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BLACKWOOD'S

EDINBURGH MAGAZINE.

No. XLVII.

FEBRUARY 1821.

VOL. VIII.

THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE TIMES.

HISTORY, Says Bolingbroke, borrow ing his observation from the Greek, is Philosophy teaching by example. This is, perhaps, rather what History ought to be, than what it is; for, however mankind may profit in their individual capacities from the lessons of experience, it would seem to be otherwise in the case of nations. The great body of a people, indeed, can seldom act in concert to the accomplishment of any good end. "Every thing for the people, and nothing by the people," is an axiom in politics, of which it is impossible not to admit the truth. Unfortunately, however, this incapacity of the people to act for themselves, does not always dispose their rulers to undertake the task of assisting them; for, while the spirit of innovation and improvement is so busily at work in every other department of art and science, the art of government seems too often to stand still. In vain does the page of history point out the consequences of misrule. It is not that the statesmen of the present day are blind to the mistakes of their predecessors, but, while they perceive the effects of former errors, they persist themselves in the same fatal neglect of the signs of the times; and their misconduct will be again recorded in history, to be alike derided and disregarded by their

successors.

There is a passage in the Memoirs of the great Sully, that is often quoted, and which well deserves the attention of all VOL. VIII.

those who are entrusted with the administration of public affairs. "Les Révolutions qui arrivent dans les grands états ne sont point un effet du hazard ni du caprice des peuples. Rien ne revolte les grands d'un Royaume comme un gouvernment foible et derangé. Pour la populace ce n'est jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle se soulève, mais par impatience de souffrir." At the present moment, when growing discontent pervades so large a portion of Europe, it may be well worth the while to consider, whether this maxim will not explain the cause of those general and almost simultaneous efforts which have been made by the people of so many different states, to effect a change in the form of their governments.

When the Emperor Napoleon was advancing with rapid strides to the completion of his purpose, in the conquest of the world, the dread of his power, and the detestation of his tyranny, roused a spirit of resistance in the hearts of the people of Europe, which effected in two campaigns, what the hired coalitions of confederated sovereigns had in vain attempted to perform during a war of twenty years. But the people were not incited by their fears alone. A more generous principle of action was supplied by the hopes they entertained for themselves; hopes founded on the promises of their respective rulers, which encouraged them to expect, that the destruction of the Corsican stratocracy should be suc

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ceeded by the general establishment of free constitutions and representative governments. How these promises were fulfilled, is too well known to need a long recital. The downfal of Bonaparte was scarcely achieved, when the allied sovereigns conspired together to put down and extinguish that very spirit to which they had been indebted for all their triumphs, and thus lost an opportunity, such as may probably never recur,of establishing their thrones in the hearts of their subjects, and securing the cause of monarchy for centuries to come, by associating the title of King with every generous and glorious recollection. As it is, they have acted as if they wished to destroy for ever that ancient feeling, which has hitherto been expressed by the word loyalty; and it will require almost superhuman skill to efface the impressions of the last five years. Conciliation and concession, applied with judgment, and applied in time, might yet do much; but such remedies are too often ne glected, till the season is past when they might be applied with advantage. It is too late to conciliate, when the bayonet has been used, and perhaps used in vain, to intimidate. It is true, force may prevail for a time, but it is the people who win the game at last; and all that is really left to the option of their governors is, to decide whether they will, by quietly consenting to such reforms as the progress of information demands, prevent the horrors and confusion which must attend upon a revolution. Who does not see that all the great revolutions upon record may be traced to that obstinate and inflexible resistance to innovation and improvement, which is so generally the characteristic of those in power; and "which at last so irritates common sense and right moral feeling, as to make them pass their proper bounds, and accomplish that reform by force, which ought to be the quiet result of following nature through the gradual stages of human improvement. Thus, the peace of Christendom might have been preserved, and the separation of the Protestants prevented, but for the obstinate pertinacity with which the Catholic Church defended even the abuses of her establishment.

