EUROPE IN TRANSITION.

'N the midst of the tranquillity that now reigns through out Europe it is difficult to realise the fact that we have only reached a pause in a mighty revolution. From one end of the continent to the other perfect peace prevails. Busy as the armourers may be in making needle-guns, Chassepots, or Sniders, and in finding out the most destructive kinds of cannon, not an angry shot is heard in Europe. Busy as the great military powers may be, conscripting and drilling and overtaxing their harassed citizens, not a single sentinel is called upon to perform the actual duties of war. Even the wordy warfare of diplomacy seems to have ceased. The rumours that float on the air show only the uneasiness of men's minds, for there is no mention of any matter of serious contention among the powers of Europe. The tomahawk lies buried, and the pipe of peace sends up its calmest wreaths. How long this deep tranquillity is likely to last may best be judged of by taking a glance at what has been accomplished, and comparing it with that which remains to be done.

The changes that have been effected in the state of Europe during the past ten years exceed in importance the changes accomplished in any former decade of modern times. Even when the great Napoleon carried his victorious arms over Continental Europe, and made and unmade kings, no such changes were effected as the reconstruction of Italy and Germany out of the scattered fragments of those ancient nations. The sword of the conqueror did indeed give new dynasties and new laws to vast masses of the human race; but the revolutions so accomplished were destitute of the moral accompaniments that make the recent changes in Europe so important in themselves and so significant of results in the future. In the one case, the face of Europe was temporarily changed by an irresistible overflow of the military power of France, led by a man of singular daring and wonderful genius as a soldier; in the other, the face of Europe has been changed by a series of events that have their roots in a deep and powerful current of human opinion:

Ten years ago neither Italy nor Germany had any national existence. Those grand old nations of the past had been broken up

into innumerable fragments, and in the weakness of division their national power had passed away. Italy was divided into petty sovereignties, whose rulers were tyrants to their subjects and puppets in the hands of their powerful neighbours. Germany was also parcelled out into such divisions, great and small, that her national power was completely destroyed. The second, and third, and fourth, and fifth-rate states were useful only for the two great German powers to quarrel over; and those two great powers were so well balanced, and so full of mutual jealousy, that they could safely be left to neutralise each other's influence. And so Germany, powerful enough united to take an equal share in the highest business of nations, was conquered by division, and made of no account in Europe.

Yet a strong national feeling existed throughout both countries. It was perhaps more latent in Italy than in Germany; but it was more passionate, and it was fed by the deeper degradation into which her petty sovereigns had led the Italian people. The love of Fatherland was at once a sentiment and a creed in the minds of the Germans; and despite a national tendency to waste their patriotism in sounding speeches, there was genuine revolutionary spirit apparent in the men who supported the Nationalverein. Here, then, were two nations possessing within themselves all the elements of national life and greatness, divided into parcels and shorn of their national existence by an artificial system of government. They were as two strong Gullivers, bound by swarms of Lilliputian princes. Their natural aspirations were to unity and national greatness; but in order that petty Italian and German princes might have thrones to sit upon, and that the patrons of those princes might have puppets to work, Italian was arrayed against Italian, German against German, and both nations were reduced to utter impotence.

Fortune and the Emperor Napoleon decided that Italy should first break her bonds. Divided as she was, Italy was but the vassal of Austria, and a very meek and obedient vassal. The Kaiser set off one Italian sovereign against another in such a manner that he could do what he liked in Italy. Himself at the time the humble slave of Rome, Francis Joseph used all his influence to keep Italy sunk in the lowest condition of civil and religious bondage. The Italian prince who showed himself the most tyrannical and intolerant gained for himself the highest favour at Vienna.

The Emperor Napoleon saw danger to himself in this state of matters. Knowing himself to be the creature of a revolution, he could not see without emotion the forces of reaction and bigotry

arrayed on every side of France. He determined to break the power of Austria in Italy, and the celebrated New Year's-day speech heralded the approach of mighty changes. The declaration of war against Austria gave the first impetus to a movement that has astonished him who made it by its power-a movement that has already effected vast changes, and that seems destined to effect yet greater changes in the future. In an unguarded moment the Emperor Napoleon proclaimed the doctrine of nationalities, little dreaming that the seed he then threw into the ground would grow up so speedily into something that he himself should fear.

The sagacious French ruler understood only partially the strength of the spirit he was evoking. He saw that the desire for national unity in Italy was strong enough to form a powerful revolutionary weapon; but he did not see that it was too strong and heavy to be guided by any man's hand. He let loose this spirit as a servant, and has found it a master. He meant to substitute his own power for that of Austria in Italy. He contemplated a confederation of weak Italian states, of which he should be the virtual head; but the national feeling that he had himself evoked made such a scheme impossible, and caused the different parts of liberated Italy to rush together like long-divided lovers.

