1 l'observer danj tory. ހ ttaly respectifs, rantissent "'intégrili, seraient -=gression, de tenant retard, et de ne не rcun preteste, le quilitaires qui teraient leur intérêt Commun. alls clauses et Hey énoncées. GAUL OR TEUTON. CHAPTER I. PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND ON THE LATE WAR. THE title chosen for this book may appear too ambitious, as though encroaching on the province of professional diplomatists, or responsible statesmen. No such ambitious idea, however, suggested these pages. They only aim at a contribution, however humble, towards a just appreciation of the vast change which has just taken place in Europe, and the corresponding change which it must produce in the foreign relations of England. In proportion as correct and impartial views of the recent contest, its causes and results, prevail among us, there will be a healthy public opinion influencing the foreign policy of England, and securing us from such popular follies as lately impelled France to her ruin. It is given to few, of course, to guide or even influence public opinion; yet as the loudest shout of a multitude is, after all, but the aggregate of single voices, so each person contributes more or less to what we call the public opinion of the country. Englishmen do not much concern themselves now-a B days with foreign politics, though no people are more strongly moved by acts of violence and oppression whereever they may occur. So far as leaving continental nations to settle their own disputes without too readily fancying that our honour or interests are concerned therein, this indifference to foreign politics is wise. But as we are occasionally stirred up, if not to action, to strong speaking and writing, it would be well that we should judge foreign questions less as mere episodes, and more as what they are-portions of a nation's history: portions of that history which is itself the outgrowth of national character, feelings, and traditions reappearing from time to time, and reproducing similar results. The same national characteristics which supported the unjust and ruinous wars of Louis XIV. and of the First Napoleon, which restored the Bonaparte dynasty in 1851, and may some day restore it again-those characteristics which led to the Russian, the Austrian, the Mexican* wars, led just as naturally and inevitably to the War for the Rhine' in 1870. To judge that war fairly, we should consider not only its causes and antecedents, but the intentions with which it was declared and the results that would have followed had those intentions been carried into effect. For the military qualities and traditions of France, and the fact that success begets success, led her to expect that as Russia and Austria had been humbled by her arms, so also would be Prussia. The event disappointed this expectation, but we should not on that account look only at the evils It may strike the reader that the Russian war was as much English as French, and that the Mexican war was not popular in France; yet both originated in the evil traditions of a French predominance everywhere. The French quarrel with Russia was about the 'Holy Sepulchre far more than about Turkey; the Mexican war grew out of the absurd but truly Napoleonic idea of supporting the Latin race against the growing power of the Anglo-Saxon!' 6 which France suffered from her defeat, forgetting those which would have followed from her victory. There is every reason to believe that the success of the French arms in 1870 would have endangered the peace and independence of continental Europe, injured the best interests of England, and fatally compromised the future of France herself; for the position of Napoleon III. would have resembled that of Napoleon I. before his reverses. Of the four allies who subjugated France in 1815, three would have succumbed. The burning desire to avenge Waterloo' would have been three-fourths fulfilled: England alone would have stood erect and unassailed-for how long? As to France herself-with the Napoleonic legend rehabilitated, Cæsarism and the military glorified, but the nation and its liberty suppressed--she would have awaited the inevitable coalition of Europe against her, and a new subjugation in which the leniency of 1815 might not have been repeated. It is not because events took another turn that we should forget all this, or think it due to national good will to suppress the truth. The consequences of the war of 1870 are not all in the past, nor do they affect France alone, or else we might be generous to her without being unjust to her adversary. But whatever be due to friends in misfortune, more is due to TRUTH, and it is highly desirable that public opinion in England should be founded on the facts, and warped neither by friendship, nor by prejudice, nor yet by the use of conventional phrases. Among such phrases none have been more misleading than Balance of power,' A strong France is a European necessity,' 'Our old ally,' 'Our faithful ally.' France has been described as under the dominion of four phrases.' England should avoid such a domination. What is meant by those who think the balance of power' destroyed by the victory of Germany? Would the victory of France have saved it, or would European equilibrium consist with French preponderance? It is a contradiction in terms. 6 As regards the necessity to Europe of a strong France,' as the phrase was used by a statesman of repute, it was probably right in the sense intended by him. But Europe was cursed with a strong France under Louis XIV., and again under Napoleon I. The slaughter (which actually amounted to millions), the devastation, and the misery caused by a strong France only ceased when on each occasion a weak France succeeded a strong. There may be instances on the other side, but they are less modern and less known. Again, much has been said about France as 'our 'old ally.' In truth, France was no more our ally in 1870-71 than Prussia, Austria, or Russia, and was less than any our old ally. We have had many treaties of alliance with all four Powers, and it is only in a loose and popular sense that one is more our ally than the rest. Lastly, as to our faithful ally,' were it not that her loyalty of forty years' was put forward by M. Thiers as claiming our gratitude, and that Englishmen have used the argument also, one would rather not rake up old quarrels and misdeeds at this time. But the argument was ill-chosen, as any one will see whose memory extends over the forty years. During the first twenty-five years of the alliance commenced in 1830, and for many years previously, the strongest political sentiment in France was animosity to England, animosity arising from the same cause and as virulent as that now existing towards Prussia. It showed itself in the daily libels of the press and the tribune, and pervaded French society from the steps of the throne to the hovel of the peasant, and was, in fact, considered a test of French patriotism. That ill-will to S |