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your liberty and laws for want of responsibility. Twothirds of those that shall happen to be present can, with the President, make treaties that shall be the supreme law of the land: they may make the most ruinous treaties, and yet there is no punishment for them. Whoever shows me a punishment provided for them will oblige me.

So, sir, nothwithstanding there are eight pillars, they want another. Where will they make another? I trust, sir, the exclusion of the evils wherewith this system is replete, in its present form, will be made a condition precedent to its adoption, by this or any other State. The transition from a general unqualified admission to offices, to a consolidation of government, seems easy; for, though the American States are dissimilar in their structure, this will assimilate them. This, sir, is itself a strong consolidating feature, and is not one of the least dangerous in that system. Nine States are sufficient to establish this government over those nine. Imagine that nine have come into it. Virginia has certain scruples. Suppose she will consequently refuse to join with those States: may not they still continue in friendship and union with her? If she sends her annual requisitions in dollars, do you think their stomachs will be so squeamish as to refuse her dollars? Will they not accept her regiments? They would intimidate you into an inconsiderate adoption, and frighten you with ideal evils, and that the Union shall be dissolved. 'Tis a bugbear, sir: the fact is, sir, that the eight adopting States can hardly stand on their own legs. Public fame tells us, that the adopting States have already heart-burnings and animosity, and repent their precipitate hurry: this, sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief. When I reflect on these and many other circumstances, I must think those States will be found to be in confederacy with us. If we pay our quota of money annually, and furnish our ratable number of men, when necessary, I can see no danger from a rejection.

The history of Switzerland clearly proves, that we might be in amicable alliance with those States, without adopting

this Constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy, consisting of dissimilar governments. This is an example which proves that governments of dissimilar structures may be confederated. That confederate republic has stood upwards of four hundred years; and although several of the individual republics are democratic, and the rest aristocratic, no evil has resulted from this dissimilarity, for they have braved all the power of France and Germany during that long period. The Swiss spirit, sir, has kept them together: they have encountered and overcome immense difficulties with patience and fortitude. In the vicinity of powerful and ambitious monarchs, they have, retained their independence, republican simplicity, and valor. Look at the peasants of that country, and of France, and mark the difference. You will find the condition of the former far more desirable and comfortable. No matter whether a people be great, splendid, and powerful, if they enjoy freedom. The Turkish Grand Seignior, alongside of our President, would put us to disgrace; but we should be abundantly consoled for this disgrace, when our citizens have been put in contrast with the Turkish slave.

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The most valuable end of government is the liberty of the inhabitants. No possible advantages can compensate for the loss of this privilege. Show me the reason why the American Union is to be dissolved. Who are those eight adopting States? Are they averse to give us a little time to consider, before we conclude? Would such a disposition render a junction with them eligible; or is it the genius of that kind of government to precipitate people hastily into measures of the utmost importance, and grant no indulgence? If it be, sir, is it for us to accede to such a government? We have a right to have time to consider-w -we shall therefore insist upon it. Unless the government be amended, we can never accept it. The adopting States will doubtless accept our money and our regiments; and what is to be the consequence, if we are disunited? I believe that it is yet doubtful whether it is not proper to stand by a while, and see

the effect of its adoption in other States. In forming a government, the utmost care should be taken to prevent its becoming oppressive; and this government is of such an intricate and complicated nature, that no man on this earth can know its real operation. The other States have no reason to think, from the antecedent conduct of Virginia, that she has any intention of seceding from the Union, or of being less active to support the general welfare. Would they not, therefore, acquiesce in our taking time to deliberate-deliberate whether the measure be not perilous, not only for us, but the adopting States?

Permit me, sir, to say, that a great majority of the people, even in the adopting States, are averse to this government. I believe I would be right to say, that they have been egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has perhaps been tricked into it. If the other States who have adopted it have not been tricked, still they were too much hurried into its adoption. There were very respectable minorities in several of them; and if reports be true a clear majority of the people are averse to it. If we also accede, and it should prove grievous, the peace and prosperity of our country, which we all love, will be destroyed. This government has not the affection of the people at present. Should it be oppressive, their affection will be totally estranged from it; and, sir, you know that a government, without their affections, can neither be durable nor happy. I speak as one poor individual; but when I speak, I speak the language of thousands. But, sir, I mean not to breathe the spirit nor utter the language of secession.

I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am really concerned that I have something yet to say. The honorable member has said that we shall be properly represented. Remember, sir, that the number of our representatives is but ten, whereof six are a majority. Will those men be possessed of sufficient information? A particular knowledge of particular districts will not suffice. They must be well acquainted with agriculture, commerce, and a great

variety of other matters throughout the continent; they must know not only the actual state of nations in Europe and America, the situation of their farmers, cottagers, and mechanics, but also the relative situation and intercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as England. Our proportion of representatives is but ten men. In England, they have five hundred and thirty. The House of Commons in England, numerous as they are, we are told, is bribed, and have bartered away the rights of their constituents. What then shall become of us? Will these few protect our rights? Will they be incorruptible? You say they will be better men than the English commoners. I say they will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be chosen blindfolded: their election (the term, as applied to their appointment, is inaccurate) will be an involuntary nomination, and not a choice.

I have, I fear, fatigued the committee, yet I have not said the one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my mind, and wish to impart. On this occasion, I conceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interest of the State; and I thought her dearest rights at sake. Having lived so long been so much honored-my efforts, though small, are due to my country. I have found my mind hurried on from subject to subject, on this very great occasion. We have all been out of order, from the gentleman who opened to-day, to myself. I did not come prepared to speak on so multifarious a subject, in so general a manner. I trust you will indulge me another time. Before you

abandon the present system, I hope you will consider not only its defects, most maturely, but likewise those of that which you are to substitute for it. May you be fully apprised of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience, but by some abler advocate than I!

8. JAMES MADISON, OF VIRGINIA.-FOR THE FED

ERAL CONSTITUTION

(In the Virginia Convention, at Richmond, June 5, 1788.)

PATRICK HENRY was answered in the Virginia Convention by several men, but by none whose fame as a constitutional thinker and writer ranks higher than that of James Madison. None did more than he to bring about the Federal Convention at Philadelphia, and none more to bring its labors to a successful conclusion; and now in the Virginia Convention no one was so carefully able in exposition of the new Constitution, so minutely unwearying in refutation of the arguments of its opponents. In all Madison spoke some twenty-four times, eight of his speeches being of considerable length.

The speech given below was delivered June 5th, the date of Henry's speech, and immediately followed an able and eloquent address by Governor Edmund Randolph, in which, in spite of the fact that he had refused to sign the Constitution in the Convention at Philadelphia, Randolph now advocated its adoption. Madison spoke in a low tone, and at the beginning the reporter states that he was unable to hear him distinctly. The text of the speech here reproduced is that in Elliot's Debates.

JAMES MADISON. Born in Virginia, 1751; graduated from the College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1771; served in the Virginia legislature, 1776, 1784, 1785, 1786, and 1797; member of Congress, 1779; of the Annapolis Convention, 1786; of the Federal Convention, 1787; joint author with Hamilton and Jay of "The Federalist," 1787-88; member of the U. S. House of Representatives, 1789-96, where he opposed Federalist measures; Secretary of State, 1801-9; President, 1809-17; died, 1836

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