1) For when, for instance, the events are distant many years or ages from the uttering of the prediction itself, depending on causes not so much as existing when the prophecy was spoken and recorded, and likewise upon various circumstances and a long arbitrary series of things, and the fluctuat ing uncertainties of human volitions, and especially when they depend not at all upon any external circumstances, nor upon any created being, but arise merely from the counsels and appointment of God himself,-such events can be foreknown only by that Being, one of whose attributes is omniscience, and can be foretold by him only to whom the "Father of Lights" shall reveal them. So that whoever is manifestly endued with that predictive power must, in that instance, speak and act by Divine inspiration, and what he pronounces of that kind must be received as the word of God; nothing more being necessary to assure us of this, than credible testimony that such predictions were uttered before the event, or conclusive evidence that the records which contain them are of the antiquity to which they pretend.(2)

The infidel author of "The Moral Philosopher," indeed, rather insinuates than attempts fully to establish a dilemma with which to perplex those who regard prophecy as one of the proofs of a Divine Revelation. He thinks, that either prophecy must respect "events necessary, as depending upon necessary causes, which might be certainly foreknown and predicted;" or that, if human actions are free, and effects contingent, the possibility of prophecy must be given up, as it implies foreknowledge, which, if granted, would render them necessary.

The first part of this objection would be allowed, were there no predictions to be adduced in favour of a professed revelation, except such as related to events which human experience has taught to be dependent upon some cause, the existence and necessary operation of which are within the compass of human knowledge. But to foretel such events would not be to prophesy, any more than to say that it will be light to-morrow at noon, or that on a certain day and hour next year there will occur an eclipse of the sun or moon, when that event has been previously ascertained by astronomical calculation.

If, however, it were allowed, that all events depended upon a chain of necessary causes, yet, in a variety of instances, the argument from prophecy would not be at all effected; for the foretelling of necessary results in certain circumstances is beyond human intelligence, because they can only be known to him by whose power those necessary causes on which they depend have been arranged, and who has prescribed the times of their operation. To borrow a case, for the sake of illustration, from the Scriptures, though the claims of their predictions are not now in question; let us allow that such a prophecy as that of Isaiah respecting the taking of Babylon by Cyrus was uttered, as it purports to be, more than a century before Cyrus was born, and that all the actions of Cyrus and his army, and those of the Babylonian monarch and his people were necessitated; is it to be maintained, that the chain of necessitating causes, running through more than a century, could be traced by a human mind, so as to describe the precise manner in which that fatality would unfold itself, even to the turning of the river, the drunken carousal of the inhabitants, and the neglect of shutting the gates of the city? This, being by uniform and universal experience known to be above all human apprehension, would therefore prove that the prediction was made in consequence of a communication from a superior and Divine Intelligence. Were events, therefore, subjected to invincible fate and necessity, there might nevertheless be prophecy.

The other branch of the dilemma is founded on the notion, that if we allow the moral freedom of human actions, prophecy is impossible; because certain foreknowledge is contrary to that freedom, and fixes and renders the event necessary.

To this the reply is, that the objection is founded on a false assumption, the Divine foreknowledge having

CHAPTER X.

THE EVIDENCES NECESSARY TO AUTHENTICATE A RE-
VELATION.Internal Evidence.Collateral Evi-

dence

THE second kind of evidence, usually considered as necessary for the attestation of a Divine revelation, is called Internal Evidence.

This kind of evidence has been already described to be that which arises from the consideration of the doctrines taught, as being consistent with the character of God, and tending to promote the virtue and happiness of man, the ends for which a revelation of the will of God was needed, and for which it must have been given, if it be considered as an act of grace and mercy.

This subject, like the two branches of the External Evidence, miracles and prophecy, involves important

(1) BOYLE'S Christian Virtuoso.

