would have been a clear violation of the divine command. But if that portion of the Presbyterian church to which we belong had thought a division absolutely essential to the maintenance of sound doctrine and good order, yet aware that the law did not permit them to separate themselves, without the forfeiture of certain civil rights, which must remain in the possession of the opposite party; no one can for a moment doubt that we might properly have effected the division, if, at the same time, we had renounced the rights mentioned. And so, if we had persisted in the exercise and enjoyment of certain rights after the separation, from a conviction that we were still entitled to them, or from a reasonable doubt as to the party in which the title was really vested, all that the most rigid interpretation of the Bible command could have required, would have been implicit obedience to the decision of any competent and supreme tribunal, adjudicating the case when properly presented for its judgment. The importance of the legal question, then, so far as the Presbyterian church is interested in the immediate result of the present controversy, may be measured by the value of the civil rights involved; and no one can hesitate to pronounce it of very small moment, when compared with the purely ecclesiastical questions that are joined with it in the issue. We by no means intend, however, to undervalue the character of the legal controversy, even as to its immediate results. Thus considered, it is well worthy of serious attention and study. And when we take into view the magnitude and probable future importance of the great principles of jurisprudence which it involves, and the weight of authority which an established legal precedent may carry with it to all later times; a rule to be reverentially obeyed, though sometimes the reason of it do not manifestly appear, or though it may seem to be against reason;-we cannot but feel that on the decision of the law in this case most momentous interests are staked.

To the review of the whole case, as brought before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and as exhibited in this report its facts, its principles, its history-we propose devoting a few pages. The subject is extensive, but we will endeavour to bring its leading points within as narrow a compass as possible. Our main object is to give a concise view of the civil rights, duties, and liabilities of ecclesiastical associations, under the laws of Pennsylvania, as illustrated by the recent events in our church. Most of the doctrines,

however, which we shall seek to establish, are by no means peculiar, as will be plainly seen, to the state of Pennsylvania, or in their application to Presbyterians. In all parts of the Union, the same great principles of religious liberty and civil obligation are recognised as applicable alike to every ecclesiastical denomination. Certainly, such investigations may more worthily occupy our attention, than the unsatisfying and fruitless inquiries at present so engrossing in many minds: "What will those who have separated from us do next? Will they continue to contest at the bar of that tribunal before which we have already been arraigned; or will they renew it before another civil court?" Instead of spending our time in auguring about the future, let us look well to the ground on which we stand, and carefully estimate the duties thence arising.

At the very threshhold of the subject, we are met by the inquiry, whether any civil court has the power, under the constitution of the United States and Pennsylvania, to review the ecclesiastical acts and proceedings of regularly organised church assemblies, and pronounce them void; whether, for example, after such an assembly has adjudicated a question of church membership, its judgment may be set aside, or treated as a nullity, for any purpose, by a court of law; or must be referred to and taken as conclusive whenever the same question arises in a civil case. Some strenuously contend, that if such a power exists, our religious liberties are but a name; our boasted rights of conscience, a mockery. We maintain, that if it did not exist, as it most clearly does, our liberty would very soon run into licentiousness of a most dangerous and disorganising character. The first article of the Amendment of the Constitution of the United States contains the only provision in that instrument at all applicable to the subject, and is not so comprehensive as the third section of the Declaration of Rights, which forms a part of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and is in these words:

"That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain. any ministry against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship."ARTICLE IX. Sect. 3.

This contains all that is to be found in the article first mentioned, and a great deal more: to it, therefore, our attention may be confined. In nearly all the states similar constitutional provisions have been framed, and there is scarcely one of them in which every principle of law that may hereafter be laid down, and applied to the case in hand, does not prevail with the full force here asserted.

We maintain that a civil court may set aside ecclesiastical acts and decisions; that is, declare them void and inoperative, whenever they contravene the established law of the ecclesiastical association which passed them, so far as those acts interfere with civil rights. This doctrine we shall endeavour to illustrate and enforce, in the application of it to the details of a particular case; that of the exclusion of one or more members of a religious society from its communion; the case that most frequently comes before a court of justice, and the consideration of which will throw most light upon our whole subject.

