tercourse with each other, which alone can prevent the manifold evils with which they are now threatened, and establish the national greatness on the broad foundation of equal rule, and the general happiness of a free, loyal, and united people."

Ordered to lie upon the table.

Mr. Burke then rose: he said, that the signers were all men who manufactured for themselves; and he was authorized to say that they possessed more than 500,000l. of English property. He wished the prayer of that petition to be considered as the exordium of what he had to say to the House. He complained of the difficulties which in civil wars lay upon moderate men, who advised lenient measures; that the moderation was attributed to a want of zeal, and their fears for the public safety, to a want of spirit; that on this particular occasion whatever they said to incline the House to lenity, was construed into a countenance of rebellion; and so many arts, and so many menaces had been used, that if they had not been opposed with a good share of firmness by the friends to the peace of their country, all freedom of debate, and indeed all public deliberation, would have been put an end to.

He said, that for his part he was no way intimidated, by all these machinations, from doing his duty; and that nothing that could be threatened by those whose measures had brought this country into so deplorable a situation, should hinder him from using his best endeavours to deliver it from its distresses.

The first step for this purpose, was to get out of general discourses, and vague sentiments, which he said had been one of the main causes of our present troubles; and to appreciate the value of the several plans that were, or might be proposed, by an exact detail of particulars.

He stated, that there were three plans afloat. First, simple war, in order to a perfect conquest. Second, a mixture of war and treaty. And thirdly, peace grounded on concession.

As to the first plan, that of mere war, he observed, that it was proposed in two ways; the one direct by conquest, the other indirect by distress. In either of these ways he thought it his duty before he voted for a war, to know distinctly that the means of carrying it on were adequate to the end. It did not satisfy his conscience to say, that the resources of this nation were great; he must see them.

That before he could trust to those resources, on the credit of what had been formerly done, he must find the situation of the country to be what it formerly was.

He then examined what the ministers had laid before the House as the means of carrying on the ensuing campaign. That as to the forces which they had made the House expect from his Majesty's allies, all discourse of them had, for some time, entirely subsided: he could, therefore, take credit for nothing more on that account, than a handful of Hanoverians, which only answered the purpose of an imperfect security to some of our foreign garrisons. That our national forces to be employed in America, by the account on the table, amounted to no more than 26,000 men. In this, credit was taken for the army now in America at full numbers. He could not allow that estimate; as, supposing the reduction of the troops in future to be estimated by the past, they must be reduced to little or nothing, by the beginning of next campaign. That the troops here are only upon paper, and the difficulty of recruiting was acknowledged. On the whole, he saw reason to apprehend that we should not be very materially stronger at the beginning of the next year, than we were at the beginning of the last. He said, the probable number of troops, whether national or foreign, weighed very little in his judgment; as he thought the circumstances of the country were such, as would disable them from effecting any thing like a conquest of it.

That as to the predatory, or war by distress (on the nature of which he greatly enlarged) he observed, that it might irritate a people in the highest degree; but such a war had never yet induced any one people to receive the government of another. That it was a kind of war adapted to distress an independent people, and not to coerce disobedient subjects.

The

But his great objection to it was, that itdid not lead to a speedy decision. longer our distractions continued, the greater chance there was for the interference of the Bourbon powers, which in a long protracted war, he considered not only as probable but in a manner certain. That he was very sure this country was utterly incapable of carrying on a war with America and these powers acting in conjunction. He entered into a long and particular enumeration of all the dangers and difficulties which must attend such a

war.

He stated the condition of France at the beginning of this century, and even within a few years; and compared it with her present situation. He observed, that from being the first, she was, with regard to effective military power, only the fifth state in Europe. That she was fallen below her former rank, solely from the advantages we had obtained over her; and that if she could humble us, she would certainly recover her situation. There was now an opportunity for her making herself, with very little hazard or difficulty, the first maritime power in the world; and to invest herself with every branch of trade, necessary to secure her in that preeminence. He admitted, that at present there were circumstances (which he mentioned) that might prevent her from availing herself of this opportunity. But, he said, we must be mad to trust such an interest as ours to such a chance; and that they who presumptuously trust to the extraordinary providence of God, by acting without prudence or foresight, deserve to be abandoned by his ordinary protec

tion.

He then observed that, as he saw no probability of success in the detail of any of the arrangements that were proposed, neither did he see any thing of authority to induce him to believe that they would succeed; not one military or naval officer having given an opinion in its favour; and many of the greatest in both services, having given their opinion directly against

it.

That as no man of military experience had vouched for the sufficiency of the force, so no man in the commissariat would answer for its subsistence from the moment it left the sea coast; that, therefore, its subsistence and its operation were become incompatible.

