Illus. In the former case, thoughts which have been formerly in the mind, may recur to us, but whether, at that time, we have the idea of the past suggested or not, there is, doubtless, a certain modification of time, because what we remember is past. In the latter case, it is more evident, that if we recal to mind former objects of its thoughts, we refer the event to a particular time; so that of every such act of Memory, the idea of the past is a neces; sary concomitant. (See Illus. 1. Art. 245.)

250. The evidence, or belief, of past existence, which always accompanies Memory, (Art. 243.) forms one important distinction between that faculty and association.

Illus. 1. The suggestions which are made by the faculty of Asso ciation alone, impress us with no belief of their reality. In fact, the very materials upon which they are employed, if not supplied by the immediate perception of the moment, must be furnished by the memory, or that faculty which enables us to treasure up past knowledge.

Corol. Thus the power of Association, in its most useful exercise, pre-supposes the power of Memory; and when, during the spontaneous flow of the current of thought, we recognize a combination of which we had formerly been conscious, and distinguish it from one newly formed, this necessarily implies an exercise of a faculty which can distinguish former knowledge from new; which is not an attribute of the faculty of Association, but of the MEMORY alone.

Illus. 2. In the case of some old men, who retain pretty exactly the information which they receive, but are sometimes unable to recollect in what manner the particulars which they find connected together in their thoughts at first came into the mind, whether they occurred to them in a dream, or were communicated to them in conversation, we have an example of the power of Association operating without any aid from memory. (See Art. 254. Illus.2. and Example.) But in most cases the suggestions of Memory are made by means of the combinations previously established among our thoughts.

3. This, however, is but one part of the province of Memory, for, as was observed above, (Art. 247.) this faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The first of these is entirely independent of the faculty of Combination; but this faculty is the principal, though not the sole instrument, by which the latter purpose is accomplished.

4. The advantages of this law are thus stated by Mr. Stewart. On the other hand, says he, it is evident that without the associating principle, the power of retaining our thoughts, and of recog nizing them when they occur to us, would have been of little use; for the most important articles of our knowledge might have remained latent in the mind, even when those occasions presented themselves to which they are immediately applicable.

Corol. In consequence of this law of our nature, not only are all our various ideas made to pass from time to time in review before

us, and to offer themselves to our choice as subjects of meditation; but, when an occasion occurs which calls for the aid of our past experience, the occasion itself recals to us all the information upon the subject which that experience hath accumulated.

IV. Varieties of Memory in different Individuals. 251. Of all our faculties, Memory is that which nature has bestowed in the most unequal degrees on different individuals; but the original disparities are by no means so immense, as they seem to be at first view; and much of this diversity is to be ascribed to different habits of Attention, and to a difference of selection among the various objects and events presented to our curiosity.

Illus. As the great purpose to which this faculty is subservient, is, to enable us to collect and retain, for the future regulation of our conduct, the results of our past experience; it is evident that the degree of perfection which it attains in the case of different persons, must vary; first, with the facility of making the original acquisition; secondly, with the permanence of the acquisition; and, thirdly, with the quickness or readiness with which the individual is able, on particular occasions, to apply it to use.

Corol. The qualities, therefore, of a good Memory are, in the first place, to be susceptible; secondly, to be retentive; and, thirdly, to be ready.

252. Susceptibility and readiness are both connected with a facility of associating ideas, according to their more obvious relations; retentiveness or tenaciousness of Memory, depends principally on what is seldom united with this fa/cility-a disposition to system and philosophical arrange

ment.

Illus. 1. The more obvious relations which befriend susceptibility and readiness, are those of resemblance and of analogy, and the casual relations arising from the contiguity of time and place; the philosophical arrangement upon which retentiveness and tenaciousness of Memory depend, has for its basis the relations of cause and effect, or of premises and conclusion.

Obs. This difference in the modes of Association in different men, is the foundation of some very striking diversities between them in respect of intellectual character. But we have anticipated the further illustration of this position in Chapters IV. VI. and VII. to which we must therefore refer the reader.

Illus. 2. Again, our ideas are frequently associated in consequence of the associations which take place among their arbitrary signs. All the signs by which our thoughts are expressed, are addressed either to the eye or to the ear; and the impressions made on these organs at the time when we first receive an idea, contribute to give us a firmer hold of it. Visible objects are remembered more easily that those of any of our other senses (See Art. 142. Illus.); and

hence it is, that the bulk of mankind are more aided in their recollection by the impressions made on the eye, than by those made on the ear. But in the philosopher, whose habits of constantly employing words as an instrument of thought, co-operating with that inattention which he is apt to contract to things external, the original powers of recollection and conception with respect to visible objects are commonly greatly weakened; while the power of retaining propositions and reasonings expressed in language is greatly strengthened by his habits of abstraction and generalization.

3. A prejudice has obtained, that a great Memory is scarcely compatible with that acuteness of parts denominated genius; and the effect of this opinion is such, that no one blushes at acknowledging a shortness of Memory, while to be accused of a defect of judgment, or a want of penetration, is usually considered a high affront. This prejudice, however, appears to be without foundation; and Memory, far from being incompatible with genius, seems even to be necessary, in its utmost perfection, for those happy exertions of intellect which confer immortality upon their authors.

Example. Robert Bloomfield, that completely self-taught genius and pleasing poet, composed the latter part of the Autumn, and the whole of the Winter of his FARMER'S BOY, mentally, without ever putting pen to paper. Nor was this all; for he even thoroughly corrected and revised this extensive portion of his poem, before he ever wrote a word of it; and this, too, while at work with his fellow journeymen, in a garret; and then, as he himself expressed it, he had nothing to do but to write it down!

