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members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect, must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed senate, only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often avoided, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions ? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing, to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region, cannot like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying, that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered, as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be re

rous and changeable body. It can only be for
small, that a sensible degree of the praise a
measures may be the portion of each individ
bly so durably invested with public trust, th
sequence of its members may be sensibly in
reputation and prosperity of the commun
representatives of Rhode Island, would pro
affected in their deliberations on the iniq
state, by arguments drawn from the light
would be viewed by foreign nations, or e
whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that
select and stable body had been necess
character alone, would have prevent
which that misguided people is now 1-

I add, as a sixth defect, the want i a due responsibility in the governme that frequency of elections, which

1 will exempt ⚫ment to les

ency of remain

se misrepresented men may suc

erations, to recollet, wrie, wuch had not

- r 'n fact tiie only ped. In each of the The constitution of the stantial evidence makes This particular from the at it had some quality or unst popular fluctuations, out of the senate, was appoint

responsibility. The remark will, per acancies itself. These exambut paradoxical. It must neverthelemitation as they are repugnant to explained, to be as undeniable as it withstanding, when compared Responsibility, in order to be resistence of other ancient repubobjects within the power of the res the necessity of some institution, to be effectual, must relate to operty I am not unaware of the a ready and proper judgment can the American from other popular The objects of government mayer; and which render exclasses; the one depending on misoning from the one case immediate and sensible operating to this consideration,

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been made of this difference, in rear papers, will have shown that I am its existence, nor to undervalue its imrestraint therefore in observing, that the ignorance of the ancient governments entation, is by no means precisely true, ly given to it. Without entering into a id here be misplaced, I will refer to a few t of what I advance.

emocracies of Greece, many of the execuperformed, not by the people themselves, but y the people, and representing them in their

orm of Solon, Athens was governed by nine y elected by the people at large. The degree of to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. hat period we find an assembly, first of four, and six hundred members, annually elected by the peoally representing them in their legislative capacity, Pre not only associated with the people in the funcng laws, but had the exclusive right of originating ropositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, ver might be its power, or the duration of its appointars to have been elective by the suffrages of the peoar instances might be traced in most, if not all the vernments of antiquity.

, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with ines; two bodies small, indeed in number, but annually

the whole body of the people, and considered as the iatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary caThe Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the : and have been considered by some authors as an institualogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference that in the election of that representative body, the right Frage was communicated to a part only of the people.

m these facts, to which many others might be added, it is , that the principle of representation was neither unknown The ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political constions. The true distinction between these and the American vernments, lies in the total exclusion of the people in their colctive capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the to!exclusion of the representatives of the people from the admin

rous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island, would probably have been little affected in their deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that state, by arguments drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by foreign nations, or even by the sister states; whilst it can scarcely be doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone, would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now labouring.

I add, as a sixth defect, the want in some important cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces this responsibility. The remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important.

Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes; the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term, as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements, which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence, which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It is sufficiently difficult, at any rate, to preserve a personal responsibility in the

members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.

The proper remedy for this defect, must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.

Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of a well-constructed senate, only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all governments, and actually will in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often avoided, if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of deereeing, to the same citizens, the hemlock on one day, and statues on the

next.

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region, cannot like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying, that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured in a former paper to show, that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered, as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be re

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