rested in maintaining false notions of sin, and distracting the minds of the people with distinctions of sins venial and mortal; which they do in such an equivocal and quibbling manner, that they can make any sin belong to the one class, or to the other, according to the disposition of the sinner's mind, or according to the weight of his purse, and his willingness to part with its contents for the good of the church.

The above extracts confirm the truth of some of my remarks in the early part of my work, in which I convicted popery of representing the Father of mercies as a cruel tyrant. It is only because Papists look upon him in this light, that they can entertain the question for a moment, as a subject of discussion, whether, and how often, they are bound to love him? If they did not regard him with aversion, they could never think of the benefit of being exempted from loving him; and they would never speak of the love of God as a painful obligation. Their doctrine, however, is deeply rooted in human nature. "The carnal mind is enmity against God;" and it is one of the radical vices of popery, that she professes to save men in their natural state of depravity, by means of her sacraments, which are declared to produce the miraculous effect of reconciling men to God, while yet there is no real change produced in the state of their minds towards God. This accounts for all the nonsense and blasphemy of the popish writers on the subjects of sin, confession, and absolution, which I have given in this, and intend to give in my future numbers.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS RELEASES MEN FROM THE OBLIGATIONS OF BOTH TABLES OF THE MORAL LAW. DANGEROUS TENDENCY OF THEIR SYSTEM. EXTRACTS FROM A WORK ENTITLED JESUITS' MORALS.' JESUIT WRITERS GOOD AUTHORITY IN THE CHURCH OF ROME. NOTICE OF A POEM BY REV. MR. GRAHAM.

SATURDAY, March 18th, 1820.

To love God with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves, is the sum of true religion: but popery teaches that it is not necessary to love God, except on some extraordinary occasions; and that if we were under obligation to love him at all times, Christians, who are the children of God, would be no better off than the Jews, who were his slaves. It will scarcely be credited, that a doctrine so horribly impious can be held by men even in the lowest state of depravity; but for the truth of what I assert, I refer the reader to the words of their own great divines and casuists, which I gave in my last number, upon the authority of Pascal, one of the greatest, and, I suppose, one of the best men that the church of Rome ever produced.

I proceed now to show, that, by the authority of the same casuists, Papists are also relieved from the obligation of loving their neighbour; and thus being made free from the painful obligation of obeying the two commandments on which hang all the law and the prophets, the reader will perceive that the confession of sin, which they have to make to their priests once a year, must be a very light and

trivial matter. I am aware that the authority of Escobar, and Suarez, and Filiutius, and Bauny, and Emanuel Sa, and Bellarmine, and all the rest, jointly and severally, is not so great as that of a general council; but I know at the same time, that the authority of any one of them is great enough to direct the conscience and the conduct of a Papist, if the opinion which he gives on any point of morals be a probable one; and any man may consider as probable whatever he pleases, or whatever may serve his present purpose.

The duty of love to our neighbour is detailed and enjoined in the second table of the law, which commences with the duty of love to parents and superiors. Let us see now how the Jesuits dispense with this troublesome duty. "For what concerns love, Dicastillus saith, that it is not altogether certain, that a child can lawfully desire the death of his father, or rejoice in it, because of the inheritance that may come to him thereby; but he believes that he sins not mortally in rejoicing, not in his death considered as an evil to his father, but as a lawful means appointed of God, for him to obtain the succession not because some evil befel the father, but some good to the son." Tambourin, who wrote after Dicastillus, delivers the doctrine with more confidence. "If you desire the death of your father upon some condition, the answer is easy, that you may lawfully. For if one say in himself, if my father should die, I should enjoy his estate; in this case he should not rejoice in his father's death, but in his inheritance." Again, "I desire the death of my father, not because it is an evil to him, but because it is good for me, or because it is the cause of good unto me; and because by this his death, I enter into the possession of my paternal inheritance." I suppose it did not occur to this grave and reverend father, that, according to this holy doctrine, a younger brother might lawfully desire his death; and that what it is lawful to desire, it is also lawful to effect, if one be able, and have an opportunity. Hear again this said Tambourin, in reply to the following question:-"May an inferior desire the death of his superior, in the church or commonwealth, that he may succeed to his office, or that he may be delivered from him, because he favours him not ?" Answer :—“ İf you desire only to receive with joy the effect of this death, to wit, the inheritance of a father, the charge of a prelate, the deliverance from some trouble he procured you, the answer is easy, that you may desire all these things lawfully, and that because you rejoice not in the evil of another, but in your own proper good." Here again, I take it for granted, that what it is lawful to desire, it is lawful to do; and by this casuistry of the Jesuits, it is lawful for any person to dispatch his superior in church or state, if he favours him not.

