wanting in patriotism attain a dangerous popularity. It was the mistaken patriotism of Thiers that won his popularity, and his parliamentary talents give him an ascendancy over the National Assembly, which makes him a necessity-whether a fatal necessity or not time will show.

It is that peculiarity in the position of M. Thiersthe parliamentary ascendancy due to his talents-which has a certain interest for us in England. It suggests the question, Could the case arise of an English statesman raised to power and maintained there contrary to the national interest, because his debating powers made him the necessary leader of the House of Commons? Of course no such Minister could continue to hold power, unless his popularity out of doors was such as to secure him a majority in a new general election.

But supposing that condition, could a Minister known to hold or incline to political opinions which, if put in practice, would prove as injurious to England as the foreign policy of Thiers has to France, maintain himself in power? If we conceive a statesman of genius, eloquence, long parliamentary experience, great ability, having successfully discharged the duties of subordinate offices, but withal a man essentially disqualified for governing England, becoming Premier, because his position in the House of Commons made it a political necessity such such a statesman, circumstances aiding, might he not bring England to ruin?

Probably no such person exists in England; but should he ever exist or be 'developed' out of some existing statesman, would not the danger be great?: For such a Minister, with all the admirable qualities supposed, might still be wanting in sound judgment and knowledge of mankind, in tact and temper. He might be rash, impulsive, emotional, and, in dealing either with internal difficulties in times of excitement or with foreign

war, might bring the country to ruin, where a more practical statesman of less genius might be a safer guide.

Theoretically, England could not, like France at this moment, be at the mercy of a dangerous Minister merely because there was no one qualified to take his place, or with administrative experience sufficient to gain the public confidence. There would be the constitutional expedient of a change of ministry or a dissolution. But in the case of the exceptional Minister supposed the danger would thereby be increased. Gifted, let us suppose, with restless and untiring energy, and that sort of impulsiveness and amiability which affect democratic sympathies, he might appeal to the masses as their especial friend and champion, and be returned with a larger majority and more popular programme. It is only the moral and intellectual impulse of such a character that could vanquish the inertia of English Conservative instincts. But such a man, however upright and honourable in heart, mistaking his own ambition for patriotic aspirations, might bring about a catastrophe which he never contemplated.

As a man is said to carry the seeds of his mortal disease from birth, so happy, prosperous England may have, either living or coming, the author of her future ruin. But, if so, he will probably be the last man to intend enacting such a part. Is thy servant a dog that he should do this great thing?' may be his inward reflection when he takes the fatal step from which there is no returning. Cromwell never meant to do all that he finally effected, and the men who have brought France to her present state were mostly patriotic. If French authorities of weight are to be believed, universal suffrage is the mortal disease from which the body politic is suffering in France. It is among the nostrums of the future in England, a country whose social organi

M

zation is even less suited to it. But when did the ruin of a neighbour teach a man with a favourite theory?

Thiers, the man of unblemished private character, of the purest and most ardent patriotism, of abilities rarely equalled; Thiers, the experienced statesman, the diplomatist, the historian, the patriot ready to die for his country, brought it to ruin by stimulating its warlike ambition. An English counterpart of Thiers would not endanger this country by such means; but could he by taking the very opposite course and winning a cheap popularity by discouraging every feeling which constitutes our military strength, and by neglecting our national defences? A reduction of our navy and army would be popular with the masses; and how far might it be carried? All armaments cost money, and their necessity in peace-time is not evident to the masses, who think they can be extemporized in war. But quarrels we have seen arise in a perfectly clear sky,' and only ten days elapsed in 1870 between the first pretext and the declaration of war. In 1867, without the shadow of a pretext, France resolved to appropriate Belgium, when we little suspected that our faithful ally was about to spring a mine under our feet. Then we have military stations at Gibraltar, Malta, Bermuda; they cost us much money; why not abolish them and thus reduce taxation? Mr. Cobden (said to have been offered a seat in the Cabinet) published reasons for surrendering Gibraltar, and Mr. Gladstone prepared the way for ceding the Ionian Islands. The Ionian people desired it, England professes to rule in conformity with the people's wishes, she must withdraw and leave them free, But a Minister guided by reasons of abstract right and by theories logically defensible, may have to go further than the Ionian Islands in his concessions. There is India occupied by 80,000 British troops; there is Ireland calling for Home Rule; there is a question-only in the

germ now-which gave some trouble to the Roman Republic, and might well, under unsteady statesmanship, upset a quasi-republican monarchy-the Land Question.

With the Ballot established, and further extension of the suffrage half promised, that question might mature rapidly. The cry of Free Air, Free Water, and Free 'Land!' would find favour with English Reds, Irish Greens, and neo-Republicans.* In fact, there is a large and promising field for any English statesman who would rival Thiers, and who might add to genius, eloquence, energy, and popular sympathies a little intellectual unsteadiness.

* Though we do not, like the French, run to phrases' in England, we have our stock fallacies and claptraps. Many liberal measures, denounced at the time as dangerous to the constitution, have not 'proved so:' therefore, we may advance indefinitely in the path of democracy, is one of the most plausible and least logical.

CHAPTER VI.

COUNT BENEDETTI.

COUNT BENEDETTI is not a man of mark like Thiers, and cannot be compared to him either in mental calibre or the influence exercised over his countrymen. But the name of Benedetti will ever be associated with two events, one among the most disastrous, the other among the most discreditable, in the annals of European diplomacy. In the French rupture with Prussia in 1870, he followed his instructions only too successfully in making war inevitable. In the earlier transaction of 1866–67, the secret plot against Belgium, he reaped for France all the dishonour, but missed the benefit, of a projected treachery. It is to the latter subject, the plot of the ex-Emperor to seize Belgium, a friendly and inoffensive State which he was bound by treaty and good faith to respect, that this chapter will be devoted.

There is something marvellous and unaccountable in the apathy with which England passed over a transaction almost unparalleled in modern history and nearly affecting her honour and interests. Yet had the projected appropriation of Belgium taken place, England would have been compelled in honour to go to war with France; no country could have felt safer from attack in peace than

* Of course no personal reflection on Count Benedetti is implied in his private character. It was his misfortune to represent an unprincipled policy.