The constitution of every voluntary association, is to be regarded as a contract by which the members bind themselves; and in the absence of any special law of the land relating thereto, those who have assented to its provisions are governed in all the relations which it creates by the general law of contracts. There can be no difference in this respect between ecclesiastical associations and others-partnerships, trades-unions, or temperance societies-unless such difference is expressly established by some positive enactment. Men unite and form associations of various kinds, governed, too, according to their respective natures by very different codes. Some of these are formed voluntarily; some by compulsion. Now we may illustrate the law of union to which the former are subject, by the consideration of that which binds together the latter. Whatever may have been the origin of civil society--whether it originated in the consent of its first members or not; certainly after a government is once regularly constituted, no man who lives within its limits can outlaw himself, be independent of the community in which he moves, connected with others by none of its ties, bound by no obligation which its laws have created. He may, indeed, forsake the country over which that government extends, and thus be freed from its requirements; but only to bring himself under new social obligations in another land, or to dwell in the wilderness apart from all society. Numerous instances of compulsory associations subordinate to this

great one-civil society-might be mentioned. The militia systems of several of the states, and of the United States, may be referred to for examples. And there is no reason why laws should not be enacted, providing for many more. such associations. In each of these several cases any member withdrawing himself, is or might be made liable, not merely to punishment, but also to process compelling his return and submission to the requirements of the law. There are also some instances of associations quite voluntary in their commencement, which the law makes compulsory as to their continuance. As one of these, we may mention the relation of husband and wife. But to whatever extent the legislature might go in compelling the formation of societies, certainly at one point its course would be arrested by the above quoted constitutional provision; it has no right to enact any law intended to force people into association for purposes of religion: to force them to remain together when already thus associated; or to force them to contribute to the maintenance of any church establishment. And, as no such law can be enacted, so it seems that under the Constitution, none can be construed to effect any of these results. All ecclesiastical societies then must be purely voluntary: both their creation and continuance must depeud solely upon the will of the partics. But except that they are excluded from legislative action, and from the operation of civil law, so far as the connection of the parts is concerned, by the express words of a paramount authority, they are, as to the point here considered like all other voluntary associations. The latter, so long as no positive enactment controls them, in matters in respect to which the former are placed beyond control, differ from these in no wise as to civil rights and liabilities. Such bodies cannot any of them, as the law now stands, be held together by compulsion. To take the case of a partnership-though partners expressly agree that their connexion shall continue for a fixed length of time, each may at any moment withdraw from his companions, and no power can prevent. True, his liability as a partner may not cease, though of this there would seem to be some doubt; and most certainly damages could, in certain supposable cases, be recovered by the other partners; but first they must show, that they have suffered a positive civil injury by the breach of contract.

The further consideration of this doctrine is, however, unnecessary, because the constitutions of all ecclesiastical socie

ties in this country, recognise, as indeed do those of almost all voluntary associations, the right of members to withdraw from their communion at pleasure. This leads us to remark that the rights and privileges belonging to such associations, or rather to the members of which they are composed, are of two distinct kinds; those which depend entirely for their existence on the existence of the body, as, for example, the right of deliberating and voting on matters which in no way involve the disposition or management of property, which may be styled personal rights; and those that might, or certainly would survive the dissolution of the body, and may be transferred from one to another, all which may pass under the denomination of rights of property. Both these classes of rights depend on contract or agreement, but the former on a contract without any legal consideration, for which reason they cannot be enforced by process of law. Any member may be wrongfully deprived of them by exclusion, partial or complete, from the society, without the power of redress. He might have withdrawn from the rest whenever he saw fit: why may not they withdraw from him? for into their withdrawing, the exclusion resolves itself, when not accompanied with personal violence; which is a distinct cause of action where it is chargeable-and even then solely so far as the rights depending on the union are concerned. Of course, when they withdraw, they necessarily carry with them all those rights that cannot survive the existence of the society.

The case of the rights of property, that may belong to the members of a voluntary association is very different. We speak of the rights of the members; for the body cannot, as such, have any rights. Corporations are expressly endowed by law with a peculiar capacity in this respect-the capacity of natural persons. Other societies cannot hold property, cannot sue or be sued. What are familiarly called their rights, technically speaking, are only the aggregated rights of the members. They have, indeed, a certain kind of legal existence. The law recognises them as exercising certain powers, though capable of possessing no rights; or, perhaps, more properly, as instruments or machines, through the medium of which power fis transmitted. But as they are not the creatures of the law, it has not the same jurisdiction over them that it has over corporations, which are its creatures. The latter, by wrongful acts, may forfeit their privileges, and by legal process be annihilated. Their existence depends