I have before me a folio volume of such morality, which was collected and arranged by a grave doctor of the church of Rome, not with approbation indeed, but with the most decided disapprobation. The work is entitled "The Jesuits' Morals, collected by a doctor of the college of Sorbonne in Paris; who hath faithfully extracted them out of the Jesuits' own books, which are printed by the permission and approbation of the superiors of their society." This doctor of the Sorbonne was evidently a Jansenist, a sect, in comparison with the Jesuits, of little account in the church of Rome; for with all her boasted unity, the church of Rome has been as fruitful in sects directly opposed to

each other, as Protestants have been at any period. He gives the very words of his authors, in the original Latin, with the most particular references, so that there can be no doubt, with regard to his authorities. The passages above quoted will be found in pages 298, 299, of

his work.

He shows, from a great number of passages, that the fathers of the Jesuits hold it lawful to commit murder in a variety of cases. "It is lawful," says Lessius, "for an honourable person to kill an assailant, who would strike him with a cudgel, or give him a box on the ear to affront him, if he cannot otherwise avoid the disgrace. This may be proved; first, because if one attempt to damnify me in my honour and reputation, by smiting me with a cudgel, or giving me a box on the ear, I may betake me to my arms to keep him off; and by consequence, I have the very same right, if he endeavour to do me some wrong by reproaching me: for it is of small consideration, what means are made use of to do me an injury, if I be hurt as much the one way as the other. In the second place, recourse may be had to arms to hinder an affront; and so also to silence reproaches. In the third place, the danger of losing honour is equal to that of losing life. But it is lawful to kill, to avoid the peril of losing life; and by consequence also for avoiding the danger of lo ing honour." Again, "if one may kill for fear of losing his money, he may also, for fear of taking an affront." Page 305. Our modern men of honour, the fighters of duels, must all have been trained in the school of the Jesuits.

Another grave author pleads for the privilege of the clergy, in the following words:-"That we cannot at least deny that clergymen and friars may, and even are obliged, to defend their honour and reputation, which proceeds from virtue and prudence; because this honour doth appertain to their profession, and that if they lose it, they lose a very great benefit and advantage." "It follows, that it will be lawful for a clergyman, or a monk, to kill a slanderer, who threatens to publish some great crimes against him, or his order, if he have no other means to defend himself therefrom." "You have read," says this author, "the doctrine of Amicus, and you demand whether a monk, that hath sinned through frailty of the flesh, with a woman of base condition, who takes it for an honour to be prostitute to so great a personage, boasts herself of it, and defames him, may kill this woman? I know not what to answer. It is true, I have heard an excellent father, a doctor in divinity, of great wit and learning, say, that Amicus might well have forborne to propound this proposition; but it being once published in print, he was obliged to maintain it, and we to defend him. This doctrine indeed is probable, and a monk may kill a woman with whom he hath sinned, for fear she should defame him." Page 313. I could fill half a dozen of chapters with extracts from Escobar, and other fathers, all to the same purpose. I cannot, however, pollute my pages with what these fathers have written upon the seventh, that is, what they call the sixth commandment. By their casuistry, they allow persons to be as wicked as they please, provided they do not take pleasure in actions as wicked. By what they call directing the intention, a man may commit the greatest crimes, and be guilty of no more than venial sin, or not even so much.

According to the same authors, theft is a harmless thing. Thus VOL. I.-78

Emanuel Sa teaches: "He who in taking what is another's, doth him no prejudice, because he made no use of it, and was not like to use it, is not obliged to restitution." Escobar asks, "If a man, after many small thefts, hath taken the last halfpenny which makes up a great theft, whereof he thereby becomes guilty, be obliged to restore all the sum, which was composed of these petty thefts ?" to which he replies, "He is not obliged, under mortal sin, to make restitution of all the sum, but only part, which being taken off, the theft would be no more criminal." Page 341.

The Jesuits have applied all their skill to evade the force of the ninth commandment. Lying is as necessary for the support of popery, as meat and drink are for the support of our bodies. It is therefore indispensable, that it be considered only a venial sin, or in most cases, no sin at all. Dicastillus demands, "Whether he be obliged to retract, who hath affirmed some falsity which will cost the loss of life, or member, to another, when the witness by his retraction will incur the same penalty?" and answers; That he believes that if the false witness have not sinned mortally by bearing this false testimony, he is not obliged, after understanding the truth, to retract what he had said, so exposing himself to great evils." Hurtado teaches, and Tambourin approves it, that "a scholar, having need to prove that he had gone through his course, and having need of two witnesses hereof, may employ therein two of his friends who have not seen him go to the lectures, but are sufficiently persuaded that he did attend them: but they may not swear for all that, that they have seen him go." Page 346. That is, they may not swear, but they may affirm what they do not know to be true; and we shall see presently that these doctors do not look upon a false oath as a mortal sin.

