A paffion when it flames fo high as to impel us to act blindly without any view to confequences, good or ill, may in that state be termed inftinctive; and when it is fo moderate as to admit reason, and to prompt actions with a view to an end, it may in that state be termed deliberative.

With refpect to actions exerted as means to an end, defire to bring about the end is what determines one to exert the action; and defire confidered in that view is termed a motive: thus the fame mental act that is termed defire with respect to an end in view, is termed a motive with respect to its power of determining one to act. Inftinctive actions have a caufe, namely, the impulfe of the paffion; but they cannot be faid to have a motive, because they are not done with any view to confequences,

We learn from experience, that the gratification of defire is pleasant; and the forefight of that pleasure becomes often an additional motive for acting. Thus a child eats by the mere impulse of hunger: a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulfe and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health *.

*One exception there is, and that is remorfe, when it is fo violent as to make a man defire to punish himself. The gratification here is far from being pleafant. See p. 188. of this volume. But a single exception, instead of overturning a general rule, is rather a confirmation of it.

From

From these premiffes, it is easy to determine with accuracy, what paffions and actions are felfish, what focial. It is the end in view that afcertains the class to which they belong: where the end in view is my own good, they are selfifh; where the end in view is the good of another, they are focial. Hence it follows, that inftinctive actions, where we act blindly and merely by impulfe, cannot be reckoned either focial or felfish: thus eating, when prompted by an impulse merely of nature, is neither focial nor felfish; but add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleasure or my health, and it becomes in a measure selfish. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert an action to the end folely of advancing my friend's happiness, without regard to my own gratification, the action is juftly denominated focial; and fo is alfo the affection that is its caufe: if another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will also contribute to my own happiness, the action becomes partly selfish. If charity be given with the fingle view of relieving a person from distress, the action is purely focial; but if it be partly in view to enjoy the pleasure of a virtuous act, the action is fo far felfifh*. Animal love when carried

into

* A felfish motive proceeding from a focial principle, fuch as that mentioned, is the most refpectable of all fel

fifh

into action by natural impulse fingly, is neither focial nor felfifh: when exerted with a view to gratification, it is felfish: when the motive of giving pleasure to its object is fuperadded, it is partly focial, partly felfifh. A juft action, when prompted by the principle of duty folely, is neither focial nor selfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is felfifh: I pay debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But fuppofe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereft, purely to oblige me: in that cafe, together with the motive of gratification, there arifes a motive of gratitude, which refpects the creditor folely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good; and the action. is partly focial, partly felfifh. Suppose again I meet with a furprifing and unexpected act of generofity, that infpires me with love to my benefactor, and the utmoft gratitude: I burn to do him good: he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure in gratifying the defire, vanisheth out of fight: in this cafe, the action I perform is purely

fifh motives. To enjoy the pleafure of a virtuous action, one must be virtuous; and to enjoy the pleasure of a charitable action, one must think charity laudable at leaft, if not a duty. It is otherwife where a man gives charity merely for the fake of oftentation; for this he may do without having any pity or benevolence in his temper,

focial.

focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes strong, the action is exerted with a view fingly to the object of the paffion, and felf never comes in view. The fame effect of stifling selfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial. An action, for example, done to gratify my ambi tious views, is selfish; but if my ambition become headstrong, and blindly impel me to action, the action is neither felfifh nor focial. flight degree of refentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arifing to myself from gratifying the paffion, is juftly denominated Selfish where revenge flames fo high as to have no other aim but the destruction of its object, it is no longer selfish; but, in oppofition to a focial paffion, may be termed diffocial".

A

When this analysis of human nature is con fidered, not one article of which can with truth be controverted, there is reafon to be furprifed\ at the blindness of fome philofophers, who, by dark and confufed notions, are led to deny all

This word, hitherto not in ufe, feems to fulfil ali that is required by Demetrius Phalereus (Of Elocution, fect. 96.) in coining a new word: first, that it be perfpicuous; and next, that it be in the tone of the language; that we may not, fays our author, introduce among the Grecian vocables, words that found like thofe of Phrygia or Scythia.

VOL. I.

D

motives.

motives to action but what arife from felf-love. Man, for aught appears, might poffibly have been fo framed, as to be fufceptible of no paffions but what have felf for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety: his conftitution, partly felfish, partly focial, fits him much better for his prefent fituation *.

Of felf, every one hath a direct perception; of other things we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes: and hence it is, that of felf the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reason now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is this fufficient to account for the prevalence of felf-love?

In the foregoing part of this chapter it is fuggefted, that fome circumstances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint ought to be pursued. It is a truth afcertained

As the benevolence of many human acions is, beyond the poflibility of doubt, the argument commonly infifted on for reconciling fuch actions to the felfish fyftem, is, that the only motive I can have to perform a benevolent action, or an action of any kind, is the pleasure that it affords me. So much then is yielded, that we are pleafed when we do good to others: which is a fair admiffion of the principle of benevolence; for without that principle, what pleafure could one have in doing good to others? And admitting a principle of benevolence, why may it not be a motive to action, as well as felfifhnefs is, or any other principle?

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