it to be necessarily implied; that is to say, when there can be no doubt. The bare mention of the evidence is all that men require. But when the evidence mentioned leaves room for doubt, then, without any superfluity, or tautology, we say we judge the thing to be so, because this is not implied in what was said before.

285. The judgments grounded upon the evidence of sense, of memory, and of consciousness, are called judgments of nature, because she has subjected us to them whether we will or not, because she has thus put all men upon a level, (Art. 121. Corol.) and thus deprived the philosopher of any prerogative above the illiterate, or even above the savage. Belief in our senses, and in our memory, is not learned by culture. It is necessary to all men for their being and preservation, and therefore is unconditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature.

II. Of the Exercise of Judgment in the Formation of abstract and general Conceptions.

286. That some exercise of Judgment is necessary in the formation of all abstract and general conceptions, whether more simple or more complex in dividing, in defining, and, in general, in forming all clear and distinct conceptions of things, which are the only fit materials of all reasoning, we shall now proceed to illustrate.

Obs. These operations are allied to each other, and have, therefore, been brought under one article. But they are more allied to our rational nature than those considered in the last section, and are therefore to be considered by themselves. And, that the illustrations we are to offer may not be mistaken for what they really are not, we take leave to premise, that it is not meant to be affirmed that abstract notions, or other accurate notions of things, after they have been formed, cannot be barely conceived without any exercise of Judgment about them. All that is meant by the position laid down in the article now in hand, is, that, in the formation, at first, of those "abstract and general conceptions" of the mind, there must be some exercise of judgment.

Illus. 1. It is impossible to distinguish the different atributes belonging to the same subject, without judging that they are really different and distinguishable, and that they have that relation to the subject which logicians express by saying, that they may be the predicated of it. We cannot generalize, without judging that the same attribute does, or may, belong to many individuals, (Art. 188.) Our simplest general notions are formed by distinguishing and generalizing; hence we may infer, that Judgment is exercised in forming the simplest general notions.

2. In those that are more complex, and which have been shewn to be formed by combining the more simple, there is anoth

er act of the Judgment required; for such combinations are not made at random, but for an end, and Judgment is employed in fitting them to that end. We form complex general notions for the conveniency of arranging our thoughts in discourse and reasoning; and, therefore, of an infinite number of combinations that might be formed, we choose only those that are useful and necessary.

287. That Judgment must be employed in dividing as well as in distinguishing, appears evident. It is one thing to divide a subject properly, another to cut it to pieces. Hoc non est dividere, sed frangere rem, said Cicero, when he censured the improper division of Epicurus.

Illus. Reason, as we shall see by and bye, has discovered rules of division which have been known to logicians for more than 2000 years. There are rules likewise of definition, of no less antiquity and authority. A man may, no doubt, divide or define properly without attending to these rules, or even without knowing them; but this can only be when he has Judgment to perceive that to be right in a particular case, which the rule determines to be right in all cases.

Corol. What has now been advanced, leads to the inference that, without some degree of Judgment, we can form no accurate and distinct notions of things; so that one province of Judgment is, to aid us in forming clear and distinct conceptions of things, which are the only fit materials for reasoning.

288. The necessity of some degree of Judgment to have clear and distinct conceptions of things, may thus be illustrated, even to the philosophers, who have always considered the formation of ideas of every kind as belonging to simple apprehension, and that the sole province of Judgment is to put them together in affirmative or negative propositions.

Mus. An artist, suppose a carpenter, cannot work in his art without tools, and these tools must be made by art. The exercise of the art, therefore, is necessary to make the tools, and the tools are necessary to the exercise of the art. And this is illustrative of the necessity of some degree of Judgment, in order to form clear and distinct conceptions of things. These are the tools which we must use in judging and reasoning, and without them our work must be very bungling indeed; yet these tools cannot be made without some exercise of Judgment.

289. The necessity of some degree of Judgment in forming accurate and distinct notions of things, will further appear, if we consider attentively what notions we can form, without any aid of Judgment, of the objects of sense, of the operations of our own minds, or of the relations of things.

(1.) To begin with the OBJECTS Of sense.

290. It is acknowledged, on all hands, that the first notions we have of sensible objects are acquired by the external senses only, and probably before Judgment is brought forth; but these first notions are neither simple, nor are they accurate and distinct. They are gross and indistinct, and, like a chaos, an indigested heap of rude materials. Before we can have any distinct notion of this mass, it must be analysed; the heterogeneous parts must be separated in our conception, and the simple elements, which before lay hid in the common mass, must first be distinguished, and then put together into one whole.

Illus. In this way it is that we form distinct notions even of the objects of sense; but this analysis and composition become so easy by habit, and can be thence performed so readily, that we are apt to overlook it, and to impute the distinct notion we have formed of the object, to the senses alone; and this we are the more prone to do, because, when once we have distinguished the sensible qualities of the object from one another, the sense gives testimony to each of them.

Example. Suppose a cube of brass to be presented at the same time to a child of a year old and to a man. The regularity of the figure will attract the attention of both. Both have the sensations of sight and of touch in equal perfection; and, therefore, if any thing be discovered in this object by the man, which cannot be discovered by the child, it must be owing, not to the senses, but to some other faculty, which the child has not yet attained.

Illus. 1. First, then, the man can easily distinguish the body from the surface that terminates it: this the child cannot do. Secondly, the man can perceive, that this surface is made up of six planes of the same figure and magnitude: the child cannot discover this. Thirdly, the man perceives that each of these planes has four equal sides, and four angles: and that the opposite sides of each plane, and the opposite planes are parallel. (See Illus. 1. Art. 183.)

