Our neighbours have from time to time reproached England with a narrow-minded selfishness in opposing the project, as she certainly did for many years, and, in fact, as long as English influence was predominant in Turkey. But Lord Palmerston, the steady supporter of that policy, was neither an ignorant nor narrow-minded statesman. No man understood English interests or French aspirations better, nor are his reasons far to seek.

As a commercial question, Lord Palmerston knew perfectly well that if any nation benefited by the proposed Canal it would be England. But as a military question, he knew-as any man capable of understanding a map must know that it placed a possible enemy between England and her vast empire in the East, greatly endangering her communications therewith.

If Englishmen, however, had overlooked, or failed to understand so palpable a truth, our martial and military neighbours assuredly did not. Nor did they leave us any excuse for blindness. In the Suez Canal they saw, indeed, a commercial advantage to France in peace, but still more clearly did they see how it might be turned against England in war. They would not have been Frenchmen if they had not.

No geographical fact was more apparent to the eye, than that a military expedition leaving Toulon for India via the Suez Canal, would arrive there many days before a British expedition starting from Portsmouth. So far the Canal was an undeniable danger to our most important possessions, and from this point of view M. Lesseps (a man well known for his strong anti-English feelings) saw the question. More than half the popularity of the project in France arose from the belief that it would injure England still more than it would benefit France.

Those who recollect the French pamphlets, newspaper articles, and speeches at the time will remember

how bitterly perfide Albion' was assailed in connection with the Canal. But the project was not, as originally conceived, confined to a canal. There was a wide strip of territory acquired by the French Company, a privilege which would in war have greatly facilitated a military occupation of the adjoining country by a French force. So well did Lord Palmerston understand all that was exciting the zeal of our ally that he had constantly to watch these encroachments. The known want of efficient organization in our naval department, however, and our Crimean shortcomings, had lessened our influence with the Porte and proportionately increased that of France. A concession of dangerous latitude was actually acquired by M. Lesseps, or rather for him, through the pressure of French diplomacy at the Porte. The rights acquired by the French Company were virtually acquired by the Government, at that time all-powerful and ready to maintain them against any interferences whether Turkish or foreign. Egypt was inundated by French engineers, labourers, tradesmen, and their attendants; nothing was seen or heard there that was not French. Unquestionably it was a triumph for their diplomacy, a check for our own.

To estimate the diplomatic and military importance of the facts, let the English reader only suppose that instead of France Russia had done this! That RUSSIA, our bête noire (established, to make the case parallel, in the Mediterranean), had acquired a large concession of Egyptian territory with two sea-ports, one in each sea. Would there not have been a furious outcry in England, and would not people have said, 'To what purpose did we protect Turkey in Europe from Russia if she is thus to 'establish herself a thousand miles nearer India and upon the direct line of our communication ?”

6

But it was France, our loyal ally,' and not Russia, whose flag was seen flying in Egypt on the new highroad to India, so we acquiesced.

It is an amusing illustration of the singular misconception prevalent as to the real danger to our Indian Empire. We have with laudable vigilance watched over and secured the upper windows and skylights of our Indian house, but the doors we left open. We kept our eyes steadily fixed on Constantinople; we shut them to Egypt. Yet history tells us that the greatest of modern commanders did take a French army to Egypt to menace us in India, and common sense might tell us that if ever Russia attacks us in India it will not be vid Constantinople or any part of Turkey, but by the route through Central Asia. On that route, as Russia has nothing to fear from Turkey, she will not gratuitously provoke her enmity by an attack on any part of the Ottoman dominions-if India be her object.

To return to the Suez Canal: the most objectionable conditions of the Charter obtained by the French Company have been annulled or modified, and M. Lesseps has probably discovered that any hope of a Napoleonic expedition from Toulon to Egypt (en route to India) must be indefinitely postponed. Meanwhile, his canal, if not profitable to the patriotic projectors, is very useful to British commerce, which benefits more by it than united Europe.

Of course it will be the duty of England henceforth to regard this new route as her military communication with India, and to take good care that should the northern terminus of the Red Sea-Egypt-fall into hostile hands, the southern terminus-the neck of the bottle-should be in British keeping. For the mistress of India this is a necessity, and though the occupation of Perim-a minute island in the Straits of Babel-Mandeb, where we built a lighthouse,-gave infinite umbrage to France some years since, prudence now requires us to do more in the way of precaution.

Such is a faithful sketch of the forty years which

young people, or old people with short memories, or diplomatists with convenient ones, may imagine passed in unbroken cordiality and alliance between England and France. Of about four or five years out of the forty that might be nearly true.

What, then, is the conclusion from that fact? That France can never be a good ally for England? God forbid ! A Napoleonic France, impregnated with the detestable and immoral maxims of the First Empire, cannot be a faithful ally to any country, but let us hope that Napoleonism is dead, and that a better, nobler, more generous France survives.

CHAPTER VIII.

PROSPECTS OF A NEW ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE.

IT is assumed in the heading of this chapter that the Alliance, or rather diplomatic co-operation, between England and France was virtually terminated in 1870. For the credit of international policy and the honour of England, it is to be hoped, at least, that such is the understanding. Agreements between nations, like other contracts, must recognize the principle that their breach by one party sets the other party free. No contract is held to be more binding than marriage, yet there even the proved infidelity of the wife releases the husband. The secret negociations of the French Government for an alliance against England was a similar unfaithfulness to a former ally. Most French writers attach little importance to the circumstance, which is natural, but unless Englishmen are prepared to admit that their allies are at liberty to betray them, they cannot make light of the matter. We are under onerous engagements to Turkey: were the Turkish Government to conspire secretly with Russia, negociating a treaty offensive and defensive with her, we should be released from these obligations. The case of the Benedetti plot is very similar, and only requires us to suppose that Russia, breaking off the negociation and quarrelling with Turkey, publishes the secret treaty. The Turkish Minister denies its authenticity; the Russian Government produces the original draft in the handwriting of the Turkish Minister, who