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Again:-Humanity would have been spared the disgrace which the frightful excesses of the French revolution have stamped upon it, if the rulers of that

people, instead of continuing a monstrous system of feudal oppression, down to a period when all the habits and feelings of society were in opposition to it, had from time to time accommodated their constitution to the altered state of the world, by the silent introduction of such changes as would have satisfied the growing appetite for improvement. Lastly:-Ferdinand might be now reigning in Spain the limited monarch of a united people, if, at his first restoration, he had put himself at the head of the Liberales, and been content with directing that reforming spirit, which could not be any longer restrained. By the voluntary grant of a part, at a time when it would have been accepted with gratitude, he would have avoided the necessity of yielding all,-a necessity to which he has been reduced by delaying the moment of compliance till he had no longer the power to deny. For, as it is, his conduct has been such as to forfeit irrevocably the confidence of his subjects, and the consequence of his conduct has been a reaction, which has produced correspondent excesses on their side, in the formation of a constitution, which must give rise to worse evils than those it is intended to prevent.

"What seems its head, "The likeness of a kingly crown has on ;” but Ferdinand has little more than the name of King; he is not only deprived of the power of doing harm, but debarred from the privilege of doing good; his title is à sarcasm, and his crown a mockery. The people too will find, that in their anxiety to secure the ascendancy of democracy, they have been destroying the bulwarks of liberty, and it is to be feared that the whole constitution will tumble to pieces, and furnish another instance of failure, to be noted down and quoted by the enemies of popular government. Let us hope, however, that it may rather induce both rulers and people to cultivate a good understanding with each other, by teaching them that they must co-operate together in order to accomplish any real and lasting benefit to their country. Above all, it will help 'to demonstrate, that the current of public opinion is every day becoming more irresistible. The attempt to oppose it altogether is about as practicable as it would be to ob

struct the course of a river. For, though this might perhaps be done for a time, near the source, in the full vigour of the stream it is impossible. If from a superabundant supply there should be reason to apprehend an overflowing of the banks, it is surely wiser to provide additional water-courses, than to attempt the construction of a dam to arrest its progress;-a protection that must give way to the first flood, and expose the whole country, far and wide, to the danger of being deluged and destroyed by the overwhelming force of the inundation. The application of this illustration is obvious. In the other states of Europe, none will deny that it is l'impatience de souffrir, and not l'envie d'attaquer, which has been the cause of their insurrection; and every Englishman, who has one genuine drop of the crimson sap of freedom circulating in his veins, must sympathise with the efforts of his continental brethren, and wish them success in their just and rightful efforts to ameliorate their political condition.

Let us now turn our eyes nearer home, and examine whether the clamours of discontent which here too assail us on all sides, will admit of the same explanation. Here the question between the governors and the people becomes a more complicated one. In reading the passage of Sully which has been quoted above, it must be remembered, that in his time there was no such thing as the liberty of the press. Had he lived in our days, it is possible, that he might have in some degree qualified his maxim; for, though we agree with him that l'envie d'attaquer is never the motive of an insurrection when the people are left to themselves, yet we doubt whether the same doctrine will apply to a people, whose passions are inflamed by daily and weekly doses of the most stimulating quality, administered to them under every form and shape by the agency of the press. There is a period in the history of a country when the universal diffusion of knowledge creates a general sentiment of equality, which is productive of consequences not wholly dissimilar to what might be expected to result from a state of anarchy. In such a stage of society, it is of the utmost importance that there should be a constant supply of those MASTER SPIRITS, whose privilege it is

to stamp the age in which they live with the impress of their own character, and who, by the splendour of their talents, and the integrity of their principles, command at once the deference and the confidence of the people; and, while they preside at the helm of the state, keep the course of the vessel even and steady. Without this constant supply, the people, especially if long accustomed to submit to such guidance, are like a crew who have been suddenly deprived of their commander; and a general spirit of insubordination succeeds. The principle of democracy," says Montesquieu, "is corrupted, not only when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when the people fall into a spirit of extreme equality; and when every citizen wants to be on a level with those he has chosen to command him. Then the people, incapable of bearing the very power they have entrusted, want to do every thing for themselves;-to debate for the senate-to decide for the judges-to execute for the magistrate. It may be well to consider whether England, at the present moment, be not much in the state that is here posed.