Illus. 4. The following example, on the contrary, justifies the foregoing prejudice; for none who have perused the writings of the amusing author of whom we are now to speak, can doubt that he possessed genius.

Example. MONTAIGNE frequently complains, in his writings, of his want of Memory; and he indeed gives many very extraordinary instances of his ignorance on some of the most ordinary topics of information. But it is obvious, as Mr. Stewart justly remarks, that this ignorance did not proceed from an original defect of memory, but from the singular and whimsical direction which his curiosity had taken at an early period of life. "I can do nothing," says Mantaigne, "without my memorandum-book; and, so great is my difficulty in remembering proper names, that I am forced to call my domestic servants by their offices. I am ignorant of the greater part of our coins in use; of the difference of one grain from another, both in the earth and in the granary; what use leaven is in making bread, and why wine must stand sometime in the vat before it ferments. When I have an oration to speak, of any considerable length, I am reduced to the miserable necessity of getting it, word for word, by heart."-Malebranche doubted the veracity of Montaigne on these matters; Mr. Stewart acquits him of affectation; but whoever has seen the statue of Montaigne in the vestibule of the "Institute of France," will not question the credibility of his assertions, provided the sculptor hath fairly chiselled a likeness of the most inanimate fooking mortal, in whom a spark of genius ever shone.

V. Of the Decay of Memory in old People.

253. The decay of Memory in old people is a matter of familiar observation, as well as that peculiarity with which it is usually accompanied ;-namely, that a complete, and even minute recollection, usually remains of the events of an older date, and the occurrences of early life.

Illus. 1. The failure of Memory, in regard to recent occurrences, is owing to the decay of Attention. From this decay, these occurrences do not make a sufficient impression on the mind to be afterwards recollected; but the associating principle remaining in full vigour, and the train of thought continuing to perform its office, circumstances which have been already familiarized to the mind are still suggested with the wonted accuracy.

2. The foregoing illustration may be reckoned satisfactory, if we understand, by the decay of Memory, not the diminished energy of some one particular faculty of the mind, but the relaxed vigour of all, or most of the mental faculties, which, like the bodily func tions, being impaired by the approach of old age, are incapable of contemplating their respective objects with that degree of force which is requisite to their being distinctly remembered afterwards, The decay of sensibility and the extinction of passion, which are the consequences of old age, likewise powerfully co-operate in produc ing this effect, by diminishing the interest which the common occurrences of life are calculated to produce.

254. That kind of Memory which old people possess, generally in a state of vigour, and by which circumstances are presented spontaneously to the mind, without any voluntary effort, has been called REMINISCENCE OF REMEMBRANCE while that which requires a more vigorous effort, and is more dependent upon the will of the individual, has been distinguished by the name of Recollection. (Art. 248. Note and Illus.)

Illus. 1. The former, as mentioned above, (Art. 250. Illus. 2.) is chiefly dependent upon the faculty of Association; while the latter will not be found but where the mind possesses the active exertion of the faculty called Attention. The distinction is as old as the days of Aristotle,* who remarks, that the brutes possess the first kind of Memory, but exhibit no traces of the last, which is therefore a valuable characteristic of man.

2. This Reminiscence of ideas, formerly impressed on the mind, and forgetfulness of recent ones, is no unusual circumstance attend. ing a paralysis, though our physiology is not yet sufficiently advanc ed to account for it.

Example. Both the foregoing illustrations are corroborated by the authority of the late learned Dr. Watson, Bishop of Landaff: "My father," says he in his Memoirs, "had been afflicted with a palsy for several years before his death. I have heard him ask twenty

* DE MEMOR, ET REMINISC,

times in a day, What is the name of the lad that is at college? (my elder brother); and yet he was able to repeat, without a blunder, hundreds of lines out of classic authors."

VI. Of the Improvement of Memory.

255. The cultivation of so noble a faculty as the Memory, is a matter of the highest importance; at the same time we must not expect that any cultivation, how assiduous so ever, will altogether make up for natural deficiencies of Memory, any more than those of judgment, taste, or any other faculty.

Illus. 1. Of a human Memory improved to no extraordinary pitch, how vast is the comprehension! With what an endless multitude of thought is it supplied, by reflection, by reading, by conversation, and by a diversified experience! Things natural; as animals, vegetables, minerals, fossils; mountains, vallies; land and water; earth and heaven; the sun, moon, and stars, with their several appearances, motions, and periods; the atmosphere and meteors, with all the vicissitudes of the weather;-things artificial, as towns, streets, houses, roads, bridges, and machines, with their various appendages-abstract notions with regard to truth and falsehood, beauty and deformity, virtue and vice-proportions in quantity and number-religion, commerce, and policy, whereof the brutes know nothing, and which are the chief materials of human conver

sation.

2. These are some of the general heads under which may be arranged the manifold treasures of human memory; and under each of these heads, what an infinity of individual things are comprehended! How numerous, for example, are the words of one language! He who is master of four, must be supposed to retain at least two hundred thousand words; with all the different ways of applying them, according to rule, and innumerable passages in books to illustrate their meaning. And that four languages do not exceed the capacity of an ordinary man, will not be denied by those who are acquainted with the writings of Sir William Jones; much less if they believe with Pliny and Quinctilian, that Mithridates understood two and twenty!

256. The utmost that can be expected from any exertion of our own, is, to direct the Memory to its proper objects, and in that order and succession, which will most facilitate its operation; to remove as much as possible those obstructions which are likely to retard the proper action of the faculty; and, by a repeated and industrious exertion, to bring it to that state of maturity and that degree of energy, which, in every human attainment, are so highly promoted by exercise.

Illus. 1. In order successfully to cultivate the Memory, we must cultivate the powers of Attention and Association, on which it mainly