Corol. 2. As this faculty, therefore, furnishes the human mind with many of its original conceptions, or ideas, as well as with the first principles of many important branches of human knowledge, it may justly be accounted an intellectual as well as an active power of the mind. IV. Analysis of Duty, Rectitude, and Moral Obligation. 342. The subject of law must have the conception of a general rule of conduct, and a sufficient inducement to obey the law, even when his strongest animal desires draw him the contrary way. Illus. Without some degree of reason he cannot have this conception. Man is endowed with some degree of reason. We shall thence pronounce him the subject of law, having the conception of a general rule of conduct. The subject of law must likewise have a sufficient inducement to obey the law, even when his strongest animal desires draw him the contrary way. The possession of good is a sufficient inducement to obey the law. Man, of all the animals of creation, desires the possession of good. We shall therefore consider man as having a sufficient inducement to obey the law, even when his strongest animal desires draw him the contrary way. 343. This inducement may be a sense of interest, or a sense of duty, or both concurring. Obs. These are the only two principles, which, in Dr. Reid's opinion, can reasonably induce a man to regulate all his actions according to a general rule or law. Corol. They may, therefore, be justly called the rational principles of action, since they can have no place but in a being endowed with reason, and since it is by them only that man is capable either of political or of moral government. 344. Our notion, or conception of duty, is too simple to admit a logical definition; and when we say, that, it is what we ought to do what is fair and honest-what is approvable-what every man professes to be the rule of his conduct-what all men praise-and what is in itself laudable, though no man should praise it,--we define it only by synonymous words, or phrases, or by its properties and necessary concomitants. 345. The notion of duty cannot be resolved into that of interest, or what is most for our happiness. say, Illus. 1. Every man may be satisfied of this, who attends to his own conceptions, and the language of mankind shows it ;-for, when I say, "this is my interest," I mean one thing; and when I "this is my duty," I mean another thing. And though the same course of action, when rightly understood, may be both my duty and my interest, the conceptions I have of each are very different. Both are reasonable motives to action, but quite distinct in their nature. 2. In every man of real worth there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable, or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest. It is folly in any man to disregard his interest, but to do what is dishonourable is baseness. The first may move our pity, or, in some cases, our contempt; but the last provokes our indignation. Corol. 1. As these two principles are different in their nature, and not resolvable into one, so the principle of honour is evidently superior in dignity to that of interest. 2. No man would allow him to be a man of honour, who should plead his interest to justify what he acknowledged to be dishonourable; but to sacrifice interest to honour never costs a blush. 346. This principle is not to be resolved into a regard to our reputation among men, else the man of honour would not deserve to be trusted in the dark. He would have no aversion to lie, to cheat, to play the coward, when he had no dread of being discovered. Corol. Every man of honour, therefore, feels an abhorrence of certain actions, because they are in themselves base, and feels an obligation to certain other actions, because they are in themselves what honour requires, and this, independently of any consideration of interest or reputation. 347. This is an immediate moral obligation; and this principle of honour, which is acknowledged by all men who pretend to character, is only another name for what we call a regard to duty, to rectitude, to propriety of conduct. It is a moral obligation, which obliges a man to do certain things because they are right, and not to do other things because they are wrong. Corol. There is, therefore, a principle in man, call it by what name you please, which, when he acts according to it, gives him a consciousness of worth, and when he acts contrary to it, a sense of demerit. Men of rank call it honour, the vulgar hind calls it honesty, probity, virtue, conscience;-philosophers have given it the name of the moral sense, the moral faculty, rectitude. 348. The universality of this principle-the words that express it-the names of the virtues which it commands, and of the vices which it forbids-the ought and ought not, which express its dictates-make it evidently an essential part of language. Illus. 1. The natural affections-of respect to worthy people-of resentment of injuries-of gratitude for favours of indignation against the worthless-are parts of the human constitution which suppose a right and a wrong in conduct. 2. Many transactions that are found in the rudest societies go upon the same supposition. In all testimony-in all promises-in all contracts-there is necessarily implied a moral obligation on one party, and a trust in the other, grounded upon this obligation. 349. The leading principle of all our active powers is Reason, and it comprehends both a regard to what is right and honourable, and a regard to our happiness upon the whole. All the principles of action-whether they be notions of duty, rectitude, or moral obligation—when rightly understood, lead to the same course of life; they are fountains whose streams unite and run in the same channel. Obs. When we say a man ought to do such a thing, the ought, which expresses the moral obligation, has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought, and, on the other, to the action which he ought to do. Those two correlates are essential to every moral obligation; take away either, and the obligation ceases to exist. 