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When, indeed, we observe the direction which the public complaints have ten, we cannot help thinking that l'envie d'attaquer has been a more powerful motive than l'impatience de souffrir, at least with the agitators of these complaints. At a period when we have so many real difficulties to struggle with, and so many evils to endure which come home to the bosoms of us all, the cries of the discontented have been confined to two points;the Queen, and Parliamentary Reform. Let us examine how far the real interests of the people are connected with either of these topics;-and first for the Queen. If the investigation have proved nothing else, it must, we think, at least have satisfied every impartial man in the kingdom, that the ministers, with such charges before them, would have deserted their duty if they had not submitted the case to the consideration of parliament. The expediency of passing the bill is another question; and while we regret the moral effect of the late trial, we must at the same time remember that every possible effort was made to avoid the necessity of a public inquiry. The pious care of those wise and worthy

of the representative system. We shall endeavour then to demonstrate, not only that the sentiments of a majority of the people, numerically considered, cannot be accurately ascertained though the medium of delegates, acting as the mere mouth-piece of their constituents,-but that, in consequence of this very mode of proceeding, it may easily happen, even where the people are most extensively and equally represented, that a great majority of the delegates shall give their votes in direct contradiction to the wishes of a great majority of the people.

persons who joined with Mr Wilberforce in proposing this healing measure, approached, like the sons of the Patriarch, with averted eyes, to spread a veil over those transactions, the exposure of which would exhibit nothing but shame. When the passions of the present hour have subsided, the public opinion will, we think, undergo a complete change; and what is now viewed through the kaleidoscope of romance, will then appear in its true light. We shall then look back with wonder at the extent of that delusion which could encourage the designing to hope, that they might succeed in exciting the people-like the two madmen of Cer-Let us take, for example, a state, vantes-to fall to loggerheads upon a where, for the sake of easy calculapoint with which they had no more tion, we will suppose the whole poconcern, than with the intrigue be- pulation of full age, of sourd mind, tween the fabulous Queen Madasima and of the masculine gender,-three and Master Elizabat, the barber. conditions, with which we believe the most radical reformers have clogged the right of suffrage, amounts to 500,000. Let this population be parcelled out, for the convenience of election, according to the district division, suggested in some of our late reform bills, into 250 equal parts. Each of these districts will then contain 2000 voters, who will constitute, in fact, a sort of corporate body, possessing the right of sending two deputies to the national assembly, which will thus be composed of 500 delegates; and these 500 delegates ought, if there be any virtue in the system, to represent fully and perfectly the will of the whole nation.

And next for Parliamentary Reform. Of all the improvements introduced by modern times into the art of government, there is none perhaps which has been attended with more important results than the establishment of the representative system;-by which the people, instead of exercising the legislative power,en masse, in a collective body, transfer it into the hands of representatives. It is this system which has enabled large states to maintain a degree of freedom, undisturbed by popular commotion, of which we have no example in the ancient Republics of Greece and Rome. Long, however, as we have been accustomed to this mode of administering government, it seems by no means yet determined in what its essence consists. Even in our own House of Commons,-one of the oldest examples of a representative assembly-the leading members of different parties have expressed the most opposite opinions on the subject. The partisans of democracy argue, that the best and surest method of securing an adequate representation of the national will would be to make the right of suffrage universal, and to compel the deputies so chosen, to receive and to follow the directions of their constituents. If, however, it can be shewn, as we think it may, that a compliance with these demands, even to their fullest extent, would by no means ensure the attainment of the object proposed; it must follow, that the opinions of such reformers are founded upon a mistaken view of the real nature and advantages