(2) Vide CHAPMAN'S Eusebius, p. 158; CuDWORTH'S Intellect. Syst. p. 866; VITRINGA in Isa. cap. 41.

general principles, and it may require to be the more serves a late ingenious writer, " in a system which carefully considered, as opinions have run into extremes. purports to be a revelation from heaven, and to conBy some it has been doubted, whether what is called tain a history of God's dealings with men, and to de"the Internal Evidence," that is, the excellence of the velope truths with regard to the moral government of doctrines and tendency of a revelation, ought to be the universe, the knowledge and belief of which will ranked with the leading evidence of miracles and pro-lead to happiness here and hereafter, we may expect to phecy, seeing that the proof from miracles and from find (if its pretensions are well founded) an evidence prophecy is decisive and absolute. For the same rea- for its truth, which shall be independent of all exterson, however, prophecy might be excluded from the nal testimony."(4) If this be true, the utility of the rank of leading evidence, inasmuch as miracles of evidence of miracles is rendered very questionable. It themselves are, in their evidence, decisive and abso- is either unnecessary, or it is subordinate and dependlute. If, however, it were contended, that proofs from ent; neither of which, by Christian divines at least, miracles, prophecy, and internal evidence are jointly can be consistently maintained. The non-necessity of necessary to constitute sufficient proof of the truth of miracles cannot be asserted by them, because they bea revelation, there would be reason to dispute the posi-lieve them to have been actually performed; and that tion, understanding by "sufficient evidence" that de- they are subordinate proofs, and dependent upon the gree of proof which would render it highly unreason-sufficiency of the Internal Evidence, is contradicted by able, perverse, and culpable in any one to reject the the whole tenor of the Scriptures, which represent authority of the revelation. This evidence is afforded them as being in themselves an absolute demonstration by miracles alone; for if there be any force at all in of the mission and doctrine of the prophets, at whose the argument from miracles, it goes to the full length instance they were performed, and never direct us to of rational proof of a divine attestation, and that both to regard their doctrines as a test of the miracles. The him who personally witnesses the performance of a miracles of Christ, in particular, were a demonstration, real miracle, and to him to whom it is credibly testified; not a partial and conditional, but a complete and abso and nothing more is absolutely necessary to enforce a lute demonstration of his mission from God; and "it rational conviction. But if it should please the Divine may be observed, with respect to all the miracles of Author of a revelation to superadd the farther evidence the New Testament, that their divinity, considered in of prophecy, and also that of the obvious truth, and be- themselves, is always either expressly asserted or neficial tendency of many parts of this revelation, cir- manifestly implied; a they are accordingly urged as cumstances which must necessarily be often apparent, a decisive and absolute proof of the divinity of the docit ought not to be disregarded in the argument in its trine and testimony of those who perform them, withfavour, nor thought of trifling import; since, though it out ever taking into consideration the nature of the may not be necessary to establish a rational and suffi- doctrine or of the testimony to be confirmed." cient proof, it may have a secondary necessity, to arouse attention, to leave objectors more obviously without excuse, and also to accommodate the revelation to that variety which exists in the mental constitutions of men, one mind being excited to attention, and disposed to conviction, more forcibly by one species of proof than by another.

Against this mode of stating the Internal Evidence, there lies also this logical objection, that it is arguing in a circle;-the miracles are proved by the doctrine, and then the doctrine by the miracles; an objection, from which those who have adopted the notion either of the superior or the co-ordinate rank of the internal evidence have not, with all their ingenuity and effort. fairly escaped.

In strict propriety, therefore, miracles may be considered as the primary evidence of the truth of a revelation, and every other species of proof as confirmatory. Prophecy and the Internal Evidence are leading evidences, but neither of them stand in the foremost place. The same abundance of proof we perceive in nature, for the demonstration of the being and attributes of God. Proofs of the existence of a First Cause, almighty and infinitely wise, more than what is logically sufficient, surround us every where; but who can doubt, that if half the instances of infinite power and wisdom which . are seen in the material universe were annihilated, there would not be sufficient evidence to demonstrate both these, as perfections of the Maker of the universe? On the other hand, the proof drawn from the Inter-ance of revelation extremely, and are (humanly speaknal Evidence by others has been placed first in order, and the force of the evidence from miracles and prophecy is by them made to depend upon the excellence of the doctrine which they are brought forward to confirm, and which ought first to be ascertained. Nothing, say they, is to be received as a revelation from God which does not contain doctrines worthy of the divine character, and tending to promote the good of mankind. "A necessary mark of a religion coming from God is, that the duties it enjoins are all such as are agreeable to our natural notions of God, and perfective of the nature and conducive to the happiness of man."(3)

