ther attributes of things, or they signify genera or species of things.

164. We have a more distinct conception of the attributes of all the individuals with which we are acquainted, than of the subject to which those attributes belong.

Mus. 1. The conception that we form of any individual body we have access to know, is, that it has length, breadth, and thickness; such a figure, and such a colour; that it is hard, or soft, or fluid; that it has such qualities, and is fit for such purposes. If it is a vegetable, we may know where it grows, what is the form of its leaves, and flower and seed. If an animal, what are its natural instincts, its manner of life, and of rearing its young. Of these attributes belonging to this individual and numberless others, we may surely have a distinct conception; and we shall find words in language by which we can clearly and distinctly express them.

2. If we consider, in like manner, the conception that we form of any individual person of our acquaintance, we shall find it to be made up of various attributes, which we ascribe to him; such as, that he is the son of such a man, the brother of such another, that he has such an employment or office, such a fortune, that he is tall or short, well or ill made, comely or ill favoured, young or old, married or unmarried; to this we may add, his temper, his character, his abilities, and perhaps some anecdotes of his history. Such is the conception we form of individual persons of our acquaintance; by such attributes we describe them to those who know them not; and by such attributes historians give us a conception of the personages of former times: nor is it possible to describe them in any other way.

Corol. All the distinct knowledge we have or can have of any individual, is the knowledge of its attributes, for we know not the essence of any individual; and indeed this seems to be beyond the reach of the human faculties.

165. Now every attribute is what the ancients called an universal. It is or may be, common to various individuals; and, on this account, attributes are expressed by general words.

Obs. 1. It appears likewise, from every man's experience, that he may have as clear and distinct a conception of such attributes as we have named, and of innumerable others, as he can have of any individual to which they belong.

2. Indeed, all that we distinctly conceive about individuals is about their attributes. It is true we conceive a subject to which they belong; but of this subject, whether it be body or mind, when its attributes are set aside, we have but an obscure and relative conception.

166. The other class of general terms are those that signify the genera and species, into which we divide and

subdivide things. And if we be able to form distinct conceptions of attributes, it cannot surely be denied that we have distinct conceptions of genera and species; because they are only collections of attributes, which we conceive to exist in a subject, and to which we give a general name. If the attributes comprehended under that general name be distinctly conceived, the thing meant by the name must be distinctly conceived; and the name may be justly attributed to every individual that has those attributes.

Mus. Thus, we can conceive distinctly what it is to have wings, to be covered with feathers, to lay eggs. Suppose then we give the name of bird to every animal that has these three attributes. And if this be admitted to be the definition of a bird, there is nothing that we can conceive more distinctly; for undoubtedly our conception of the animal is as distinct as our notion of the attributes which are common to the species. If we had never seen a bird, and can but be made to understand the definition, we can easily apply it, without danger of mistake, to every individual of the species.

167. When things are divided and subdivided by men of science, and names given to the genera and species, those names are defined.

Illus. Thus, the genera and species of plants, and of other natural bodies, are accurately defined by writers in the various branches of natural history; so that, to all future generations, the definition will convey a distinct notion of the genus or species defined.

168. When we meet with words signifying genera and species of things, which have a meaning somewhat vague and indistinct; so that they who speak the same language do not always use them in the same sense; we may rest assured that there is no definition of them which has authority.

Illus. Thus, a man may know, that when he applies the name of beast to a lion or a tiger; and the name of bird to an eagle or a turkey, he speaks properly; but whether a bat be a bird or a beast, he may be uncertain. If of a beast and of a bird there was any accurate definition, of sufficient authority, he could be at no loss. And, strange as it may seem, legislators have seldom or never thought fit to give the definition of a man.

Corol. A genus or species being a collection of attributes, conceived to exist in one subject, a definition is therefore the only way to prevent any addition or diminution of its ingredients in the conception of different persons, and when there is no definition that can be appealed to as a standard, the name will hardly retain precision in its signification.

169. To conceive the meaning of a general word, and to conceive that which it signifies, is the same thing. We conceive

distinctly the meaning of general terms, therefore we conceive distinctly that which they signify. But such terms do not signify any individual, but what is common to many individuals: therefore, we have a distinct conception of things common to many individuals :—that is, we have distinct general conceptions.

170. We must here beware of the ambiguity that is sometimes thrown around the word conception in popular language, which sometimes makes it signify the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. When the word is taken in the first sense, every act of the mind is an individual act: the universality, therefore, is not in the act of the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived. The thing conceived is an attribute common to many subjects, or it is a genus or a species common to many individuals.

Illus. Suppose we conceive a triangle; that is, a plane figure terminated by three right lines. He that understands this definition distinctly, has a distinct conception of a triangle. But a triangle is not an individual; it is a species. The act of my mind in conceiving it is an individual act, and has a real existence; but the thing conceived is general, and cannot exist without other attributes, which are not included in the definition. Every triangle that really exists must have a certain length of sides and measure of angles; it must besides have place and time; but the definition of a triangle includes neither existence, nor any of those attributes; and therefore they are not included in the conception of a triangle, which cannot be accurate if it comprehended more than the definition.

