judgment with regard to the character of others, and of selfdeceit with regard to our own.

359. Moral approbation or disapprobation, is accompanied with agreeable or uneasy feelings in the breast of the spectator or judge.

Illus. The benevolent affections give pleasure, the malevolent desires give pain, in one degree or another. And when we contemplate a noble character, though but in ancient story, or even in a novel, a comedy, or a tragedy; like a beautiful object, it gives a lively and pleasant emotion to the spirits-it warms the heart, and invigorates the frame-like the beams of a meridian sun, it enlivens the face of nature, and diffuses heat, light, and joy, all around.

Example. We feel a sympathy with the noble Caractacus, and are afflicted in his distress; and Alfred the Great compels us to rejoice in his prosperity; we even catch some sparks of that celestial fire that animated the conduct of the latter and it is impossible to accompany the former to Rome, without feeling the glow of his virtue and magnanimity.

Corol. This sympathy is the necessary effect of our judgment of the conduct of those men, and of our approbation and esteem due to that conduct; for real sympathy is always the effect of some benevolent affection, such as esteem, love, pity, or humanity.

360. Sympathy gathers strength from the social tie, and bids us claim some property in the worth of a father, or a mother, a brother, or a sister, a relation, or an acquaintance, and chiefly so in that friend whom we value above all her sex. But the highest pleasure of our soul is, when we are conscious of good conduct in ourselves.

Obs. On the other hand, the view of a vicious character, espe cially if that character be connected with us, like that of an ugly and deformed object, is disagreeable, and our sympathy is very painful indeed; for we blush for those faults, by which we feel ourselves dishonoured.

Corol. If bad conduct in those in whom we are interested, be uneasy and painful, it is much more so when we are conscious of it in ourselves. This uneasy feeling has a name in all languages; we call it remorse. In repentance, contrition, and remorse, self-reproach, and even indignation, are largely intermixed with the affection of

Borrow.

Note. We shall here close our division of "The Intellectual Powers," recommending to the more advanced reader, the study of Reid and Stewart's writings on the same subject: what we have said is sufficient in an elementary treatise.

15

BOOK III.

SUBJECTS OF COLLATERAL INQUIRY, WITH THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

CHAPTER 1.

OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF

BODIES.

361. WE have observed in Chapter II. of Book II. that sensation is generally conjoined with perception: but these terms denote two separate and distinct acts of the mind; and we have no appropriate name to designate the conjunction of sensation with perception. Both are generally confounded together under one term, which comes to be more strictly appropriated either to the sensation or the perception, according as the one or the other more strongly occupies the attention of the mind.

Illus. 1. If it be asked, What I mean by the smell of a rose? it is evident that, in the general acceptation of the phrase, this denotes a sensation of the mind; as appears from the epithets fragrant, agreeable, &c. which are applicable to it, and which have meaning when referred to a sentient being. (Art. 105. Illus. 1, 2, and 3.) Along, however, with this sensation of an agreeable odour, there is conjoined a perception, by which we form a certain notion of that quality in the rose, which is the cause of its odour; but this perception is totally distinct from the sensation, (Art. 42. and 108.); for the perception cannot be said to be agreeable or otherwise, and it has an external object, the existence of which depends not upon the act of the mind, as doth the sensation, (See Art. 106. and Illus. Art. 110.) Yet we have no name by which to distinguish the object of this perception, unless it be that which more properly belongs to the accompanying sensation, to wit, the smell of the rose; a defect of language, which is no doubt the source of much ambiguity.

2. Again, if it be asked, What is the effect produced by applying the hand upon any solid and compact substance? it will be answer

ed, that, We feel the body to be hard. And, in like manner, when the parts of a body are easily displaced, or its figure changed by applying the hand to it, we call it soft: we feel it soft. These are the notions which all mankind have of hardness and softness. They are neither sensations, nor like any sensation; they were real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be so when they are not perceived; for if any man will affirm, that diamonds were not hard till they were handled, who would reason with him?

3. The sensation of hardness may be easily had, by pressing one's hand against the table, and attending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside, as much as possible, all thought of the table and its qualities, or of any external thing. But it is one thing to have the sensation, and another to attend to it, and make it a distinct object of reflection. The first is easy; the last, in most cases, extremely difficult.

4. The sensation of touch, and the hardness of bodies, have not the least similitude; yet the hardness of bodies is a thing that we conceive as distinctly, and believe as firmly, as any thing in nature; and no rules of reasoning are required to convince me of the consciousness I have of this sensation when I press my hand against the table. I see nothing left, but to conclude, that, by an original principle in my constitution, a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness, and creates the belief of it: or, in other words, that this sensation is the natural sign of hardness.

