CHAPTER X.

CONCLUSION.

IT has been the first object of the previous chapters to prove that the political, or, more correctly speaking, the military domination of France has been a giant evil to continental Europe, including France herself, and in a less degree to England also.

The second object has been to show that the transference of the first place in the European system from France to Germany neither involved any moral wrong nor any detriment to the general interests of Europe.

The third proposition contended for, and upon which it remains to add some further considerations, is the advantage that would result from the substitution of a strong alliance between several Powers for the supremacy of one.

If these propositions be established, it follows that the Anglo-French alliance, in so far as it contributed to support the domination of France, was detrimental to the general interest. In truth, it would be hard to say how far that alliance did, unintentionally on the part of England, conduce to the arrogant, domineering policy of France. Before, however, stating the strong reasons in favour of the close alliance suggested between England, Germany, Austria, and Italy, it may be well to recapitulate briefly the points which have, it is hoped at least, been established.

An English writer and public speaker whose political

penetration and foresight has been singularly accredited by events, thus expressed himself lately on the recent

war:

1870,

however, and the

commencement of the year that followed it, will be rendered for ever memorable by the gigantic war which freed Europe 'from the incubus of French militarism and put an end (let us hope for ever) to the absurd boast, "When "France is satisfied, Europe is at peace." Of course it is very desirable that France and all other countries. should be satisfied, but it is intolerable that any country. 'should advance the pretension to which I have referred. The Liberal cause has gained no greater victory since the Crimean War than it did when the influence of France as a disturber of all men's peace received a long quietus.' 'Before 1870 she (France) had long 'said all she had as a people for the present got to say to the world, and had fallen far behind her adversary in 'intellectual vigour, in acquired knowledge, and in comprehension of the spirit of the time.' The speaker might have gone further (and probably would agree in this view) than saying that the Liberal cause' had gained every cause involved in the primary conditions of civilization, security of life and property, must have gained, when the only country that made war from vainglory and levity was chastised and humbled. Europe needed no other evidence against France than her own boast, that the lives and welfare of her neighbours were held at her whim and pleasure. To hold them durante beneplacito under any other people were bad enough, but that neighbouring nations should be told that their tenure of life and all that makes it desirable depended upon the humour of the least stable, most vainglorious and impulsive people in the world, must seem abhorrent to every sane mind. Were there insurance-offices for nations, it is probable that Belgium, Prussia, Baden,

Switzerland, and Italy might insure their lives at a much lower rate now than before 1870.

To say this would seem to be enough and more than enough, were there not Englishmen who still contend that Germany has usurped the place of France, and who think that French domination (which did not extend to England, however) was a benefit to Europe. The truth is, that France, with her genius, quick intellect, and refined taste, is like the element Fire, according to the proverb, 'A good servant but a bad master.' There are those, however, who say that France will not-nay, ought not— accept a secondary plan, especially since territory has been taken from her. 'We must first reconquer our position and our provinces, and then we may honourably 'make peace.' Frenchmen, even, those who acknowledge the iniquity of her late aggression, hold this language. They may perhaps learn some day that it is nobler to forgive than to avenge, when we ourselves have done wrong. 'Tis nobler to forgive, even as He forgives Our trespasses, than to avenge like angry man.'

Two stories-one known to all English children, the other to most Parisians-seem to the purpose, and may be excused here:

A certain youthful Prince of Wales in former days (when a divinity did hedge a king' with a vengeance), having indulged in riotous conduct with his young companions, was brought before the Chief Justice, but forgot the respect due to that high functionary. The Chief Justice, holding the law in more reverence even than the heir-apparent, committed him to prison, and the highspirited youth, feeling he had done wrong, went submissively to gaol, as the humblest peasant might have done. 'Ah le misérable! si c'eût été le Dauphin alors!' Perhaps so; but that Prince afterwards met the French Princes with all the might of France at their

back, and gave them too good reason to remember the meeting. Ah! bah!' That Prince was crowned King of France. 'Impossible!'

Another tale:*-When the Germans occupied Paris in 1871, a French sentry posted at the Tuileries having, according to his orders, refused to admit a German officer, that officer very improperly tried to force his way. Thirty thousand German soldiers were close at hand, but the French sentry adhered to his orders none the less. The German officer fell dead, transfixed by the sentry's bayonet, and the German soldiers rushed to the scene to avenge their officer. Learning the facts, however, they only said the sentry had done his duty, and the officer deserved his fate.

Frenchmen will appreciate the faithful soldier and possibly the German witnesses who respected his sense of duty. Can they apply the story to a nation that, having lost its own liberty and sense of justice, attacked a neighbour unjustly and reaped a due reward?

Briefly; if aggressiveness, vainglory, ignorance, levity, and love of change, all stimulated by evil traditions, be the proper qualifications for a dominant position in Europe, France has the best claim to it. If otherwise, then has Germany rendered to all nations the greatest service recorded in history. Still farther, if Germany has rendered any return to Napoleonism impossible, France is even more indebted to her than are other nations.

There may be some, however, who, admitting what seems impossible to deny, that France has been the danger and the scourge of continental Europe, will deny that to England she was other than a good ally. As that point, which must be decided by history, has been discussed at length in the Retrospect of the AngloFrench Alliance,' it is unnecessary to travel over the

*The story appeared in the English papers at the time, and not having been contradicted, may be assumed to be true.

same ground, but two considerations are suggested by the facts. It would not follow that because France had acted well to England it would be right to support a French domination that was oppressive or perilous to other Powers. Neither would it necessarily be for the honour or the benefit of England that she should purchase the alliance of any nation by acting a constantly subordinate part. The French theory-unexpressed of course, but acted on-of the Anglo-French alliance, was, that in all differences with other European Powers, England should accept the advice and share the policy of France, but that France should reserve to herself and exercise the right of making war upon all Europe in defiance of English advice. Thus France had attacked three of the Great Powers, and one only with the consent of England. It is by no means certain that an English attack on Spain or Italy without the sanction of France would not have been made a casus belli by her.

It was a very simple course, which neither over-taxed our diplomacy nor made it necessary to manage our naval affairs well, to follow in the wake of France, as we did more or less during the Second Empire. England may have shut her own eyes to that fact, but other nations did not. The loose way of speaking of France as our ally,' which in strict language she was not, any more than the Power she attacked, came to identify English policy too much with the exceptionable course often taken by France. Those who trace the decline of English influence to the events of 1870 might look for its cause at an earlier period.

The question naturally arises here, Whether, granting the unfitness of France for the place to which she aspired, there is evidence of the fitness of Germany? It is not contended here that to any single Power can an absolutely dominant position be safely entrusted. But to say that