Let us now suppose some great question,-peace or war for example, to be agitated in this supreme council of the state. The deputies, having consulted their constituents, assemble. Three hundred, in obedience to their instructions, declare for war; the remaining 200, under different direction, give their votes in favour of peace. Here then, a large majority of the representatives are decidedly for war; but if we inspect the sentiments a little more closely, we shall find a still greater majority of them as decidedly for peace. The 100 districts represented by the minority are, from commercial or manufacturing considerations, which may easily be imagined, unanimously in opposition, while the 150 districts on the warlike side of the question, are much divided in opinion. Let us suppose, to simplify the calculation, that the advocates of war

amount to 1200, which will leave 800 as the strength of the minority. A very little arithmetic will now enable us to perceive, that the numerical amount of the people coinciding with the opinion of the majority of the national assembly, and in fact directing its resolutions, is 1200 multiplied by 150, which yields a total of only 180,000. On the other hand, to ascertain the number of those who entertain the sentiments of the minority of the assembly, we must take the sums of the minorities in the 150 warlike districts, by multiplying 800 by 150, which will amount to 180,000; and these being added to the unanimous suffrages of the 100 peaceful districts (1200 X 100), will swell the whole amount of these to 300,000. Thus, from the very circumstance of the deputies being obliged to follow the instructions of their constituents, is a measure carried to which a great majority of the people are decidedly averse. We have perhaps laboured this point at greater length than was necessary; but the case here supposed is not a mere hypothetical possibility, for a fact perfectly similar, though on a smaller scale, took place in France at the convention of the Notables in 1787. This body, consisting of 144 members, was to give its opinion, not by a majority of individuals but of sections, of which it was divided into seven. The French minister M. Calonne, is said to have distributed 44 members, upon whom he could rely, in such a manner as to secure a majority in four of the sections, by which contrivance, he was enabled to direct as he pleased, the resolutions of the whole. From this instance, it may be safely deduced as a general principle, that a majority of corporate bodies does not necessarily include a majority of individuals; and we may also infer as a corollary, that no state, where the people, from their numbers, are induced to delegate their power to representatives, can be in the true sense of the word democratic, and least of all so where the deputies are under the absolute controul of their constituents.

In what then, it will be asked, real ly consists the advantage of representation? To this we answer, that it enables the people to influence without actually interfering with the measures of the government; an advantage of inestimable importance, the

absence of which occasioned most of the evils that attended the popular governments of antiquity. A powerful body is thus forined in the state, able from its authority, and willing from an identity of interests, to defend the rights of the people. If such is found to be the result of the representative system, it is surely needless to inquire further, what are its advantages.

The practical question arising out of these considerations is, whether the British House of Commons, constituted as it is at present, does not answer all the purposes which a reasonable man can expect from any assembly of national representatives. We have endeavoured to shew that no scheme of election, however equal and universal, would ensure that the council of the nation should be, as it were, a reflecting mirror of the people they represent; all, therefore, that remains to decide is, whether we will put to hazard the substantial advantages of our present state, to realize some untried theory, with the hope of obtaining some unknown good. Are we to listen to the radical empirics, who describe annual parliaments and universal suffrage as the sovereign panacea,-just as an advertising quack recommends an infallible pill to cure all sorts of diseases? One might fancy that these learned Thebans had but lately acquired the art of reading, and having discovered, in practising upon the pages of Blackstone, that our obligation to pay the taxes and obey the laws is founded upon the supposition that every man has himself ratified them by his own consent, given through the person whom he has chosen to represent him in Parliament, they immediately proceed to infer that the practice of the constitution no longer corresponds with the theory, and that some gross departure from ancient usage must have taken place, to give rise to the actual state of things. It is possible that these representations may deceive those to whom they are addressed, and indeed we are inclined to attribute much of the clamour on this subject to an honest and sincere, however mistaken, belief in the truth of such statements. Those, however, who have read the history of their country in other pages than those of the Radical Register, need not be told that Blackstone did not mean to say that every man has a

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