362. This sensation may be increased in strength at pleasure, merely by increasing the pressure of the hand; and it may be increased to such a degree, as to be very disagreeable. It then arrests the attention forcibly enough, and we give it the name of Pain, which is, however, no appropriate term, but the common appellation of all sensations that are disagreeable. If I hit my toe against a stone with violence, the sensation I experience is the same in kind, but different in degree, with what I feel when I gently press the table with my hand.

363. We have now shewn, that language affords, in general, but a single term whereby to distinguish both the sensation and its accompanying perception; and that this term is chiefly appropriated either to the sensation or the perception, according as the attention is most engrossed by the one or the other. Upon this circumstance, appears to be founded a distinction of the qualities of body into two kinds, called primary and secondary.

Illus. The reality of the distinction appears to be placed in this, that the primary qualities are those of which we have a distinct perception, and but a slight sensation: while, of the secondary, our perception is but obscure, and we have a strong sensation, which

chiefly arrests our attention. Hence, the names of the primary qualities of body, more usually refer to the perception by which they are made known to us; while those of the secondary qualities have more properly a reference to the accompanying sensation.

364. The three senses of taste, smell, and hearing, appear to give us information of the secondary qualities of body alone; the other two senses of sight and touch, inform us both of primary and secondary qualities. Heat and cold are secondary qualities, discernible by touch; and colour is a secondary quality, discernible by sight.

Illus. The disposition of bodies to reflect a particular kind of light, or the fitness of certain particles of external bodies to reflect some only of the rays of light, ocasions the sensation of colour; and, in this acceptation, it really exists in the sentient being, although early prejudice induces us to refer it to the external body alone; and the term is usually applied only to the external cause of the sensation, and not to the sensation itself, which is not the case with the other secondary qualities. All the primary qualities of body may be discovered by the sense of touch alone; and it is this sense, as diffused over our whole corporeal frame, which imparts the most accurate notions concerning those qualities. For the notions of extention and figure, as conveyed by the eye, require the correction of the touch; and even motion, which might be supposed to be the peculiar province of sight, can only certainly be ascertained by the touch, because the eye often judges motion to be real, when it is but apparent; as when, sailing along the Shore in a vessel, we fancy the land moves.

365. There appears, upon the whole, to be a real distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of body; our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of extension, divisibility, figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness, and fluidity, which are all primary qualities; but of the secondary qualities, sound, colour, taste, smell, and heat or cold, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion.

Obs. A relative notion of a thing, is, strictly speaking, no notion of the thing at all, but only of some relation which it bears to something else. Thus, of the word gravity, I can have a distinct and accurate notion, when it signifies the tendency of bodies towards the earth; but when it signifies the cause of that tendency, I have no conception of what the thing is, though I may think of it as an unknown cause of a known effect. This is a relative notion; and there are many objects of thought and discourse, of which our faculties can give no better than a relative notion.

CHAPTER II.

OF NATURAL LANGUAGE AND SIGNS.

$66. IN Illus. 4. Art. 361. sensations were called NaTURAL SIGNS. Mankind reciprocally communicate their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and desires, by language or signs.

Illus. These signs are of two kinds: first, such as have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them; these are artificial signs. 2dly. Such as, previous to all compact and agreement, have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of his nature.

Corol. Language, therefore, so far as it consists of artificial signs, may be called artificial; so far as it consists of natural signs, we call it natural.

367. If mankind had not had a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and, therefore, there must be a natural language, before an artificial language can be invented.

368. The elements of the natural language of mankind, or the signs that are naturally expressive of our thoughts, consist in modulations of the voice, gestures, and features.

Illus. By means of these, two savages, who have no common artificial language, can converse together; can communicate their thoughts in some tolerable manner; can ask and refuse, affirm and deny, threaten and supplicate; can traffic, enter into covenants, and plight their faith! Historical facts of undoubted credit are the bases of this illustration.

369. Mankind having thus, by nature, a common language, though a scanty one, adapted only to the necessities of nature, their ingenuity improved it by the addition of artificial signs, to supply the deficiency of the natural.

Illus. These artificial signs multiply with the arts of life, and the improvements of knowledge. The articulations of the voice, seem to be, of all signs, the most proper for artificial language; and as mankind have universally used them for that purpose, we may reasonably judge that nature intended them for it. But nature does not intend that we should lay aside the use of the natural signs: it is enough that we supply their defects by artificial ones. Dumb people retain much more of the natural language than others, be