Meanwhile, the desire for national unity was working strongly in the hearts of the German people. But they had no leader, and the aspirations which ended in patriotic speeches could not destroy that balance of power between Austria and Prussia wherein lay the weakness of the nation. So long as that balance of power existed it was felt to be impossible to make Germany great or united. Each of those two powers had influence enough to make any scheme of confederation proposed by the other impracticable, and the only hope for Germany lay in the possibility that the rival leaders might one day fight until the one should reduce the other to subjection. The Germans had no Napoleon to do for them what had been done for Italy; and in fact all the influence of that potentate was exerted to perpetuate the duality that reduced Germany to impotence.

But the time came, and the man. A minister, who by his harsh and despotic domestic policy had offended the dearest aspirations of the Liberal party in Germany, suddenly showed himself as the leader of the national movement. No more startling metamorphosis was ever effected on the pantomimic stage than that which converted the stern upholder of the divine right of kings into the leader of the German people in their assault upon the kingly rights that prevented the accomplishment of the national unity. It turned out that the VOL. I., N. S. 1868.

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very cause of Count Bismarck's conflicts with popular opinion was a desire to advance the interests dearest to that popular opinion. His arrogant and unconstitutional attempts to increase the military force of the country without the assent of Parliament were made in the secret and incommunicable knowledge that the future destinies of the Fatherland would soon be determined by the strength of that force in conflict with the armies of Austria. He had resolved to break the power of Austria in Germany, but he could not publicly avow his determination.

The work Bismarck had to do was a work that could only be satisfactorily done by an irresponsible government; and in order to do it, he ignored the constitution, and carried on the government of Prussia in the spirit of autocracy. The strong-willed minister carried his point amid the execrations of Liberal Europe; and when Prussia met Austria in decisive conflict it was with the immense and well-equipped army created by him in spite of parliamentary opposition. For once unconstitutional conduct proved advantageous to the country. The power of Austria in Germany was utterly crushed, and North Germany was left free to constitute herself a nation under the headship of Prussia.

It is perfectly evident, we think, that all this has been accomplished, both in Italy and Germany, by something more than a mere fortuitous concourse of circumstances. It has been effected by the power of a strong current of opinion in favour of that doctrine of nationalities of which the Emperor Napoleon made himself the mouth-piece, and of which he has since become the practical opponent. Such a current of thought could never have existed had not human opinion respecting the relationship between sovereign and subject undergone a complete revolution. Formerly, it was practically held that subjects existed only for the convenience of sovereigns; and in all territorial arrangements it was the interests of kings and not of peoples that were held to be of primary importance. The reverse is now the dominant doctrine in Europe. Sovereigns are held to exist only for the convenience of their subjects, and territorial arrangements may be made in the interest of the communities affected.

Men perceive that for the protection of their best interests it is necessary that the communities of which they are members should be powerful enough to defend and uphold their own laws; and whereever a race is divided by artificial arrangements it is natural that this desire for aggregation should lead them to break down those barriers, so that all who speak the same language and have a community

of national characteristics and interests, should unite to form a single nation. Respect for royal interests has for centuries allowed those artificial divisions to split nations into sections, but that respect is no longer powerful enough to induce nations to sacrifice their national greatness in order that many sovereigns may have separate kingdoms. Military force has of course done the rough work of unification in Italy and Germany, but we see in both countries indubitable proofs that military force has only acted as the instrument of the national will. When the military power of the first Napoleon overthrew ancient dynasties, and made new nations, it could not rally to its support the patriotism and talent of the conquered countries in the way that the military force of King Victor Emmanuel and King William has done in Italy and Germany. In the one case, military force was the instrument of an ambitious man's will, and in the other it is the instrument of a nation's will.

A clear understanding of the cause of the accomplished changes is the best means of enabling one to form a judgment respecting the changes that are likely to be brought about in the future. We have seen that the moving spirit of the past has been a passionate desire for national unity on the part of divided peoples. There are still divided peoples, and there is still the desire for unity. We have no reason to suppose that that desire has been satiated by the partial success it has achieved. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that, like jealousy, such a desire must grow on what it feeds

The aggregations that have already taken place have greatly strengthened the champions of nationalities. Italy is much stronger than Piedmont was, and North Germany than Prussia; and it is reasonable to suppose that the wish to complete their unity has not decreased as their power to gratify it has grown, There is, therefore, much yet to be done. Italy longs for Rome as lover longs for his mistress, and the German has much to do before he can say that the Fatherland is one and indivisible.

Germany remains divided into three portions. The victories of Prussia have given her all Germany north of the Maine, and she has formed of it the North German Confederation; Austria retains her German provinces; and the southern states of Bavaria and Wurtemburg retain their independence. Any one who speaks of German unity as an accomplished thing must, therefore, be understood only as asserting that a substantial foundation of national unity has been laid. This three-fold partition leaves Germany yet much divided; but it concentrates the vitality and power of the nation so entirely in one of the sections, that we may regard the complete unification of