another in consequence of similarity in sound, when no etymological relationship exists between them.

The writer remarks that analogy in language produces a twofold disorder: "First, we gradually wear a word into the resemblance of another, if that other is associated with it in our minds by some mutual property in meaning. Secondly, we gradually contract new shades of meaning in the use of a word, approximating it to another, if that other is associated with it by some mutual property in sound." As random illustrations, he gives the word bumper, which he says receives an addition to its expressiveness from bump and bumping; also slime, slide, sly, slink, crash, crush, gash, gush, rush, &c. &c." "All these, by their correspondence, receive a certain force of meaning beyond the control of their etymologies." *

But I feel that I have now dwelt upon the subject at sufficient length. It is time to sum up the views contained in this Essay. After having, at the outset, classed such changes of language as I purposed to treat of, under the several heads of the introduction of new words, the formation of new compounds, the abandonment of old words, and changes in the meaning of words still retained, I have endeavoured to show, first, that the introduction of new words necessarily results from the progress of knowledge and

* Some of the words cited by this writer are, however, evidently related by derivation.

the efforts of the human mind to find commensurate expressions: secondly, that new combinations of existing words proceed, partly from the same cause, and partly from the desire to escape circumlocution: thirdly, that the disuse of old words may be accounted for by the disappearance of the objects and cessation of the acts they formerly denoted, also by the propensity of mankind to drop useless synonymes, to shun phrases debased by low and indelicate associations, and to disembarrass themselves of such words as are identical in sound although different in signification: fourthly, that changes in the senses of words still in use are some of them simply limitations of meaning, the result of greater accuracy in thinking, and of the consequent effort after greater precision of language, which have led to the appropriation of terms before used loosely and interchangeably to distinct ideas or shades of thought; while other changes may be referred to unconscious trespasses on precision in the transference of terms from subjective to objective acceptations, and from proper uses to analogous cases where they do not strictly apply; others to the transition of words from a metaphorical to a literal sense; and others to the influence of similarity in sound amongst words not related by derivation.

To a Literary and Philosophical Society there is no need, I hope, to offer an apology for the introduction of a subject in which, if any where,

literature and philosophy unite, and in which they are almost equally interested. As a matter of taste, such mutations in language as I have been engaged in tracing are full of interest to the cultivator of polite letters: as a matter of moral speculation, exhibiting as they do the operation of the faculties and propensities of human nature and the progress of knowledge, they are equally interesting to the philosopher. In another respect, all investigation into causes which influence the structure and copiousness of language, and the meaning of terms, is still more important, as it directly assists to improve the great instrument of reasoning and communication itself. A knowledge of the causes of change tends to prevent all but legitimate and useful changes; and by fixing the attention on the acceptation in which words are to be employed, it gives precision to language and accuracy to thought.

I may add, that of all the languages in the world none is more worthy of investigation than our own, which, as it at present exists, may be characterised as full, rich, vigorous, and expressive; and every Englishman with the slightest tincture of literature must feel interested in tracing the course by which it has reached its actual condition.

106

DISCOURSE IV.

ON THE SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THE design of the discourse which I have undertaken to deliver this evening is to show the object and utility of a science which has latterly attracted great attention and some obloquy. Much, however, as it has been brought into public view, the general conception of its scope and usefulness seems unsteady and imperfect, if not erroneous.

It may be described in general terms as the science which treats of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations; or better, perhaps, as the science which treats of the economical condition of nations, and the circumstances which affect it; that is to say, their condition in respect of the necessaries, comforts, and luxuries of life.

Even this description may be considered as somewhat vague, and, to those who have never bestowed any attention on the subject, would not convey any definite notion of the science; but it appears to me preferable to the definitions which have been substituted for it.

Let us turn for a moment to the definitions usually given. One class of writers tell us that

Political Economy is to the state what Domestic Economy is to a family. This seems wide of the mark. A family receives in some way or other a certain income, which it has to expend; and its economy, according to the meaning usually attached to the term, consists in the disposal of it. If there is any thing in a state analogous to this, it is the management of the state-revenue the fiscal or financial department; but this is evidently not the meaning of the definition. The parallel is intended to be drawn between a family and the community. In what points, however, they are meant to be compared, it is not easy to see, as the economy of a community, if it does mean the management of the public revenues, must be the aggregate of the economy of single families, since there is no separate entity called a community which acquires and expends a revenue. If, in these strictures, I have misconceived the purport of the definition, this very misconception would be a presumptive proof that the definition has not accomplished its proper object, that it has thrown no light on the matter which it attempts to explain.

Again, we are told that Political Economy treats of the laws which regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth or commodities. This may appear, at first sight, precise enough; but let us examine it. What is meant by a law which regulates the production of a commodity? By a law, in this use of the term, is meant a general fact, or a