worship, its freedom from dogmatic and merely didactic propositions. To the highly cultivated, transcendental apperceptions of the Vedantist, the limitations of written language must have been as embarrassing as those derived from a material universe, and their worship seems to have been singularly free from tenets of a harsh and arbitrary character. It was also subjective in its nature, making its object, not interested interferences with the laws of the universe, but the religious edification of the worshipper. Even the denial of the free-will of the individual soul, and the ascription of all its acts to the Supreme Being, helped, together with the doctrine of its identity with Brahma, to confirm and intensify rather than repress its spiritual freedom.1

Nor, in enumerating the free aspects of Vedantism, must we leave out of consideration the effect of its belief in the soul's final perfection as a deliverance from all material restraints, and from the knowledge of matter which in reality was ignorance. It was something to have affirmed that redemption consisted in spiritual knowledge, and that by the cultivation of the mental faculties alone could men gain freedom and Brahma. No doubt the knowledge of the Vedantist was different from that which we understand by the term. Its tendencies were negative rather than positive, destructive rather than constructive, and its aim was a mystic passivity in which the individual appeared to be lost. But whatever disadvantages pertain to such a belief by reason of inordinate introspection, of intellectual numbness in its later stages, of defective physical energy, it possesses the advantages of maintaining the dignity of knowledge and humanity, and of counteracting dogmatism regarded as an ab-extra importation. These advantages, indeed, Vedantism shares with every system of idealism and introspective independence. In common with other Hindu modes of thought, it affords an illustration of the important part played by virtual Skepticism in every scheme of transcendental thought. Its ultimate issue, the complete interfusion of subject and object, of the human soul and Brahma, was a standpoint which, though dissimilar from other goals of Skepticism, e.g. the Ataraxia of the Greek Skeptic, was just as impatient of arbitrary and authoritative dictation from without. It was a dogma so far Skeptical that it was absolutely destructive of all dogmas excepting itself.

We have the same causes productive of the same effects in the religious philosophy of Malebranche.

IV.

Although Buddhism is not generally classed among Hindu modes of thought, no sketch of Oriental Skepticism would be complete that took no account of what may claim to be its most striking manifestation. In Buddhism we are confronted with a scheme of dogmatic negation which is not only a system of philosophy, but one of the most widely extended of the religions of humanity. To me the phenomena seems the most remarkable in all the records of philosophical unfaith. In ancient Greece and in modern Europe we have unbelievers and Atheists as individuals, and occasionally in schools, but here is an elaborate scheme of the blankest negation which reckons as its adherents no less a number than four hundred and fifty-five million human beings. Nor is its extent as a principle of Negation less remarkable than its wide diffusion. The total suspense of the Greek Skeptic, the Free-thought of the Renaissance, the most negative among modern schemes of thought, all pale into utter insignificance compared with Buddhist Nihilism. All the schools of Hindu thought represent varying phases of doubt. We find in them denial of creation, of the Supreme Being, of ordinary modes of knowledge, of material existence; but in each case there is a reserve of belief in something, if in nothing else at least in infinite spirit and in human consciousness. But in Buddhism there is absolutely nothing left, or I should say absolute nothing alone is left. The universe is swept clean of all conceivable objects of faith, and a clearance no less complete is effected of all subjects of faith. The Buddhist has one deity, one sole object of contemplation, one sole article of belief, one motive of his energies, one single object of his aspiration, and that is-Nothingness. Whatever might be said of the unfitness of negative modes of thought for certain nations or epochs or under given circumstances, it can hardly be asserted in the face of Buddhism that negation even of an extreme kind cannot claim a prominent place among the convictions of humanity. Nor is our wonderment at such a phenomenon lessened when we come to investigate it further, for we find that so far from an utter denial of beliefs almost universally held among men operating detrimentally to Buddhists, it is indisputable that the religion of negation has contributed to the civilization and enlightenment of not a few of the Eastern races among whom it has been disseminated; while as to its effect on ethical practice, no religion, with the single exception of Christianity, has a purer code of morals than Buddhism. We may therefore regard it as the protest of history and of indisputable fact against the allegation so often made that morality is

under all circumstances and among all peoples so inseparably joined to definite theological beliefs that it cannot exist without their authentication and support.

The mythical but in many respects beautiful legend of Sakya Muni is too well known in modern literature to need recapitulation at our hands. A prince, inspired by the physical evils of humanity, especially by its liability to sickness, old age, and death, conceives the purpose of liberating his fellow men from these various ills. Finding, however, that these are necessary incidents of existence, his project assumes the audacious but indisputably thorough form of minimizing their source, in other words, of suppressing those feelings, impulses, and energies which constitute the prominent features of vitality. He thus endeavours, and this is the main object of his teaching, to induce an emotional and intellectual passivity, a condition of self-negation hardly distinguishable from death. This is the more necessary because in common with other Hindu thinkers Sakya Muni also believes in the indefinite prolongation of existence by means of transmigrations. His conception of entire freedom is therefore a state of absolute extinction, which he calls Nirvana. We thus perceive that the Buddha's search was not so much for intellectual as for what he esteemed practical truth, the deliverance of men from the miseries of life and repeated births. No doubt existence presented itself to him as in a sense erroneous, not as being, like the Maya of the Vedantist, an illusion, but, in Schopenhauer's meaning, 'a uselessly interrupting episode in the blissful repose of nothingness.' Truth in Sakya Muni's conception was the synonym of absolute negation; for this alone was permanent and unchangeable. Every mode of existence being a departure from this truth was of necessity a falsehood. Hence the pursuits of mankind, their ideas, opinions, passions, and wishes, were proved to be false. They emphasized and rendered obtrusive the existence which was itself a lie, besides adding to its inevitable unhappiness. To a certain extent Sakya Muni endeavoured to divert all these human passions and desires by concentrating them on the nothingness which was the sole deity and heaven of his faith, but the concentration was in point of fact only another mode of repression. The disciple's culminating point of excellence was gained when the aspiration was lost in the nothingness it desired. The attempt, though impossible, was characterized by such inimitable daring, such a superb contempt for the ordinary convictions of mankind, that one cannot help admiring it. Undoubtedly there could be no error or pain or any other evil without existence. No expedient can be so effective in preventing visual error as destroying one's eyesight, and it is quite impossible for a man totally deaf to hear