2. It will surely be allowed, that a man of ordinary Judgment may observe all this in a cube which he makes an object of contemplation, and takes time to consider; that he may give the name of a square to a plane terminated by four equal sides and four equal angles; and the name of a cube, to a solid terminated by six equal squares; all this then is nothing else but analysing the figure of the object presented to his senses into its simplest elements, and again compounding it of those elements.

3. By this analysis and composition two effects are produced, First, from the one complex object which his senses presented to his mind, though one of the most simple the senses can present, he educes many simple and distinct notions of right lines, angles, plane surface, solid, equality, parallelism; notions which the child has not yet faculties to attain. Secondly, when the man considers the cube as compounded of these elements, put together in a cer

tain order, he has then, and not before, a distinct and scientific notion of a cube. The child neither conceives those elements, nor in what order they must be put together, so as to make a cube; and therefore of a cube he has no accurate notion which can make it a subject of reasoning.

Corol. Whence we may conclude, that the notions which we have from the senses alone, even of the simplest object of sense, are indistinct, and incapable of being either described or reasoned upon, until the object is analysed into its simple elements, and considered as compounded of those elements. (See Illus. and Corol. Art. 188.)

lus. 4. And if we should apply this reasoning to more complex objects of sense, the conclusion is still more evident.

Example. A dog may be taught to turn a jack, but he can never be taught to have a distinct notion of a jack. He sees every part of it as well as a man; but the relation of the parts to one another, and to the whole, he has not Judgment to comprehend. (See Illus. 6. Art. 192.)

Illus. 5. A distinct notion of an object, even of sense, is never got in an instant; but the sense performs its office in an instant. Time is not required to see it better, but to analyse it, to distinguish the different parts, and their relation to one another, and to the whole.

Corol. Hence it is, that when any vehement passion or emotion hinders the cool application of Judgment, we get no distinct notion of an object, even though the sense be long directed to it.

Example. A man who is put into a panic, by thinking he sees a ghost, may stare very long, without having any distinct notion of what he fancies he beholds; it is his understanding, and not his sense, that is disturbed by his horror. If he can lay that aside, Judgment immediately enters upon its office, and examines the length and breadth, the colour and figure, and distance of the object. Of these, while his panic lasted, he had no distinct notion, though his eyes were open all the time.

Illus. 6. When the visual organ is open, but the Judgment disturbed by a panic, or any violent emotion that engrosses the mind, we see things confusedly, and probably much in the same manner that brutes and perfect ideots do, and infants also before the use of judgment.

Corol. There are, therefore, notions of the objects of sense, which are gross and indistinct, and there are others which are distinct and scientific. The former ay be acquired from the senses alone; but the latter cannot be obtained without some degree of Judg

ment.

291. (11.) Having said so much on the notions which we acquire of the objects of sense from the senses alone; let us next consider what notions we can have of the operations of our minds, from consciousness alone.

Illus. Consciousness is an internal sense, (Art. 24.) that gives the like immediate knowledge of things in the mind, that is, of our own thoughts and feelings, (Illus. Art. 100.) as the senses give

us of things external, (Art. 103.) There is this difference, however, that an external object may be at rest, and the sense may be employed about it for some time, (Illus. Art. 115.) But the objects of consciousness are never at rest; the stream of thought flows like a river, without stopping for one moment; the whole train of thought passes in succession under the eye of consciousness, which is always employed about the present. But is it consciousness that analyses complex operations, distinguishes their different ingredients, and combines them in distinct parcels, under general names?—No.-(Art. 24. and Illus. Art. 48.)-This is not the work of consciousness, nor can it be performed without reflection, (Art. 51.) recollecting and judging of what we were conscious, and what we distinctly remember. This reflection does not appear in children, and, of all the powers of the mind, it comes latest to maturity, whereas consciousness is coeval with the earliest. (Obs. Art. 102. and Illus. Art. 129.) But this subject has been so sufficiently handled in the fifth Chapter of Book I. that further proofs in this place are unnecessary.

292. (11.) We proposed, in the third place, to consider our notions of the relations of things: and here, it appears, that, without Judgment we cannot have any notion of relations.

Пllus. 1. There are two ways in which we acquire the notion of relations. The first is, by comparing the related objects, of which we have before had the conception. By this comparison we perceive the relation, either immediately, or by a process of reasoning.

Examples. That the fifth finger of my hand is shorter than the middle finger, I perceive immediately; as well as that three is the half of six. This instantaneous perception is immediate and intuitive Judgment. (See Art. 114. and 118.) The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, I perceive by a process of reasoning, in which it will be acknowledged that there is Judgment. (See Illus. Art. 119.)

Illus. 2. Another way in which we get the notions of relations, is, when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive, or judge, that it must, from its nature, have a certain relation to something else, which before perhaps we never thought of; and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of a certain relation between them.

Example. Thus, when you attend to colour, figure, weight, you cannot help judging these to be qualities which cannot exist without a subject (Illus. Art. 18.); that is, something which is coloured, figured, heavy (See Illus. Art. 182.). If you had not perceived such things to be qualities, you would never have had any notion of their subject, or of their relation to it. (See the Illustrations to Article 195.)

Illus. 3. By attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive, or judge, that there must be something which thinks, remembers, and reasons; and this something we call the mind. (Art. 5.) When we attend to any change that