sphinxes, in narrow chambers, in the heart of eternal pyramids."

We propose to go no further under this head, viz., of Original Suggestion, although there are other important ideas which, in their origin, may be attrib→ uted to this source. Indeed, it is not necessary, nor even proper, to say everything under every subordinate division which might be said. The powers of the mind are in their exercise so implicated with each other, and disorder in one part so frequently extends to another part, that such a course would be likely to be attended with too many needless repetitions.

CHAPTER II.

DISORDERED CONSCIOUSNESS.

§ 119. Of the meaning of the term Consciousness. WE proceed now to the second great source of internal knowledge, viz., Consciousness.-The term Consciousness, as we had occasion to remark in one of the Introductory chapters, is appropriated to express the way or method in which we obtain the knowledge of those objects which belong to the mind itself, and which do not, and cannot exist, independently of some mind. Imagination and reasoning, as was also remarked in the chapter just re

ferred to, are terms expressive of real objects of thought; but evidently, the objects for which they stand cannot be supposed to exist, independently of some mind which imagines and reasons. Hence every instance of Consciousness may be regarded as embracing in itself three distinct notions at least, viz., the idea of Self or of personal existence; besides this, the idea or notion of some quality, state, or operation of the mind; and also the relative perception of possession, appropriation, or belonging to, which announces or substantiates the mental quality, whatever it is, as an attribute of the person or self.

It may be added further, in connexion with this topic, that Consciousness, properly speaking, relates exclusively to the present time, and takes no cognizance of the past. We cannot be said, in strictness of speech, to be conscious of the feelings which we had yesterday, but merely of the recollection of them. But we may be conscious of any mental acts or feelings which exist now.

§ 120. Two forms of disordered Consciousness.

It will be particularly understood, from what has been said, that the great fact of Consciousness always implies something in the first person; an EGO; in plain English, a SELF or I. The terms SELF, MYSELF, I, and the like, are expressions for the simple fact of our personal existence, which is one of our earliest conceptions, and is made known by what we have denominated Original Suggestion. Consciousness, in distinction from this, expresses the fact, that we naturally and necessarily recognise all

the acts or operations of the mental part, of the SELF or I, as belonging to such mental SELF or I; in other words, as belonging to our own minds.Consequently, in a sound state of Consciousness, the EGO or I is one, and one only; and all mental acts and operations are promptly and invariably referred to this great centre of personality. And, on the other hand, there is an insanity of mind (specifically an insanity of Consciousness) when the EGO becomes divided; in other words, when a man has a different self at different times; and also in all cases when Consciousness is unable to connect an individual's mental acts or operations invariably with one and the same personal centre.

In accordance with these views, there are two forms, at least, of an unsound state of Consciousness; FIRST, Suspended Consciousness, which is the more common form, and, SECOND, Divided or Intermittent Consciousness.

§ 121. Illustrations of suspended Consciousness. Various instances are recorded of what may be called SUSPENDED CONSCIOUSNESS.-The case already mentioned in the preceding chapter, of the man who placed his beetle and wedges in a hollow tree, and became maniacal the night after, is an instance in point. It is, of course, unnecessary that the statement should be repeated. There is another instance found in the same Work, the American Journal of Science, vol. i., p. 432. The statement is given in the following terms:

"Mrs. S., an intelligent lady, belonging to a re

spectable family in the State of New-York, some years ago undertook a piece of fine needlework. She devoted her time to it almost constantly for a number of days. Before she had completed it she became suddenly delirious. In this state, without experiencing any material abatement of her disease, she continued for about seven years, when her reason was suddenly restored. One of the first ques

tions which she asked after her reason returned, related to her needlework. It is a remarkable fact, that during the long continuance of her delirium, she said nothing, so far as was recollected, about her needlework, nor concerning any such subjects as usually occupied her attention when in health."

The case of an English clergyman, the Rev. Simon Browne, seems properly to be mentioned here. This gentleman entertained the idea that "he had fallen under the sensible displeasure of God, who had caused his rational soul gradually to perish, and left him only an animal life in common with the brutes."* He was a man of exemplary life, and of no small ability and learning. His insanity was limited to the single conviction that, although he possessed a vital principle or sort of animal life, the perceptive and reasoning part or mind was totally extinct. Accordingly, as every case of consciousness implies not only a recognition of the mental acts, but a reference of those acts to the mind as their subject, it would seem that, in his case, consciousness was disordered and suspended.

This case, as well as the preceding one in this * Conolly, p. 412.

section, might also have been introduced under the head of Suggestion, since the facts stated evidently involve a disordered state of the suggestive power as well as of consciousness.

§ 122, Illustrations of divided or intermittent Con sciousness.

There are other cases of disordered consciousness, somewhat different from those which have been mentioned, which may be designated as cases of DIVIDED or INTERMITTENT CONSCIOUSNESS. That is to say, the mind, at two different periods of time, is found to be in two different states. In one state its action is marked by certain peculiarities; it has thoughts, reasonings, feelings, remembrances peculiar to itself at that particular time. In the other state it is the subject of thoughts, reasonings, and feelings wholly different; the point of transition from one state to a subsequent one is distinct; and in the actually existing state, whatever it is, there is a forgetfulness of the other. "I once attended" (says Dr. Rush) "the daughter of a British officer, who had been educated in the habits of gay life, who was married to a Methodist minister. In her paroxysms of madness she resumed her gay habits, spoke French, and ridiculed the tenets and practices of the sect to which she belonged. In the intervals of her fits she renounced her gay habits, became zealously devoted to the religious principles and ceremonies of the Methodists, and forgot everything she did and said during the period of her insanity.”*

* Rush's Diseases of the Mind, p. 165.