divinely-given authority over the State. Apart from this altogether it would still remain true, that any Catholic sovereign, who should clearly apprehend the true ideal of a State,

it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may change. This feeling may attach itself, as among the Jews (and, indeed, in most of the commonwealths of antiquity) to a common God or gods, the protectors and guardians of their State. Or it may attach itself to certain persons, who are deemed to be, whether by Divine appointment, by long prescription, or by the general recognition of their superior capacity and worthiness, the rightful guides and guardians of the rest. Or, it may attach itself to laws, to ancient liberties or ordinances. Or, finally (and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter) it may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and social equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist only in a rudimentary state. But in all political societies which have had a durable existence, there has been some fixed point; something which men agreed in holding sacred; which, wherever freedom of discussion was a recognized principle, it was of course lawful to contest in theory, but which no one could either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in short (except, perhaps, during some temporary crisis), was in the common estimation placed beyond discussion. And the necessity of this may easily be made evident. A State never is, nor, until mankind are vastly improved, can hope to be, for any long time exempt from internal dissension; for there neither is, nor ever has been, any state of society in which collisions did not occur between the immediate interests and passions of powerful sections of the people. What, then, enables society to weather these storms, and pass through turbulent times, without any permanent weakening of the securities for peaceable existence? Precisely this-that however important the interests about which men fall out, the conflict did not affect the fundamental principles of the system of social union which happened to exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the subversion of that on which they had built their calculations, and with which their hopes and aims had become identified. But when the questioning of these fundamental principles is (not the occasional disease, or salutary medicine, but) the habitual condition of the body politic, and when all the violent animosities are called forth which spring naturally from such a situation, the State is virtually in a position of civil war, and can never long remain free from it in act and fact.

"The third essential condition of stability in political society is a strong and active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or State. We need scarcely say that we do not mean nationality in the vulgar sense of the term-a senseless antipathy to foreigners, an indifference to the general welfare of the human race, or an unjust preference of the supposed interests of our own country; a cherishing of bad peculiarities because they are national; or a refusal to adopt what has been found good by other countries. We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean, a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they set a value on their connection; feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves; and do not desire selfishly to free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connection."-" Dissertations and Discussions," vol. i. pp. 416-420.

would quite as a matter of course constitute Catholicity as the ethical basis of his government. He would do this, we say, quite as a matter of course, unless there were some serious impediment in the way; such e.g. as the prevalence among his people of religious dissensions and distractions, and some hereditary non-Catholic sect. This is our first inference. Our second is, that in any given time or place, even where Catholicity is no longer the exclusive religion, it would be a grave calamity if any part of the existent true ethical basis were removed. We do not here speak of States in which the existent ethical basis is partially false; nor are we at all denying the abundant possibility, that-thanks to some disastrous movement of thought-the abandoning some portion of the true ethical basis may be hic et nunc a less evil than the retaining it. But it would always be a very grave calamity, we say, if any religious or moral errors known with certainty as such, which are now, in full accordance with public sentiment, placed by law in a position of disadvantage,were to receive fuller toleration. The civil toleration of any grave religious error, known certainly as such, is in itself and necessarily an evil, and a militation against the conscience of rightly-instructed citizens; even though, under deplorable circumstances, such toleration may be a less evil than any practicable alternative.

Now in regard to each one of these two inferences, we have some difficulty in understanding exactly where Dr. Mivart stands. We will begin with the former.

He says no doubt expressly in p. 118, that "a separation of Church and State cannot be good, save relatively through human perverseness." "A union of Church and State," he proceeds, "is the natural and true ideal; and will spontaneously reappear, when once the world has been re-converted, through common consent." Then in p. 30 he admits that "the Church asserts the legitimacy of the use of the sword "not indeed for the propagation of the Faith-but for purposes of defence: i.e. for the purpose of defending existent Catholic unity. But he does not explain (so far as we can see) how he reconciles this statement with his general principle, that the State is under an obligation of permitting all men to follow without molestation the dictates of their conscience. In one or two places he speaks as though this obligation were removed, wherever some divine revelation is generally recognized. Thus in p. 77" in the absence or non-recognition of a divine Revelation limiting its exercise, such personal freedom becomes Godgiven and absolute." Again in p. 79 he says, that his principle of civicism "revolts against the domination of man (merely

as man) over his fellows." Here it is he who italicises the words "merely as man"; seeming to imply, that God may commission man to "dominate over his fellows." At p. 73 also he glances at a similar theory. Yet in p. 75 he apparently bases his principle of civicism on the Natural Law; and he certainly does not think, either that a Revelation could countervene the Natural Law, or that God could commission man to violate that Law. We repeat therefore, that he has left us in perplexity as to what he intends. We do not understand how he reconciles with his general principle his admission, that Catholic unity may legitimately be preserved by the

sword.