Miracles must, therefore, be considered as the leading and absolute evidence of a revelation from God; and "what to me," says a sensible writer, "is, à priori, a strong argument of their being so, is the manifest inconsistency of the other hypothesis with the very condition of that people for whose sake God should raise up at any time his extraordinary messengers, endued with such miraculous powers. For if God ever favours mankind with such a special revelation of his will, and instructions from heaven, in a way supernatural, it is certainly in that unhappy juncture when the principles and practices of mankind are so miserably depraved and corrupted, as to want the light and assisting) utterly incorrigible without it. Now, to say that, in these particular circumstances, men are not to depend on any real miracles, but, before they admit them as evidence of the prophet's divine mission, they must carefully examine his doctrine, to see if it be perfectly good and true, is either to suppose these people furnished with principles and knowledge requisite for that purpose, contrary, point blank, to the real truth of their case; or else it is to assert, that they who are utterly destitute of principles and knowledge requisite for that work must, nevertheless, undertake it without them, and judge of the truth of the prophet's doctrine and auNow, though it must be instantly granted, that in a thority by their false principles of religion and morevelation from God, there will be nothing contrary to rality; which, in short, is to fix them immoveably his own character; and that, when it is made in the where they are already, in old erroneous principles, way of a merciful dispensation, it will contain nothing against any new and true ones that should be offered. but what tends to perfect the nature and promote the Especially with the bulk of mankind, full of darkness happiness of his creatures; it is clear, that to try a and prejudice, this must unavoidably be the conseprofessed revelation by our own notions, as to what is quence; and the more they wanted a reformation in worthy of God and beneficial to mankind, is to assume, principle, the less capable would they be of receiving that, independent of a revelation, we know what God it in this method. Thus, for instance: were a teacher is, or we cannot say what is worthy or unworthy of sent from heaven, with signs and wonders, to a nation him; and that we know, too, the character and rela- of idolaters, and they previously instructed to regard tions and wants of man so perfectly as to determine no miracles of his whatsoever, till they were fully sawhat is beneficial to him; in other words this sup- tisfied of the goodness of his doctrine, it is easy to poses that we are in circumstances not greatly to need foresee by what rule they would prove his doctrine, supernatural instruction. Another objection to the In- and what success he would meet with among them ternal Evidence being made the primary test of a reve- Add to this, what is likewise exceedingly material, the lation is, that it renders the external testimony nuga- great delays and perplexities attending this way of protory, or comparatively unimportant. "Surely," ob-ceeding. For if every article of doctrine must be dis

(3) Dr. S. CLARKE

(4) ERSKINE on the Internal Evidence, &c,

cussed and scanned by every person to whom it is offered, what slow advances would be made by a divine revelation among such a people! Hundreds would probably be cut off before they came to the end of their queries, and the prophet might grow decrepid with age before he gained twenty proselytes in a nation."(5) It is easy to discover the causes which have led to these mistakes, as to the true office of the Internal Evidence of a divine revelation.

In the first place, a hypothetic case has been assumed, and it has been asked, "If a doctrine, absurd and wicked, should be attested by miracles, is it to be admitted as divine, upon their authority ?" The answer is, that this is a case which cannot in the nature of things occur, and cannot, therefore, be made the basis of an argument. We have seen already, that a real miracle can be wrought by none but God, or by his commission, because the contrary supposition would exclude him from the government of the world which he has made and preserves. Whenever a real miracle takes place, therefore, in attestation of any doctrine, that doctrine cannot be either unreasonable or impious; and if it should appear so to us, after the reality of the miracle is ascertained, which is not probable ordinarily, our judgment must be erroneous. The miracle proves the doctrine, or the ground on which miracles are allowed to have any force of evidence at all, either supreme or subordinate, absolute or dependent, must be given up;' r their evidence consists in this-that they are the works of God.

ation, renders our instruction in many doctrines and duties possible, the rational evidence of whose truth is wanting; and as some doctrines may be true, and highly important to us, which are not capable of this kind of proof, that is, which are not so fully known as to be compared with any received propositions, and determined by them, our knowledge is, in this way, greatly enlarged: the benefits of revelation are extended; and the whole becomes obligatory, and therefore efficient to moral purposes, because it bears upon it the seal of an infallible authority.

The firmer ground on which a revelation, founded upon reasonable external proof of authority, rests, is also obvious. The doctrines in which we need to be instructed are, the nature of God; our own relations to that invisible Being; his will concerning us; the means of obtaining or securing his favour; the principles of his government; and a future life. These and others of a similar kind involve great difficulties, as the history of moral knowledge among mankind sufficiently proves; and that not only among those who never had the benefits of the Biblical revelation on these subjects, but among those who, not considering it as an authority, have indulged the philosophizing spirit, and judged of these doctrines merely by their rational evidence. This, from the nature of things, appearing under different views to different minds, has produced almost as much contrariety of opinion among them, as we find among the sages of pagan antiquity. The mere rational proof of the truth of such doctrines being, therefore, from its nature, in many important respects, obscure, and liable to diversity of opinion, would lay but a very precarious and shifting foundation for faith in any revelation from God suited to remove the ignorance of man on points so important in doctrine, and so essential to an efficient religion and morality.