To the objection, that at this rate the Americans might always bring us to unreasonable terms, by the supposed impossibility of reducing them by force, he said that he could not help the difficulties which arose from nature and the constitution of things; that he could not make America nearer to us than it is; or a country of another nature than what God has made it. That people who cannot contrive to reconcile their quarrels, must suffer the evils that happen to a divided nation. That he was of opinion, there was no dishonour at all in any kind of amicable adjustment of domestic quarrels; and he would rather yield an hundred

points, when it was Englishmen who gave and received, than a single point to a foreign nation; and we were in such circumstances that we must yield to either one or the other.

After an examination of the merits of the first plan, that of reducing the colonies to obedience by simple war, in order to a perfect conquest, he entered into a discussion of the second, namely, that of the mixture of war and treaty.

Among the great and manifest diversity of sentiments which prevailed on the Treasury-bench, he thought he could discern that this plan had been the most generally adopted by ministers, or by those who acted as such. That no light, however, had been let in upon the particulars of the scheme, except in the speech from the throne. It was, indeed, very little, and that little very fallacious. One would be inclined to think from that speech, that nothing had retarded the restoration of peace, but a doubt, whether those in arms might, upon laying them down, obtain a speedy pardon. However, the fact was, no pardon had been ever applied for. If nothing had been wanting to conclude the peace but such a power, the commander in chief might be authorized to hold out mercy to all those who should submit: and then there would be no need of the la borious, expensive, uncertain, and dilatory process of a commission.

It was impossible to pass by the very exceptionable manner in which this power of pardoning was to be delegated: "they shall have authority," says the Speech from the throne, "to grant general or particular pardons or indemnities, in such manner, and to such persons, as they shall think fit." A shocking, arbitrary power, not to be trusted to any persons, giv ing encouragement to dangerous partiali ties, and tending rather to distract than to quiet the country. That the rule of par don, when delegated to subjects, ought not to be their pleasure or displeasure, but the compliance or non-compliance of the guilty with certain fixed conditions. That some such discretionary power as that mentioned in the speech, seemed to be given already, and to have produced the mischiefs which might be expected from it. For that general Gage had already, whether by himself, or by order from ministers, made a very indiscreet use of it, by offering mercy to those who were openly in arms and actually besieging him in his station, and excluding from mercy

those who were 500 miles from him,* and then sitting in an assembly never declared by authority to be illegal; an assembly, from which the ministers in the House of Commons had at one time declared they were not without hopes of proposals, which might lead to accommodation. On this part of the specch from the throne he animadverted with great severity.

He said he understood, that instead of the Americans waiting for pardons, they were to be persuaded by negociation to accept them. Therefore it would be necessary to examine what body of men it was that administration proposed to negociate with, and what the objects of the negociation were to be.

That if he did not mistake the discourses of ministers, they did not now propose to negociate with the present, or with any other General Congress or meeting, but with the several assemblies distinctly. In this scheme, he said, they knew that they could not succeed. Because there was one principal province, that of Massachuset's Bay, whose assembly, under their charter, was destroyed by act of parliament. That no assembly would sit in that province under the new constitution; because if it should, the inhabitants must, as a preliminary, yield the principal object for which they had taken up arms; and thus turn the negociation against themselves, even before it should be opened. That this province was the actual seat of war, as its sufferings had been the cause of the war itself. Treaty must therefore stumble upon the threshold.

That besides this objection, (which was fundamental) a negociation with so many provinces, of such different constitutions, tempers, and opinions, never could come to an end. In the mean time our hostile operations, with their whole train of disasters, accidents, and ruinous expences, would be continued, to the destruction of this country and of that. That the hope of dividing the colonies, on which this part of the plan was founded, and which was even avowed as a reason for adopting it, would be the most unfortunate thing that could happen; as it would protract the war, and complicate its horrors and miseries, without a possibility of ending it.

* Messrs. Hancock and Adams, who were excepted in the general pardon offered by general Gage on submission, whilst Ward, Putnam, &c. besieging him, were not excepted.

It was, he said, a vain imagination, that any of the colonies would take up arms in favour of ministry, for the execution of any of their plans; and that a part of the colonies was sufficient, at least, to keep this war alive, until the interference of foreign powers should render it utterly destructive.

That with regard to the objects of the treaty, there must be concessions on the side of the colonies; or upon ours; or upon both. That upon their side they must be either speculative recognitions of rights upon as large a scale as we had claimed them; and this it was absolutely certain they never would submit to; or upon a lesser, excluding taxation, and its consequences, and this they had submitted to already; so that there seemed to be no object of the speculative kind, which made it necessary to postpone peace by a protracted negociation.

