§ 239. Consideration of the foregoing statements in

connexion with Power.

The statements which have just been made illustrate a leading remark in the preceding chapter to this effect, that the subject of disordered action existing in the Will will be found, in nearly all cases, to have a relation to the attribute of Power. A normal or right Will may, of course, be expected to have power enough to secure the great objects for which the Will obviously exists, viz., the exercise of a supervisory control, and the enforcement of that control upon the other parts of the mind, as well as upon the body. This is the true idea of a perfectly regular or sane state of the Will. Consequently, every deviation from this state, when, for instance, there is not power enough to secure these great objects, and the man is governed by the impulses of association and feeling rather than by the great regulator, necessarily implies, to some extent, an imperfect or disordered state.

And this is precisely the case which was considered in the preceding section. The Will fails of its object, and, therefore, is not such as it should be. It does not exhibit the great requisite and characters istic of its own nature, viz., the element of authori tative control, and, therefore, cannot escape the imputation, according to the degree in which the defect exists, either of disorder short of insanity, or of pos itive alienation.

Of this form of disordered Will some illustrations might properly be given in this place, additional to

the facts and instances given in the chapters on Abstraction and Attention, which will help to communicate some idea of it.

§ 240. Illustration of natural imbecility of the Will.

Pinel states, that he had frequent opportunities of seeing a person, whose conduct, as it seems to us, rather strikingly illustrates this form of mental disorder. After stating that his ideas appeared to be insulated, and to rise one after the other without connexion, he goes on to remark as follows: "His motions, his ideas, his broken sentences, his confused and momentary glimpses of mental affection, appeared to present a perfect image of chaos. He came up to me, looked at me, and overwhelmed me with a torrent of words, without order or connexion. In a moment he turned to another person, whom, in his turn, he deafened with his unmeaning babble, or threatened with an evanescent look of anger. But, as incapable of determined and continued excitement of the feelings, as of a just connexion of ideas, his emotions were the effects of a momentary effervescence, which was immediately succeeded by a calm.

"If he went into a room, he quickly displaced or overturned the furniture, without manifesting any direct intention. Scarcely could one look off before he would be at a considerable distance, exercising his versatile mobility in some other way. He was quiet only when food was presented to him. rested, even at nights, but for a few moments."*

He

* Pinel's Treatise on Insanity, Davis's Translation, p. 163.

It is very evident that the power of Will existed in this person in a very limited degree. Indeed, it is not easy to perceive how his conduct could be very much different, if the faculty of the Will had been entirely erased from his mind, and he had been left without any controlling principle at all.

241. Further remarks on imbecility of Will. There are some important applications which may be made of the view that has now been taken. There are some men, for instance, who, under the influence of some more or less slightly excited passion, commit crimes which we should certainly suppose they would not do if they had the least power of self-restraint. They go forward much as do some children, in whom the volitive power is but little developed, and whose constantly varying acts seem to originate exclusively in mere sensitive, passionate impulses. In other words, their conduct is very much such as we should suppose it would be if the outward action were based directly upon the sensibilities, without the suspensive and regulative faculty of the Will intervening. They feel, they have an impulse, and they go and do accordingly, without any interrogatory being put or any restraint being exercised by the higher regulating power. In all such cases, where we do not see occasion for great excitement of the passions, and where, in point of fact, although there is some, there is yet no very great excitement, it seems impossible to explain the facts that present themselves, except on the ground of inordinate weakness of the Will.

I am inclined to the opinion, that in many cases of murder, if we could analyze perfectly the mental structure of those who commit this crime, we should find these individuals differing from a multitude of other persons less in the positive malignity of the passions than in a great weakness of the will, which renders them unable to control their passions. It is probable that, in most cases, this is not the only ground of difference, as there may, for instance, be combined with the weakness of the will an inordinate feebleness of the moral power; but it is one, and a very important one, The persons in question are the subjects of excited feeling and passion in a greater or less degree; sometimes in rather a small degree. They have, however, something, and evidently must have something, to move them on in the course which they take; but they would probably do otherwise than they do, in fact, and would frequently repress their emotions and passions, which have put them on a wrong direction, if they were not greatly deficient in the superintending and controlling principles of the mind.

These remarks will perhaps apply to the case of an individual by the name of Prescott, who was recently executed in New-Hampshire for the crime of murder. The case is given at some length, and with appropriate remarks, in the work of Dr. Ray on Medical Jurisprudence,

242. Of alienation of the Will termed INCON

STANTIA.

Imbecility of the will is sometimes connected with

STANTIA.

an irregular action of the power of Association; and it seems to be the peculiar modification of mental disorder which the mind then assumes, which is known in medical writers under the name of INCONThe instances which illustrate this form of mental disorder might many times be arranged, according to the view which is taken of them, either as instances of alienated will or alienated association. The persons who are subject to this form of perplexed and disordered mental action are designated by various epithets, such as fickle, flighty, light-headed, hair-brained. The thoughts of these persons, as we have already described them under the head of Association, fly from one subject to another with great rapidity; their bodies are almost always in motion, and their volubility of speech is excessive.

M. Pinel mentions an instance (a gentleman who had been educated in the prejudices of the ancient noblesse of France) which illustrates this singular condition of mind. "He constantly bustled about the house, talking incessantly, shouting, and throwing himself into great passions for the most trifling causes. He teased his domestics by the most frivolous orders, and his neighbours by his fooleries and extravagances, of which he retained not the least recollection for a single moment. He talked with the greatest volatility of the court, of his periwig, of his horses, of his gardens, without waiting for an answer, or giving time to follow his incoherent jargon."