The second cause of the error has been, that the rational evidence of the truths contained in a revelation has been confounded with the authenticating evidence. When once an exhibition of the character, plans, and laws of God is made, though in their nature totally undiscoverable by human faculties, they carry to the reason of man, so far as they are of a nature to be On the other hand, the process of obtaining a rational comprehended by it, the demonstration which accom- proof of the Divine attestation of a doctrine, by mirapanies truth of any other kind. For, as the eye is cles for instance, is of the most simple and decisive kind, formed to receive light, the rational powers of man are and gives to unbelief the character of obvious performed to receive conviction when the cougruity of pro- verseness and inconsistency. Perverseness, because positions is made evident. This is rational, but it is not there is a clear opposition of the will rather than of authenticating evidence. Let us suppose that there is the judgment in the case; inconsistency because a no external testimony of miracles or prophecy vouch- much lower degree of evidence is, by the very objectsafed to attest that the teacher through whom we re- ors, acted upon in their most important concerns in ceive those doctrines which appear to us so sublime, life. For who that saw the dead raised to life, in an so important, so true, received them from God, with a appeal to the Lord of life, in confirmation of a docmission to impart them to us. He himself has no trine professing to be taught by his authority, but means of knowing them to be from God, or of distin- must, unless wilful perverseness interposed, acknowguishing them from some happy train of thought into ledge a Divine testimony; and who that heard the which his mind has been carried by its own force; nor fact reported on the testimony of honest men and comif he had, have we any means of concluding that they petent observers, under circumstances in which no are more than the opinions of a mind superior in vigour illusion can take place, but must be charged with inand grasp to our own. They may be true, but they consistency, should he treat the report with skepticism, are not attested to be Divine. We have no guarantee when upon the same kind and quantum of evidence of their infallible truth, because our own rational pow- he would so credit any report as to his own affairs, as ers are not infallible, nor those of the most gifted hu- to risk the greatest interests upon it? In difficult docman mind. Add then the external testimony, and we trines, of a kind to give rise to a variety of opinions, have the attestation required. The rational evidence the rational evidence is accompanied with doubt; in of the doctrine is the same in both cases; but the ra- such a case as that of the miracle we have supposed, tional evidence, though to us it is as far, and only as it rests on principles supported by the universal and far, as we can claim infallibility for our judgment, the constant experience of mankind:-1. That the raising proof of the truth of the doctrine, is no proof at all of the dead is above human power: 2. That men, unthat God has revealed it. In the external testimony questionably virtuous in every other respect, are not alone that proof is found: the degree of rational evi- likely to propagate a deliberate falsehood: and, 3. That dence we have of the truth and excellency of the doc-it contradicts all the known motives to action in human trine may be a farther commendation of it to us, but it is no part of its authority.

nature that they should do so, not only without advantage, but at the hazard of reproach, persecution, and death. The evidence of such an attestation is therefore as indubitable as these principles themselves.

The fourth kind of evidence by which a revelation from God may be confirmed, is the collateral; on which at present we need not say more than adduce some instances, merely to illustrate this kind of testimony.

From this distinction, the relative importance of the external and the internal evidence of a revelation may be farther illustrated. Rational evidence of the doctrines proposed to us, when it can be had, goes to establish their truth, so far as we can depend upon our judgment; but the external testimony, if satisfactory, establishes their Divine authority, and therefore their absolute truth, and leaves us no appeal. Still farther, a revelation, dependent upon internal evidence only, could contain no doctrines, and enjoin no duties, but of which the evidence to our reason should be complete. The least objection grounded on a plausible contrary reason, would weaken their force, and the absence of a clear perception of their congruity with some previous principles admitted as true, would be the absence of all evidence of their truth whatever. On the other hand, a revelation, with a rational proof of Divine attest-tural or instituted, remain to attest the truth of its his

(5) CHAPMAN's Eusebius.