falsely. All the misleading perceptions and inferences on which Greek and other Skeptics laid such stress had the ground cut from beneath them by such an unconditional negation as that of Sakya Muni's. If the negation propounded as a dogma really included itself, just as Greek Skepticism was held to involve its own selfdestruction, that was a comparatively small matter. If it involved a palpable contradiction of sensation and consciousness, the consequence was still less. The aspirant after absolute nothingness might have grimly retorted that he had no wish to save from ultimate annihilation even his own dialectical weapons. Besides which, all philosophers, even those whose designs are not nihilistic but dogmatic, show an admirable capacity for ignoring both material and mental objections to their conclusions, and from their very standpoint Buddhist thinkers are peculiarly liable to charges of gross self-contradiction.

In the accomplishment of his mission-the preaching of the gospel of extinction—the great Indian Liberator had to oppose the influence of the Brahmans, and especially to break the yoke of the dogmatic and ritual chains by which they had so long held the minds of the people in slavery. From the Brahmanical point of view, he is, therefore, a Skeptic and a Free-thinker, one who opposed himself to the religious usages and traditions of his ancestors, while he in return characterized his foes as hypocrites, charlatans, the interested protectors of error, fraud, and ignorance. Not that Buddhism differed from Brahmanism as to their common possession of the starting-points of all Hindu speculation. Both agreed, e.g. as to existence being an evil, as to the supreme necessity of deliverance from it, not only in the present but in the future. They differed only as to the best means of accomplishing this object. The Brahmans inculcated sacrifices, ritual observances, implicit submission to the text of the Vedas, a deferential regard to their own priestly traditions, and a profound reverence for their sacred persons-in a word, they enjoined those ideas, principles, and tendencies which are usually comprised in the term sacerdotalism. Sakya Muni, on the other hand, starting from the standpoint of a moralist and philosopher, demanded self-discipline, the forcible suppression of all passions and desires, whatever disturbed the even current of existence. To attain this he devised a routine of singular efficacy for his purposes, derived from his own experience and indicating a profound acquaintance with the motives which mostly govern human conduct. He suggested to his disciples self-imposed austerities and incessant contemplation. There was thus a radical difference between the dependence on

1

the external means, offices, and persons which the Brahmans taught and the self-reliant individualism which formed a main principle of Buddhist thought. Another important distinction between them belongs to their modes of promulgating their respective creeds. The Brahmans, like all ancient sacerdotal castes, adopted the high authoritative tone becoming their profession of being the exclusive possessors of divine revelation, whereas Sakya Muni propagated his doctrine by preaching, or in other words by reasoned persuasion. This is one among several points of similarity in which he has been likened to the Protestant Reformers in their attitude against Roman Catholicism. Nor was it only against the dominant priesthood that Sakya Muni waged his war of liberation. To a very large extent the movement he initiated was more social than religious. His repudiation of the caste system, both directly and indirectly, was perhaps the most important declaration of human equality that India had ever received. Nor was his doctrine of human liberty less effective against the tyranny of Indian princes.3 Even his main position of the evil of existence and the desirability of its termination, however benumbing to the energies of the individual believer, was clearly a manifestation of hostility to 'the powers that be,' and hence indirectly subserved the cause of human freedom. There was also in Buddhism the distinction of superior disinterestedness (another point of resemblance to the Protestant Reformation). Instead of being indebted for spiritual guidance and final emancipation to the interested and well-paid labours of the priesthood, his followers had to achieve their deliverance by their own unaided efforts. His apostles were all like himself mendicants, but even in the pursuit of their calling were rigidly forbidden to ask for alms or food. Quite in harmony with the entire mental independence fostered by Buddhism is its rejection of the Vedas. I do not mean that, like the Sankhya and even the Vedanta, it made free with the sacred text, for it went further and denied unreservedly its authoritative character. Instead of this, Buddhists took the personal teaching of their founder as their standard of faith. It may be granted that the personal authority of Sakya Muni assumed after a time an unduly dogmatic aspect, but no one who knows the influence of the Vedas on orthodox Hindu thought

1 Burnouf, in his Introduction à l'Histoire du Buddhisme, p. 194, points out that Sakya Muni was the first Indian teacher who made disciples by preaching.

2 Burnouf, Introd. pp. 149-51.

4 Burnouf, Introd. p. 547.

Comp. Burnouf, Introd. p. 199.