That the other object of treaty might be a practical recognition of our right of taxing for a revenue; that this revenue was to be either nominal or beneficial; if only nominal, it amounted to nothing more than that speculative acknowledgment of right, which we knew they would for ever refuse to make. If beneficial and productive, it was to be either by submitting to lord North's proposition, namely, that of forcing them to furnish a contingent by authority of parliament; or according to their ancient mode, by a voluntary grant of their own assemblies.

If the former, we know, said he, they have already rejected that propositio n and never can submit to it, without abandoning that point, for the maintenance of which they have risked their all. If it only requires, that they should resort to their ancient mode of granting by their assemblies, they have declared again and again, from the beginning of this contest to the end, that they were willing to contribute according to their ability, as estimated by themselves, who were the best judges of what their ability was. That ability would be lessened, if not totally destroyed, by the continuance of those troubles. This armed negociation for taxes would therefore inevitably defeat its own purposes; and prevent for ever the possibility of raising any revenue, either by our authority, or by that of their own assemblies.

That if the minsters treated for a revenue, or for any other purpose, they had but two securities for the performance of the

A

terms: either the same force which compelled these terms; or the honour, sincerity, and good inclination of the people. If they could trust the people to keep the terms without force, they might trust them to make them without force. If nothing but force could hold them, and they meant nothing but independency, as the Speech from the throne asserted, then the House was to consider how a standing army of 26,000 men, and 70 ships of war, could be constantly kept up in America. people meaning independency, will not mean it the less, because they have, to avoid a present inconvenience, submitted to treaty. That after all our struggles, our hold on America is, and must be, her good inclination. If this fails, all fails; and we had better trust to the honesty of the colonies, before we had ruined ourselves, than after; before we had irritated them, than after we had alienated their affections for ever.

That the troops sent for the purpose of forwarding, would certainly impede the negociation. That it was impossible the provincials could be mad enough to lay down their arms, whilst a great adverse military power remained in their country, without any assurance whatsoever of their obtaining any one of the points for which they had contended. This would not be to negociate, but to surrender at discretion. All the grievances they had complained of, were contained in acts of parliament. Lord North had declared very 1 truly, that nobody could have power to negociate for the repeal of an act of parliament.

But if the colonies should incline to put any confidence in the certain influence of ministry over parliament, even that grand confidence must fail them; as they cannot tell whether the same ministers will continue in power; and that even at this very time no two persons upon the Treasury bench were of the same opinion, on the conduct to be held towards America. Which of those opinions would finally prevail, no man living could divine. That this uncertainty might continue the armed negociation for several years, to the utter ruin of both countries.

He gave many other equally strong reasons against the scheme; and concluded this part of his speech, by observing, that although the mixed plan of war and negociation could answer no good end in future, it might have a retrospective operation, to justify the ministers in the use of their

forcible proceedings. For force and concession going out together, if peace should be the result, ministers would attribute the success, not to the concession, but to the force. So that all this delay, bloodshed, and expence, was incurred merely to furnish ministers with an excuse in debate.

After going through the two first plans, he spoke to the third (his own)—that of a concession previous to treaty.

He observed, that as he put no great trust in any negociation, and none at all in an armed negociation, his idea was, to have very little treaty; and that little as short as possible. The House was therefore at that time to judge, whether it was necessary to make any concession to the colonies: if it should appear to them that such concession was necessary, he was clearly of opinion, that they ought to make it immediately, and of their own free grace. This he thought of more dignity with regard to themselves, and of much more efficacy with regard to the quiet of the colonies, than the concession upon treaty which had been proposed.

He said, that the first ground of treaty must be confidence; and that the colonies never could confide for the effect of any concession (as he had shewn in examining the foregoing plan) in a less assurance than that of parliament itself.

He then shewed, by a variety of instances, collected from the public proceedings during the last ten years, how necessary it was that government should be aided by parliament in re-establishing that confidence which had been shaken by those proceedings, and that some firm ground should be laid as a foundation for future peace.

He was of opinion, that this foundation of confidence was become the more neces sary, from the constitution of the present ministry. That in no time or country, or under any form of government, was the power of ministers suffered to survive the success of their counsels; or the same men permitted to inflame a dependent people to arms, and then to appease them by concessions. That the duke of Alva would be a strange plenipotentiary to have sent, for making the concessions which king Philip the 2nd proposed to the Ne therlands. In concession, the credit of a state is saved by the disgrace of a minister; because it is his counsel alone that is discredited. But when the same ministers do and undo, in consequence of the re