350. The circumstances, both in the action and in the agent, necessary to constitute a moral obligation, are these: I. With regard to the action, it must be a voluntary action, or præstation of the person obliged, and not of another. II. The opinion of the agent in doing the action gives it its moral obligation. Obs. With respect to the person obliged; to things only which come within the sphere of his natural power can he be under a moral obligation. As respects the agent, if he does a materially good action, without any belief of its being good, but from some other principle, it is no good action in him. And if he does it with the belief of its being ill, it is ill in him. Corol. These qualifications of the action, and of the agent, in moral obligation, are super-evident; and the agreement of all men in them, shews that all men have the same notion, and a distinct notion, of moral obligation. V. Analysis of the Sense of Duty. 351. We are next to consider, how we learn to judge and determine that this is right, and that is wrong. Obs. The abstract notion of moral good and ill would be of no use to direct our life, if we had not the power of applying it to particular actions, and determining what is morally good, and what is morally ill. 352. By the external senses we have not only the original conceptions of the various qualities of bodies, but the original judgments that this body has such a quality, that such another; so by our moral faculty, we have both the original conceptions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, in ourselves and others; and also the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong; that this character has worth, that demerit. Illus. 1. The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it. 2. The truths immediately testified by the external senses, are the first principles from which we reason, with regard to the material world, and from which all our knowledge of it is deduced. 3. The truths immediately testified by our moral faculty, are the first principles of all moral reasoning, from which all our knowledge of our duty must be deduced. 353. Moral reasoning is all reasoning that is brought to prove that such conduct is right and deserving of moral approbation, or that it is wrong, or that it is indifferent, and, in itself, neither morally good nor ill. Corol. 1. All that we can properly call moral judgments, are reducible to one or other of these, because all human actions, considered in a moral point of view, are either good, or bad, or indifferent. 2. Let it be understood, therefore, that in the reasoning which we call moral, the conclusion always is-That something in the conduct of moral agents is good or bad, in a greater or a less degree, or indifferent. 354. All moral reasonings rest upon one or more first principles of morals, whose truth is immediately perceived, without reasoning, by all men come to years of understanding. Illus. This is common to every branch of human knowledge that deserves the name of science; and these first principles are the dictates of our natural faculties. Example 1. In astronomy and in optics, the first principles are phenomena attested by the human eye; and with him who disbelieves the testimony of that little organ, the whole of those two noble fabricks of science falls to pieces like the visions of the night. 2. The principles of music all depend upon the testimony of the ear. Those of natural philosophy, upon the facts attested by the senses. Those of mathematics, upon the necessary relations of quantities considered abstractedly. (Art. 44. Illus.) The science of politics borrows its principles from what we know by experience of the character and conduct of man. The first principles of morals, are the immediate dictates of the moral faculty. 3. He that will judge of the colour of an object, must consult his eyes in a good light, when there is no medium, or contiguous object, that may give it a false tinge. In like manner, he that will judge of the first principles of morals, must consult his conscience, or moral faculty. When he is calm and dispassionate, unbiassed by interest, affection, or fashion. Corol. The sum of the reasonings that we have made, or that we might make, on this analysis of the sense of duty, is-that, by an original power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the moral faculty, we have the conception of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other moral conceptions, and that, by the same faculty, we per ceive some things in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties. VI. Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation. 355. The judgments we form in speculative matters are dry and unaffecting; our moral judgments, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with AFFECTIONS and FEELINGS, which we are now to consider. Illus. We approve of good actions and disapprove of bad ones; and this approbation and disapprobation, when we analyse it, appears to include not only a moral judgment of the action, but some affection, favourable or unfavourable, towards the agent, and some feeling in ourselves. 356. Moral worth, even in a stranger, with whom we have not the least connexion, never fails to produce some degree of esteem mixed with good-will. The esteem which we have for a man on account of his moral worth, is different from that which is grounded upon his intellectual accomplishments, his birth, fortune, and connexion with us. Illus. Moral worth, when it is set off by eminent abilities, and external advantages, is like a diamond in the mine, which is rough and unpolished, and perhaps crusted over with some other baser material that takes away its lustre. But, when it is attended with these advantages, it is like a diamond cut and polished, and set round with pearls in a massy crown. Its lustre then attracts every eye; and yet these things, which add so much to its appearance, add but little to its real value. Corol. There is no judgment of the heart more clear, or more irresistible than this-That esteem and regard are really due to good conduct, and the contrary to base and unworthy conduct. Nor can we conceive a greater depravity in the heart of man, than it would be to see and acknowledge worth without feeling any respect to it; or to see and acknowledge the highest worthlessness without any degree of dislike and indignation. 357. The object of moral approbation is, then, either some disposition of the mind, or some external action. Illus. Probity is the most approved disposition; and the external expressions of probity the most approved actions. These constitute the whole, or the most essential part of virtue. Other subjects may be admired or contemned, but these alone are the subjects of moral approbation, of esteem and love. 358. PARTIALITY, which makes us blind to the faults of our friends, and the merits of those to whom, from prejudice or passion, we are ill affected, is the foundation of our wrong |