Filiutius instances, in the case of promises and oaths, speaking of one who promised something outwardly, without intention of performing, "For if one ask him if he have promised, he may say no, intending that he had not promised, by any promise that obliged him; and by consequence he may also swear, for otherwise he should be constrained to pay what he owes not." Sanchez, speaking of the same thing, says, "All the difficulty is reduced to this, to know if he that hath sworn had an intent to swear, but not be obliged in swearing, if he be truly obliged?" After reporting the opinions and the reasons of those who hold that the oath obliges, he adds: "The second opinion, which I hold more probable, holds, that in this case the oath obliges not at all." Page 47. By this rule a man may swear to any thing, and yet not be bound; for it was only his intention to take the oath, but not to be bound by it. If you be assured," says Tambourin, "that you have made a vow, or an oath, and you doubt whether you had an intent to oblige yourself, or if the words which you used in your oath contained an invocation of God, at least a tacit one, I believe it is probable that you are not obliged to keep it."

Considering all these things, the reader must be convinced, that confession, in the church of Rome, must be a very easy matter; and that most persons will have very few sins to confess. There is not one of the divine commandments, by which a person can be convicted of mortal sin, though he had transgressed them all a thousand times in the course of the year, if he be but ingenious enough to apply the doc

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trine of intention to all his actions. He may have desired the death of his father, or of his civil superior; he may have killed the man who had affronted, or designed to affront him, and the woman who had it in her power to divulge his wickedness; he may have embezzled the property of another; and he may have invented a thousand lies in order to ruin his neighbour, if he had but a suspicion that his neighbour had an ill will towards him in short, he may have been a habitual blasphemer, and murderer, and adulterer, and thief, and liar, and yet be held not guilty of any mortal sin, because he did not these things, taking pleasure in them as sins, but for some desirable and necessary purpose. When he goes to confession, he may tell his priest why and wherefore he did such things; and if his confessor be a Jesuit, he will admit the force of every extenuating circumstance, and, according to the morality of his order, exact no more, in the way of penance, than what he may consider agreeable to the penitent himself.

Besides, persons in meaner circumstances, who do not stand so high in the esteem of the Jesuits as the rich and the great, may get over the painful duty of confession very easily, if they will go to the priest at the season of the year when he has most work on his hands, or if they will only be at the pains to concert matters with their poor neighbours, so as to go to the priest in forties or fifties at a time; for he must hear them all separately; and the Jesuits have a rule, that when they have many penitents to attend to, they need not be very particular in rummaging the conscience of any one of them. Thus Bauny teaches: That if any one of ignorance or simplicity confess his faults only in gross, without determinately expressing any one of them in particular, there is no need to draw from his mouth the repetition of those faults, if it cannot conveniently be done; because the confessor is pressed with penitents that give him not leisure for it."

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The priest, however, is empowered to grant absolution of the penitent's sins, though he should not have heard of what nature they are, and this absolution is as effectual as if he had heard a confession of them all, with every symptom of deep sorrow on the part of the penitent. It is not, however, necessary, in ordinary cases, that a penitent should be very sorrowful on account of his sins. Some of the above cited fathers teach that contrition is indeed a desirable thing, if one can come at it; but if not, they say that attrition is enough. Now this word attrition does not signify sorrow for sin, as displeasing God; but only such sorrow as arises from the fear of punishment. It is quite consistent with a state of mind at enmity against God; and yet, with this hatred of God in their hearts, the priest grants them the pardon of all their sins, and sends them away with the belief that God has pardoned them too; and that if they were to die immediately, they would certainly go to heaven, either directly, or by way of purgatory. Every intelligent Christian must be convinced that this doctrine could proceed only from the father of lies, and the enemy of men's souls.

In order to absolution, it is indeed required, in ordinary cases, that the penitent should resolve to forsake his sins and lead a new life; but it is not in all cases necessary that this resolution be sincere, or that there be a probability of his fulfilling it. Father Bauny confesses that "oftentimes it be supposed that such resolutions come but from the teeth outwards." Emanuel Sa says the same thing, and adds, "we