The collateral evidence of a revelation from God may be its agreement in principle with every former revelation, should previous revelations have been vouchsafed--that it was obviously suited to the circumstances of the world at the time of its communication-that it is adapted to effect the great moral ends which it purposes, and has actually effected them-that if it contain a record of facts as well as of doctrines, those historical facts agree with the credible traditions and histories of the same times--that monuments, either na

tory-that adversaries have made concessions in its favour--and that, should it profess to be a universal and

On the principles, therefore, already laid down, that, though the rational evidence of a doctrine lies in the doctrine itself, the rational proof of the Divine author- (6) "It is the error of those who contend that all neity of a doctrine must be external to that doctrine; cessary truth is discoverable or demonstrable by reason, and that miracles and prophecy are appropriate and that they aflirm of human reason in particular, what satisfactory attestations of such an authority whenever is only true of reason in general, or of reason in the abthey occur, the use of human reason in this inquiry is stract. To say that whatever is true must be either apparent. The alleged miracles themselves are to be discoverable or demonstrable by reason, can only be examined, to determine whether they are real or pre-affirmed of an all-perfect reason, and is therefore preditended, allowing them to have been performed; the cated of none but the Divine Intellect. So that unless testimony of witnesses is to be investigated, to deter- it can be shown that human reason is the same, in mine whether they actually occurred; and if this tes- degree, as well as in kind, with Divine reason; i. e. timony has been put on record, we have also to deter- commensurate with it as to its powers, and equally inmine whether the record was at first faithfully made, capable of error; the inference from reason in the aband whether it has been carefully and uncorruptedly stract to human reason is manifestly inconclusive. preserved. With respect to prophecy, we are also to Nothing more is necessary to show the fallacy of this examine whether the professed prophecy be a real pre- mode of arguing, than to urge the indisputable truth, diction of future events, or only an ambiguous and that God is wiser than man, and has endued man with equivocal saying, capable of being understood in vari- only a portion of that faculty, which He himself and ous ways; whether it relates to events which lie be- none other besides him possesses in absolute perfection." yond the guess of wise and observing men; whether-VAN MILDERT'S Sermons at Boyle's Lecture.

the rational evidence of the doctrines taught, but not as to what concerns many of the attributes of God; his purposes concerning the human race; some of his most important procedures towards us; and the future destiny of man. When once it is revealed that man is a creature, we cannot but perceive the reasonableness of our being governed by the law of our Creator; that this is founded in his right and our duty; and that, when we are concerned with a wise and gracious and just Governor, what is our duty must of necessity be promotive of our happiness. But if the revelation should contain any declarations as to the nature of the Creator himself, as that he is eternal and self-existent and in every place; and that he knows all things; the thoughts thus suggested, the doctrines thus stated, nakedly and authoritatively, are too mysterious to be distinctly apprehended by us, and we are unable, by comparing them with any thing else (for we know nothing with which we can compare them), to acquire any clear views of the manner in which such a being exists, or why such perfections necessarily flow from his peculiar nature. If, therefore, the revelation itself does not state in addition to the mere facts that he is self-existent, omnipresent, omniscient, &c., the manner in which the existence of such attributes harmonizes with the nature and reason of things, we cannot supply the chasm; and should we even catch some view of the rational evidence, which is not denied, we are unable to complete it; our reason is not enlightened up to the full measure of these truths, nor on such subjects are we quite certain that some of our most rational deductions are perfectly sound, and we cannot, therefore, make use of them as standards by which to try any doctrine, beyond the degree in which they are clearly revealed, and authoritatively stated to us. Other examples might be given, but these are sufficient for illustration.