But further (as we said a few pages back) neither does his general tone at all convey to us the impression, that he regards the loss of that unity with any keen regret. He regards indeed "the medieval theocracy" as the "glorious dawn of Church supremacy" (p. 113). But then in the same breath he describes it as a calamity, that "vast numbers of the indifferent, the gross, the merely credulous, and the worldly were led within the Church's fold by circumstances"; though he admits that they in real truth "accepted her doctrines unhesitatingly." Now surely this is in effect to deny the desirableness of any Catholic unity, which can possibly exist on earth. Without here entering on deep theological and philosophical questions, it is indubitably in some sense a universal law, that the multitude of men are very far indeed from living conscientiously on the principles of their religion; that they are "indifferent," or "gross," or "credulous," or "worldly," as the case may be. In our view, of course, it was an unspeakable blessing to such men, that the social atmosphere by which they were surrounded was preserved by the State's agency free from heretical intermixture; but Dr. Mivart holds, that their faith was "unprofitable" to them. If this were so, under what possible circumstances could the secular arm be used with propriety, for the purpose of preserving unity of the Faith?

So much on the medieval period. But now secondly, we cannot precisely apprehend what course Dr. Mivart would have the State take, under present anxieties and miseries. No one feels more justly than he, the extent of those anxieties and miseries.

"The Christianity which yet remains diffused amongst us and the refinement of modern manners render the open practice of licentious and sanguinary rites as yet impossible; but the spirit which prompted them finds in this system [the system of contemporary antitheists] its complete and logical justification, as it has found in a contemporary poet its distinct lyrical

expression. The tendency of this movement is to approach little by little to this worst phase of paganism, as the corruption of morals gradually increases through the temporarily decreasing influence of Christianity upon the outer surface of society. Already we have openly advocated the murder of the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old, as well as self-murder. Free-love has not only its advocates, but its avowed votaries; and a hatred of marriage and the family is one of the sentiments common to those political enthusiasts, who claim for themselves par excellence the title of 'advanced'" (pp. 43, 44).

Mr. Lilly quotes Dean Church's words to a somewhat similar effect (p. 193):

"The Christian idea of purity has still a hold on our society imperfectly enough. Can we ask a more anxious question, than whether this hold will continue? No one can help seeing, I think, many ugly symptoms. The ideas of purity which we have inherited and thought sacred are boldly made the note and reproach of the 'Christian.'

If Dr. Mivart's theory of civicism be understood in its more obvious sense, he would appear to take a very strange practical view of all this. His theory appears to imply that every one, who sincerely holds those flagitious and disgusting tenets just recited, is treated unjustly, if the laws place him on that account in an inferior position to that of his fellow-citizens. A number of men-let us suppose-choose to form themselves into an association of their own, based on that ethical principle, which regards as admirable the practice of free love, of suicide, of murdering the infirm, the sick, the suffering, and the old. Firmly persuaded of their principle, they use every effort to propagate it among their countrymen, and to obtain for it a hold over public opinion. The theory of civicism seems on the surface to require, not only that they should not be molested on that account,which surely would be monstrous enough-but that they should be placed on a footing of perfect equality with their fellow-citizens. We suppose Dr. Mivart cannot intend this; but we wish we knew what he does intend.

He might no doubt allege, that the "conscience" of these scoundrels is not "invincibly erroneous"; and that no respect therefore is due to it. But we cannot suppose that this is his solution of the difficulty. He cannot really, under the name "liberty of conscience," propound the theory, that it is the business of civil rulers to determine in what respective cases a misbeliever's conscience is "vincibly"

*We may add, that even so grave a writer as Dr. Bain has published the passage, which we quoted from him in Jan., 1872, p. 64, note.

or "invincibly" erroneous; and that where the former is their judgment, they may legitimately refuse him toleration on that avowed ground. We shall assume therefore as a matter of course, that the distinction, between vincible and invincible erroneousness of conscience, is not at all one which Dr. Mivart accounts to fall within the civil ruler's cognizance. At the same time the very supposition we have just mentioned suggests another difficulty, which needs elucidation. Civicism is based on certain alleged "rights of conscience." But what has it to say concerning that already large and constantly increasing number of thinkers, who openly profess to have no "conscience"? A large and constantly increasing number of thinkers openly profess, that nothing whatever is hic et nunc of moral obligation; that nothing whatever is hic et nunc morally preferable; that there is no such thing in rerum naturâ as moral obligation or moral preferableness; in the sense in which Dr. Mivart understands those respective terms. What does he hold concerning these persons? Having described a theory of large and liberal civil comprehension,-does he intend to exclude from its benefit the whole body of thinkers, who disbelieve the existence of any fundamental distinction between duty and pleasure? Or if not, how not?

The theory of ethicism on the contrary is very clear, as to the principle on which such miscreants should be dealt with, as those who uphold free love, suicide, and occasional murder: though of course, on details, there is room for fair difference of opinion. Catholics, Christians of every denomination, right-minded Theists, should combine as one man to uphold the existent true ethical basis of society. They should account it their sacred duty, to stimulate and intensify by every legitimate means the detestation and abhorrence with which such tenets are now regarded. Then as to the State's corporate action. Children of every Government school should be carefully trained in such detestation and abhorrence of these tenets; and the law should visit any one who attempts to propagate them with precisely that degree of severity, which may be found most successful in discrediting and repressing them. A person, who approves and sympathizes with such practices, is not to be (so far) accounted a fellow-citizen, but a public enemy of the most dangerous kind. He should be visited by the law (as we have said) with just that amount of severity, which the public sentiment will bear. And the infliction should not be carried further than this-not because he does not richly deserve a much severer punishment-but because public morality would