Determinism from Hobbes to HumeKreysing, 1895 - 52 страници |
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accident according agent argument Aristotle aversion Bacon Bethel College Bishop Bramhall Bishop of Worcester Cambridge Platonists cause and effect clearness of thought coextended consciousness Descartes develop discussion doctrine of determinism doctrine of innate Dodona doubt Empiricism essence existence explain faculty Galileo Gerh HARVARD COLLEGE Hobbes Hobbes's human actions human mind Human Nature Hume imagine impressions individual infer innate ideas intellectual interest Jupiter knowledge last appetite Leibniz Leviathan Liberty and Necessity Locke Locke's logical London mankind mathematical matter mechanical philosophy monad moral motives moved namely natural bodies necessary connection notion of Substance object opinion organ of sense Oxford personal identity phantasm phenomena phenomenal world Phil philosophy of experience pressing uneasiness principles question reason relations says Scholasticism Schoolmen sensation and reflection sentient Sextus simple ideas speculations spirit standpoint terms of motion things thinking tion treatise University of Leipzig voluntary actions vouloir
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Страница 31 - ... the dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as it is in the great world of visible things, wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being.
Страница 46 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Страница 48 - The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected.
Страница 51 - To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience ; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy.
Страница 33 - All the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion, so far as a man has a power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free.
Страница 32 - They who first ran into the notion of accidents, as a sort of real beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word substance, to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance...
Страница 52 - ... human actions with prescience or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries, and, leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return with suitable modesty to her true and proper province, the examination of common life...
Страница 24 - I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner : liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments, and though...
Страница 35 - ... and yet, we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good.