the courts have held constitutional a statute conferring on courts of Special Sessions exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine charges of petit larceny not charged as a second offense. People v. Dutcher, (1880) 83 N. Y. 240, reversing 20 Hun 241; Devine v. People, 20 Hun 98.

The provision in article 1, section 6, that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment has no application to misdemeanors cognizable by a court of Special Sessions by virtue of this section, the infamy of an offense being determined by the nature of the punishment prescribed therefor and not by the moral obliquity involved in its commission. People v. Manett, (1913) 154 App. Div. 540, 139 N. Y. S. 61.

Meaning of "misdemeanor." Whether an offense is a misdemeanor within the purview of this section depends not on its legislative designation but on the punishment prescribed therefor. People v. Manett, (1913) 154 App. Div. 540, 139 N. Y. S. 61. See also People v. Dutcher, 83 N. Y. 240. In view of the above consideration it has been said obiter that the legislature cannot give courts of Special Sessions jurisdiction of offenses punishable by severe penalties merely by styling them "misdemeanors." People v. Craig, (1909) 195 N. Y. 190, 88 N. E. 38, reversing 129 App. Div. 851, 114 N. Y. S. 833. Compare People v. Davis, (1911) 143 App. Div. 579, 127 N. Y. S. 1072, affirming 122 N. Y. S. 788.

Jurisdiction dependent on statute.— This section does not purport to vest jurisdiction of misdemeanors on courts of Special Sessions. It merely empowers the legislature to grant that jurisdiction, leaving the extent of the grant to legislative discretion. Courts of Special Sessions have, therefore, no authority to try misdemeanors except that expressly given by statute. People v. Harris, (1890) 123 N. Y. 70, 25 N. E. 317.

Recorder's Court.— A Recorder's Court empowered (§ 2, tit. 9, ch. 55, Laws of 1890) to hold courts of Special Sessions is a court of Special Sessions and may properly be granted jurisdiction of misdemeanors. v. Hulett, (1891) 61 Hun 620, mem., 15 N. Y. S. 630.

People

ARTICLE VII.

1. State credit limited.

The credit of the State shall not in any manner be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation. Const. 1846, Art. VII, § 9; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. VII, § 1.

Relation to article 8, section 9.—The provisions of this section are substantially embodied in section 9 of article 8. A further discussion of the gift or loan of the state credit may be found on reference thereto.

Loan of credit existing prior to adoption of section. This section is prospective in its operation; and where the credit of the state was loaned before its adoption, a statute extending that credit in accordance with a provision of the original loan is not unconstitutional. Thus, chapter 193, Laws of 1840, authorized the sale, by and for the benefit of the Long Island railroad, of certificates secured by the state and reimbursable at its pleasure at any time after twenty years from the issue thereof. Under that statute the certificates did not automatically fall due twenty years from the date of their issue. Payment could not be demanded until the legislature should fix the date thereof. Wherefore, chapter 36, Laws of 1858, deferring payment until fifteen years after the expiration of the twenty years provided for, is valid. People v. Denniston, (1861) 23 N. Y. 247.

Deposit of funds with state. The Act of 1866 (ch. 576, Laws of 1866), authorizing the North American Life Insurance Company to deposit with the superintendent of the insurance department a fund for the security of its registered policyholders, and the provisions of the Act of 1869 (ch. 90) and of the Act of 1867 (ch. 708), making similar provision for a special fund for the security of registered policyholders, are not violative of this section. "The credit of the state was not given or loaned by these acts. It simply became the custodian of the securities deposited with it. It incurred or assumed no responsibility, except as a depositary. . It was never before supposed that the constitutional provision cited was intended to prohibit the assumption by the state of the responsibility imposed by such acts.” Attorney-General v. North American Life Ins. Co., (1880) 82 N. Y. 172.

§ 2. State debts, power to contract.

Application of moneys.

The State may, to meet casual deficits or failures in revenues, or for expenses not provided for, contract debts; but such debts, direct or contingent, singly or in the aggregate, shall not at any time exceed one million of dollars; and the moneys arising from the loans creating such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which they were obtained or to repay the debt so contracted, and to no other purpose whatever.

