the addition of some discoveries among the manuscripts of the Advocates' Library. These throw an entirely new light upon the moral springs of Montrose's isolated and almost incredible exertions, and, at the same time, aid not insignificantly our reflections upon the state and results of his times,-an exhaustless source of political and moral instruction. Whilst such enthusiastic democratical writers as Mr Brodie, (now Historiographer Royal for Scotland,) followed by Lord Nugent, and, in the chapter we refer to, quoted and relied upon even by an historian of such superior powers as Hallam, whilst these have run riot in their assumptions of Montrose's unprincipled selfishness, reckless ambition, and insatiable appetite for blood and murder, how little has been done to illustrate what was the actual state of the Hero's mind in his meteor-career of self-devotion. But, as an antidote to those baneful historical calumnies,-in opposing which I am conscious of having caught too much of the tone of excited controversy,-of having written" tumultuante calamo," and, it may be said, occasionally somewhat in King Cambyses' vein,-I would desire no more than that beside those calumnies should be placed the hitherto unknown letters and documents I have now produced, in which Montrose may be said to speak for himself, on the matter of his advice to Charles I. and the motives and principles of his own conduct.

From the charge of having "touched that unclean thing whiggery,"-(I adopt the expressive phrase of a distinguished literary correspondent, who honoured me

with a perusal of these volumes before they were published,)—of having committed a false step in joining at their outset the covenanting clique in Scotland,-a word I do not shrink from using, as being truly descriptive of a party who arrogated to themselves the character of a whole nation's generous voice,—of having acted inconsistently with the dictates of his reason, and his maturer principles of action, by having carried, what he fondly considered the arms of " the Covenant,” against the last hope of true Religion and Liberty in the north, from these charges Montrose can never be exonerated. But the moral, and, when we remember his expiatory struggle and death, it may be added, the grandeur, of his heroic character and career, cannot, by such defects, lose their value and interest. documents referred to must carry an irresistible conviction, at least to every unbiassed mind commencing its study of the times past, that, even in his first error and inconsistency, Montrose was humane and honest, was no far-sighted and selfish factionist, no bloodthirsty destroyer, but a youthful and mistaken enthusiast. If the sudden and violent excitement of the period, and Montrose's age of four-and-twenty, will not suffice to reconcile such political inconsistency as can be proved against him, with the character of an honest statesman, and a glorious hero, we may close the annals of human virtue.

The

I am induced to notice still further in this place the manuscripts which prove Montrose to have exercised, in his later patriotic struggle, the ratiocination of an

upright and accomplished politician, from having, in a recent visit to Cambridge, my attention called to a published Discourse, pronounced by one of the living -ornaments of that seat of learning and loyalty. I will be excused for transcribing the whole passage from such a writer as Professor Sedgwick. In his scrutiny of some of Paley's defective Philosophy, occurs what will be found in the note.* I have no reason to ima

Why is it our duty to obey the civil government? Paley replies, because it is the will of God as collected from expediency......so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God that the established government be obeyed—and no longer. This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of danger and grievance on one side, and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other. But who shall judge of this? We answer, every man for himself.* A more loose and mischievous doctrine -one more certain to be turned to base purposes by bad men—was never, I believe, upheld by any Christian moralist. In times of excitement, men are too much blinded by passion ever to enter fairly on a computation of civil grievance: and as for danger-brave men of sanguine. tempers are not restrained by it, but on the contrary, are urged by it into action. On Paley's principles, civil obedience cannot continue to be regarded as a duty: and if civil order be retained at all, it can only be through selfishness and fear on the one hand, and by corruption and brute force on the other. Such a state of things can only lead to ruin and confusion, or the establishment of a despotic executive.

"An unbeliever may ground his duty of obedience in expediency: but a Christian finds, in the word of God, a ready answer to the question we started with. Obedience to the civil government is a duty, because the word of God solemnly and repeatedly enjoins it. But does this doctrine lead us to the slavish maxims of non-resistance and passive obedience? Undoubtedly not. The Apostles of our religion gave us an example and a rule for the resistance of a Christian. They resisted not the powers of the world by bodily force; but by persuasion, by patient endurance, and by heroic self-devotion: and the moral and civil revolutions, which they and their followers effected, were incomparably the most astonishing that are recorded in the history of man.

Should it, however, be said, that ordinary men, not having the powers

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Book vi. Chap. iii.

gine that those powerful passages were composed under the direct influence of a recollection of the times of Charles I., or with an immediate reference to Montrose and the Covenanters. Certainly Professor Sedgwick had never seen the fragments of papers which have preserved to us the reasonings of Montrose, and of his preceptor, Napier, on the subject of Sovereign power, and Rebellion. Yet, notwithstanding all that has come and gone, since about the year 1641, when those frag

given to the inspired Apostles, must, on that account, adopt less exalted maxims as their rules of life: we may state in general terms (without loading this discussion with extreme cases which lead to no practical good in moral speculation), that where the Christian religion prevails in its purity, it is impossible there should ever exist an unmitigated despotism: and where the power of the executive is limited (in however small a degree) there will always be found within the constitution some place where the encroachments of bad and despotic men may be met by a moral and legal resistance. Rebellion is proscribed by human law, and is forbidden by the law of God. But a moral opposition to the executive, conducted on constitutional grounds, is proscribed by no law, either of God or man: and if it be wisely and virtuously carried on, it has in its own nature the elements of increasing strength, and must at length be irresistible. If, however, during the progress of a state, the constituted authorities be in open warfare with each other; a good man may at length be compelled to take a side, and reluctantly to draw his sword in defence of the best inheritance of his country. Such an appeal, to be just, must be made on principle; and after all other honest means have been tried in vain.

"Unfortunately, the opposition to the encroachments of arbitrary power, has too often been commenced by selfish men for base purposes. Instead of taking their stand in a moral and constitutional resistance-instead of trying, by every human means, to concentrate all the might of virtue and high principle on their side, they have broken the laws of their country, dipped their hands in blood, and needlessly brought ruin on themselves and their party. The vices of the subject are not only the despot's plea, but the despot's strength. Where the virtuous elements of social order are wanting in the state, whether men be willing slaves or not, they are unfit for freedom."-Discourse, &c. by Adam Sedgwick, M. A., F. R. S., &c. Woodwardian Professor and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Fourth Edition, 1835, p. 137–139.

ments entered, not history, but the obscurity of a Scottish charter-chest, to the year 1835, when one of the most accomplished of her sons addressed Alma Mater as quoted, Montrose's principles of civil obedience, his axioms of political government, his anxious and elaborate search for that invisible line of demarcation, betwixt the philosophy of non-resistance and passive obedience on the one hand, and, on the other, justifiable resistance to arbitrary power,—the reasoning and sentiments, we say, of Montrose, when deprecating the approach of the great civil war, are wonderfully similar, in their philosophy, logic, and even language, to those with which Professor Sedgwick instructed the youth of Cambridge in the Chapel of Trinity College. "Rebellion is proscribed by human law, and is forbidden by the law of God. But a moral opposition to the executive, conducted on constitutional grounds, is proscribed by no law, either of God or man; and if it be wisely and virtuously carried on, it has in its own nature the elements of increasing strength, and must at length be irresistible. If, however, during the progress of a state, the constituted authorities be in open warfare with each other, a good man may at length be compelled to take a side, and reluctantly to draw his sword in defence of the best inheritance of his country. Such an appeal to be just, must be made on principle; and after all other honest means have been tried in vain." So inculcates the living Professor. And moreover, he maintains obedience to the civil government as a duty," because the word of God solemnly and re