Corol. Thus, it appears to be evident, that we have general conceptions that are clear and distinct, both of attributes of things and of genera and species of things.

III. Of general Conceptions formed by analyzing objects. 171. The operations of the mind, by which we are enabled to form general conceptions, appear to be three:

First. The resolving or analyzing a subject into its known attributes, and giving a name to each attribute, which name shall signify that attribute, and nothing more.

Secondly. The observing of one attribute, or more attributes than one, to be common to many objects. The first is by philosophers called abstraction; the second may be called generalizing; but both are commonly included under the name of abstraction.

A third operation of the mind, by which we form abstract conceptions, is the combining into one whole a certain number of those attributes of which we have formed abstract no

tions, and giving a name to that combination. It is thus we form abstract notions of the genera and species of things.

172. There is nothing with regard to abstraction, strictly so called, that is either difficult to be understood or practised.

Illus. What can be more easy than to distinguish the different attributes which we know to belong to any subject? In a man, for instance, to distinguish his size, his complexion, his age, his fortune, his birth, his profession, and twenty other things that belong to him. To think and speak of those things with understanding, is surely within the reach of every man endowed with human faculties.

173. There may be distinctions that require nice discernment, or an acquaintance with the subject that is not

common.

Illus. Thus, a critic in painting may discern the style of Raphael or Titian, when another man could not. A lawyer may be acquainted with many distinctions in crimes, and contracts, and actions, which never entered the head of a man who has not studied law. One man may excel another in the talent of distinguishing, as he may in memory or in reasoning; but there is a certain degree of this talent, without which a man could have no title to be considered a reasonable creature.

174. We may in our conception, with perfect ease, distinguish and disjoin attributes, which cannot be actualJy separated in the subject.

Illus. Thus, in a body, we can distinguish its solidity from its extension, and its weight from both. In extension, we can distinguish length, breadth, and thickness, yet none of these can be separated from the body, or from one another.

175. There may be attributes belonging to a subject, and inseparable from it, of which we have no knowledge, and consequently no conception; but this does not hinder us from conceiving distinctly those of its attributes which we do know.

Illus. Thus, all the properties of a circle are inseparable from the nature of a circle, and may be demonstrated from its definition; yet a man may have a perfectly distinct notion of a circle, who knows very few of those properties belonging to it which mathematicians have described and a circle has, probably, many properties which mathematicians never dreamed of.

Corol. It is therefore certain, that attributes, which, in their nature are absolutely inseparable from their subject, and from one another, may be disjoined in our conception; one cannot exist without the other, but one can be conceived without the other...

IV. Of the Operation of Generalizing.

176. We proceed now to consider the operation of generalizing, which is nothing but the observing of one attribute, or more attributes than one, to be common to many subjects.

Illus. There are many men above six feet high, and many below that height; many men are rich, many poor; many born in Britain, many born in France. But here, size, fortune, and country, are attributes. There are, therefore, innumerable attributes which are common to many individuals; and if this be what the schoolmen called universale a parte rei, we may affirm, with certainty, that there are such universals.

177. There are some attributes expressed by general words, and of these, this position may seem more doubtful; as, for instance, the qualities which are inherent in their several subjects. It may be said that every subject hath its own qualities, and that which is the quality of one subject cannot be the quality of another subject.

Illus. 1. Thus, the whiteness of the sheet of paper that I write upon cannot be the whiteness of another sheet, though both are called white. The weight of one guinea is not the weight of another guinea, though both are said to have the same weight.

2. To this we answer, that the whiteness of this sheet is one thing, whiteness is another; the first signifies an individual quality really existing, and is not a general conception, though it be an abstract one; the second signifies a general conception, which implies no existence, but which, in the same sense, may be predicated every thing that is white.

3. On this account, if any one should say, that the whiteness of this sheet is the whiteness of another sheet, every one perceives this to be absurd; but when he says both sheets are white, this is true and perfectly understood. The conception of whiteness implies no existence; it would remain the same, though every thing

in the universe that is white were annihilated.

Corol. 1. It appears, therefore, that the general names of qualities, as well as of other attributes, are applicable to many indviduals in the same sense, which cannot be if there be not general conceptions signified by such names.

2. It appears further, that, since no individual can have a plural number, (Art. 154. Illus.) as soon as a child can say with understanding, that he has two brothers or two sisters; as soon as he can use the plural number, so soon must he have general conceptions.

178. As there are not two individuals in nature that agree in every thing, so there are very few that do not agree in some things.

Illus. 1. We take pleasure from our earliest years, in observing such agreements; and one branch of what we call wit, which, when innocent, gives pleasure to every good man, consists in discovering