Const. 1846, Art. VII, § 10; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. VII, § 2.

Scope of section.-On construing this section with section 4 of this article it is manifest that both apply only to state debts as such and not to the debts of counties, cities or towns. People v. Flagg, (1871) 46 N. Y. 401. See also People v. Ingersoll, (1874) 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178, affirming 67 Barb. 472.

Force. Any attempt to create a state debt in excess of the limit here imposed is void unless made in accordance with the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of this article. No power is competent in any other manner to make the state liable for an amount greater than that limit. "Neither the legislature nor the officers and agents of the state, or all combined, can create a debt or incur an obligation for or in behalf of the state, except to the amount and in the manner provided for in the constitution." People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 556. Accordingly, the court in that case found subversive of the Constitution a statute (ch. 700, Laws of 1872) authorizing the incurrence of a debt to meet deficiencies in the canal and general funds. In the words of the court, the statute "proceeds upon the assumption that a state debt may be created and exist outside of the constitution, either by act of the legislature, or the acts of the administrative or executive officers and agents of the state; that, notwithstanding the stringent provisions of the organic law of the state, expenses may be authorized and liabilities incurred in advance and in excess of money provided, which must be met either by direct taxation or by borrowing."

§ 3. Debts for state defense.

In addition to the above limited power to contract debts, the State may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection,

or defend the State in war; but the money arising from the contracting of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was raised, or to repay such debts, and to no other purpose whatever.

Const. 1846, Art. VII, § 11; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. VII, § 3.

§ 4. Limitation of legislative power to create debts.

Submission to people of laws creating debts.

Manner of passage of such laws in legislature.

Legislature's power over debts after approval by people.
Tax irrepealable.

Use of loan restricted.

Restrictions on submission to people.

Bond issue.

Sinking fund.

Alteration of interest upon state debt.

Additional tax to pay increased interest and principal.

Except the debts specified in sections two and three of this article, no debts shall be hereafter contracted by or in behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by law, for some single work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; and such law shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay, and sufficient to pay, the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within fifty years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people, and have received a majority of all the votes case for and against it at such election. On the final passage of such bill in either house of the Legislature, the question shall be taken by ayes and noes, to be duly entered on the journals thereof, and shall be: "Shall this bill pass, and ought the same to receive the sanction of the people?" The Legislature may at any time after the approval of such law by the people, if no debt shall have been contracted in pursuance thereof, repeal the same; and may at any time, by law, forbid the contracting of any further debt or liability under such law; but the tax imposed by such act, in proportion to the debt and liability which may have been contracted in pursuance of such law, shall remain in force and be irrepealable, and be annually collected, until the proceeds thereof shall have made the provision hereinbefore specified

to pay and discharge the interest and principal of such debt and liability. The money arising from any loan or stock creating such debt or liability shall be applied to the work or object specified in the act authorizing such debt or liability, or for the payment of such debt or liability, and for no other purpose whatever. No such law shall be submitted to be voted on within three months after its passage or at any general election when any other law, or any bill shall be submitted to be voted for or against. The Legislature may provide for the issue of bonds of the State to run for a period not exceeding fifty years in lieu of bonds heretofore authorized but not issued and shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax for the payment of the same as hereinbefore required. When any sinking fund created under this section shall equal in amount the debt for which it was created, no further direct tax shall be levied on account of said sinking fund, and the Legislature shall reduce the tax to an amount equal to the accruing interest on such debt. The Legislature may from time to time alter the rate of interest to be paid upon any State debt, which has been or may be authorized pursuant to the provisions of this section, or upon any part of such debt, provided, however, that the rate of interest shall not be altered upon any part of such debt or upon any bond or other evidence thereof, which has been, or shall be created or issued before such alteration. In case the Legislature increase the rate of interest upon any such debt, or part thereof, it shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay and sufficient to pay the increased or altered interest on such debt as it falls due and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within fifty years from the time of the contracting thereof, and shall appropriate annually to the sinking fund moneys in amount sufficient to pay such interest and pay and discharge the principal of such debt when it shall become due and payable.