which cannot be proved by our reason is not, on that, is opened, which may be pursued to the enlargement of account, contrary either to the nature of things, or even to reason itself. This is sometimes lost sight of, and that which has no evidence from our reason is hastily presumed to be against it. Now rational investigation is a process by which we inquire into the truth or falsehood of any thing, by comparing it with what we intuitively, or by experience, know to be true, or with that which we have formerly demonstrated to be so. "By reason," says Cicero, "we are led from things apprehended and understood to things not apprehended." Rational proof, therefore, consists in the agreement or disagreement of that which is compared with truths already supposed to be established. But there may be truths, the evidence of which can only be fully known to the Divine Mind, and on which the reasoning or comparing faculty of an inferior nature cannot, from their vastness or obscurity, be employed; and such truths there must be in any revelation which treats of the nature and perfections of God; his will as to us,--and the relations we stand in to him, and to another state of being. As facts and doctrines, they are as much capable of revelation as if the whole reason of things on which they are grounded were put into the revelation also; but they may be revealed as authoritative declarations, of which the process of proof is hidden, either because it transcends our faculties, or for other reasons, and we have therefore no rational evidence of their truth farther than we have rational evidence that they come from God, which is in fact a more powerful demonstration. That a revelation may contain truths of this transcendent nature must be allowed by all who have admitted its necessity, if they would be consistent with themselves; for its necessity rests, in great part, upon the weakness of human reason. If our natural faculties could have reached the truths thus exhibited to us, there had been no need of supernatural instruction; and if it has been vouchsafed, the degree depends upon the Divine will, and he may give a doctrine with its reasons or without them; for surely, the ground of our obligation to believe his word does not rest upon our perception of the rational evidence of the truths he requires us to believe. If doctrines, then, be given without the reasons on which they rest, that is, without any apparent agreement with what is already known; because the process of proof must, in many cases, be a comparison of that which is too vast to be fully apprehended by us with something else, which, because known by us, must be comparatively little, or perhaps in some of its qualities or relations of a different nature, so that no fit comparison of things so dissimilar can be instituted; this circumstance proves the absence of rational evidence to us; but it by no means follows, that the doctrine is incapable of rational proof, though probably no reason but that of God, or of a more exalted being than man in his present state, may be adequate to unfold it.

These observations being made, it will be easy to assign definite limits to the rule, "that no doctrine in an admitted revelation is to be understood in a sense contrary to reason." The only way in which such a rule can be safely received is, that nothing is to be taken as a true interpretation, when, as to the subject in question, we have sufficient knowledge to affirm, that the interpretation is contrary to the nature of things, which, in this case, it is also necessary to be assured that we have been able to ascertain. Öf some things we know the nature without a revelation, inasmuch as they lie within the range of our own observation and experience, as that a human body cannot be in two places at the same time. Of other things we know the nature by revelation, and by that our knowledge is enlarged. If, therefore, from some figurative passages of a revelation, any person, as the Papists, should affirm, that wine is human blood, or that a human body can be in two places at the same time, it is contrary to our reason, that is, not to mere opinion, but to the nature of something which we know so well, that we are bound to reject the interpretation as an absurdity. If, again, any were to interpret passages which speak of God as having the form of man to mean, that he has merely a local presence, our reason has been taught by revelation, that God is a spirit, and exists every where, that is, so far we have been taught the nature of things as to God, that we reject the interpretation, as contrary to what has been so clearly revealed, and resolve every anthropomorphite expression we may find in the revelation into figurative and accommodated language. In the application of this rule, when even thus limited, care is, however, to be taken, that we distinguish what is capable of being tried by it. If we compare one thing with another, in order to determine whether it agrees with, or differs from it, it is not enough that we have sufficient knowledge of that with which we compare it, and which we have made the standard of judgment. It is also necessary, that the things compared should be of the same nature, and that the comparison should But if by this is meant, that our reason, once enlight-be made in the same respects. We take for illustration ened by the annunciation of the great truths of revela- the case just given. Of two bodies we can affirm, that tion, can discover or complete, in all cases, the process they cannot be in the same place at the same time; but of their rational proof, that is, their conformity to the we cannot affirm that of a body and a spirit for we nature and truth of things, and is thus authorized to know what relation bodies have to place and to each reject whatever cannot be thus harmonized with our other, but we do not know what relation spirits have own deductions from the leading truths thus revealed, to each other, or to space. This may illustrate the first so great a concession cannot be made to human ability. rule. The second demands, that the comparison be In many of the rules of morals, and the doctrines of re- made in the same respect. If we affirm of two bodies, ligion too, it may be allowed, that a course of thought one of a round, and the other of a square figure, that

It has indeed been maintained, that, though our reason may be inadequate to the discovery of such truths as the kind of revelation we have supposed to be necessary must contain, yet, when aided by this revelation, it is raised into so perfect a condition, that what appears incongruous to it ought to be concluded contrary to the revelation itself. This, to a certain extent, is true. When a doctrine is clearly revealed to us, standing as it does upon an infallible authority, no contrary doctrine can be true, whether found without the record of the revelation, or deduced from it; for this is, in fact, no more than saying that human opinions must be tried by Divine authority, and that revelation must be consistent with itself. The test to which in this case, however, we subject a contradictory doctrine, so long as we adhere to the revelation, is formed of principles which our reason did not furnish, but such as were communicated to us by supernatural interposition; and the judge to which we refer is not, properly speaking, reason, but revelation.