Const. 1846, Art. VII, § 12; continued without change in Const. 1894, Art. VII, § 4; amended in 1905 and in 1909.

Scope of section. On construing this section with section 2 of this article it is apparent that both sections apply only to state debts as such and not to the debts of counties, cities or towns. People v. Ingersoll, (1874) 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178, affirming 67 Barb. 472; People v. Flagg, (1871) 46 N. Y. 401.

Obligation chargeable to particular fund as debt.- A debt, within the meaning of this section, may relate only to the income of particular property, or it may embrace the whole resources of the state. "The extent of the obligation does not affect or qualify its nature; so long as there is an obligation assumed by the state, it constitutes a debt something due from the state." Wherefore, a statute, (Act of July 10, 1851) authorizing the issue of canal

certificates to raise money for the completion of certain canals, and pledging the surplus revenues of the state canals for a prescribed period to the redemp tion of the certificates, creates a debt within the meaning of this section, although provision is made in the act that the state shall in no wise be bound for the payment of the certificates except to the extent of the canal revenues for the period prescribed. Newell v. People, (1852) 7 N. Y. 9.

66

Declaration in statute that no debt is created thereby.- A provision in a statute that the statute shall, in no event or contingency, be so construed as to create any debt or liability against the state or the people thereof within the meaning of " this section, is not final and does not preclude the court from examining the act with a view to ascertaining if it does, in fact, authorize the creation of a debt. Newell v. People, (1852) 7 N. Y. 9. In that case, with reference to such a provision contained in an act authorizing the issue of certificates to raise money, Johnson, J., said: "Is its effect, to preclude us from inquiring whether the certificates, or the provisions of the act, taken in connection with the certificates, purport to create a debt or liability against the state, or the people thereof ? We think not. It does not alter, or profess to alter, any one provision of the act; it leaves them all standing on the statute book, with the apparent force of law, and with the sanction of legislative approval, forming together a single scheme for raising money, on the faith of which capital is invited to assist the state. Under this state of things, can we be asked to take the ground that the state is to be regarded as coming into the money-market, with a cunninglydevised plan of promises, seemingly efficacious, but really known to be wholly unlawful, and incapable of conferring any legal right, and by such means seeking to procure the advance of money? The respect which we owe to the legislature, forbids us to listen for one moment to the suggestion. The clause in question is only a legislative declaration of the meaning of the constitution and an injunction upon the courts to construe the act accordingly. If it were to be regarded by us, and such effect given to it, as is contended for then the most flagrant legislative violations of the constitution may always be screened from the scrutiny of the courts, by the addition of this simple clause."

Purpose of provisions relative to single object and to submission of law to people. The provision of this section that a law authorizing the incurrence of indebtedness shall not be submitted at a general election at which another law will be voted on, that the debt to be created shall be for some single work or object, and that the work or object shall be distinctly specified in the law, were devised "to secure to the electors the information necessary to an intelligent expression of their will, and to enable them to act upon the merits of the proposition unembarrassed and undisturbed by interests and influences other than those connected with the character and importance of the single work or object for which it should be proposed to contract the debt." People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 566.

Meaning of “ single work or object.” — “The 'work or object' contemplated by the constitution is the public work or object to be accomplished by the expenditure of the money to be borrowed." An appropriation to meet expenses incurred, or to be incurred, for several distinct purposes is not, therefore, a single work or object. Wherefore, an act (ch. 700, Laws of 1872) purporting to authorize the state to borrow money to meet certain appropriations for a variety of distinct purposes, offends against this section. People v. Kings County, (1873) 52 N. Y. 556. Referring in that case to the second section of the act there under consideration, the court said: “It is enacted by that section that to provide the means of paying the appropriation made by the first section, declared to be for the canals,' and 'to pay the floating indebtedness of the state, and the estimated liabilities of the state' not yet provided for by law, a debt is authorized. It is true the act makes a show of respect for the constitution by writing appropriation' in