lost but half as many, about 450, out of a total of from two to three thousand. But the numbers were nothing; the fact that the provincials had resisted regular troops was everything.

The "great American army" was still growing at Cambridge; it had been adopted by Congress, even before the battle, and George Washington, of Virginia, had been unanimously placed in command, by recommendation of the New England delegates. He assumed this authority beneath the historic elm-tree at Cambridge, July 3, 1775. On the 9th he held a council of war of the newly organized general officers. The whole force was still from New England, and consisted of 16,770 infantry and 585 artillerymen. These were organized in three divisions, each comprising two brigades, usually of six regiments each. They had a long series of posts to garrison, and they had nine rounds of ammunition per man. Worst of all, they were still, in the words of Washington, "a mixed multitude of people, under very little discipline." Their whole appearance under the new organization may be best seen from the contemporary description by the Rev. William Emerson, grandfather of our great poet and essayist:

"There is great overturning in the camp, as to order and regularity. New lords, new laws. The Generals Washington and Lee are upon the lines every day. New orders from his Excellency are read to the respective regiments every morning after prayers. The strictest government is taking place, and great distinction is made between officers and soldiers. Every one is made to know his place, and keep in it, or be tied up and receive thirty or forty lashes, according to his crime. Thousands are at work every day from four till eleven o'clock in the morning. It is surprising how much work has been done. The lines are extended almost from Cambridge to Mystic River, so that very soon it will be morally impossible for the enemy to get between the works, except in one place, which is supposed to be left purposely unfortified to entice the enemy out of their fortresses. Who would have thought, twelve months past, that all Cambridge and Charlestown would be covered over with American camps and cut up into forts and intrenchments, and all the lands, fields, orchards, laid common -horses and cattle feeding in the choicest mowing land, whole fields of corn eaten down to the ground, and large parks of well-regulated locusts cut down for firewood and other public uses! This, I must say, looks a little melancholy. My quarters are at the foot of the famous Prospect Hill, where such

great preparations are made for the reception of the enemy. It is very diverting to walk among the camps. They are as different in their form as the owners are in their dress; and every tent is a portraiture of the temper and taste of the persons who encamp in it. Some are made of boards, and some of sailcloth. Some partly of one, and some partly of the other. Again, others are made of stone and turf, brick or brush. Some are thrown up in a hurry; others curiously wrought with doors and windows, done with wreaths and withes, in the manner of a basket. Some are your proper tents and marquees, looking like the regular camp of the enemy. In these are the Rhode-Islanders, who are furnished with tent equipage and everything in the most exact English style. However, I think this great variety is rather a beauty than a blemish in the army."

In a

All that was experienced on both sides at the beginning of the late American civil war, in respect to rawness of soldiery, inexperienced officers, short enlistments, local jealousies, was equally known in the early Continental army, and was less easily remedied. Even the four New England colonies that supplied the first troops were distrustful of one another and of Washington, and this not without some apparent reason. state of society which, as has been shown, was essentially aristocratic, they had suddenly lost their leaders. Nearly one-third of the community, including almost all those to whom social deference had been paid, had taken what they called the loyal, and others the Tory, side. Why should this imported Virginian be more trustworthy? Washington in turn hardly did justice to the material with which he had to deal. He found that in Massachusetts, unlike Virginia, the gentry were loyal to the King; those with whom he had to consult were mainly farmers and mechanics-a class such as hardly existed in Virginia, and which was then far rougher and less intelligent than the same class now is. They were obstinate, suspicious, jealous. They had lost their natural leaders, the rich men, the royal councillors, the judges, and had to take up with new and improvised guides-physicians like Warren-" Doctor-general" Warren, as the British officers called him, or skilled mechanics like Paul Revere, or unemployed lawyers and business men like those

whom Governor Shirley described as "that brace of Adamses." The few men of property and consequence who stood by them, as Hancock and Prescott, were the exceptions. There were few on the patriotic side of whom it could be said, as Hutchinson said of Oxenbridge Thacher, "He was not born a plebeian, but he was resolved to die one." Their line officers were men taken almost at random from among themselves, sometimes turning out admirably, sometimes shamefully. Washington cashiered a colonel and five captains for cowardice or dishonesty during the first summer. The Continental army as it first assembled in Cambridge was, as was said of another army on a later occasion, an aggregation of town-meetings, and, which is worse, of town-meetings from which all the accustomed leaders had suddenly been swept away. No historian has yet fully portrayed the extent to which this social revolution in New England embarrassed all the early period of the war, or shown how it made the early Continental troops chafe under Washington and Schuyler, and prefer in their secret souls to be led by General Putnam, whom they could call “Old Put," and who rode to battle in his shirt-sleeves.

And, on the other hand, we can now see that there was some foundation for these criticisms on Washington. With the highest principle and the firmest purpose, his views of military gov ernment were such as no American army in these days would endure for a month. His methods were simply despotic. He thought that the Massachusetts Provincial Legislature should impress men into the Revolutionary army, should provide them. with food and clothes only, not with pay, and should do nothing for their families. He himself, having declined the offered $500 per month, served his country for his expenses only, and so, he thought, should they, overlooking the difference between those whose households depended only on themselves, and those who, like himself, had left slaves at work on their broad plantations. He thought that officers and men should be taken from differ

ent social classes, that officers should have power almost absolute, and that camp offences should be punished by the lash. These imperial methods produced a good effect, on the whole; probably it was best that the general should err on one side if the army erred on the other. But there is no doubt that much. of the discontent, the desertion, the uncertain enlistments, of the next two years proceeded from the difficulty found by Washington in adapting himself to the actual condition of the people, especially the New England people. It is the highest proof of his superiority that he overcame not merely all other obstacles, but even his own mistakes.

Such as it was, the army remained in camp long enough to make everybody impatient. The delay was inevitable; it was easier to provide even discipline than powder; the troops kept going and coming because of short enlistments, and more than once the whole force was reduced to ten thousand men. With that patience which was one of Washington's strongest military qualities he withstood dissatisfaction within and criticism from without until the time had come to strike a heavier blow. Then, in a single night, he fortified Dorchester Heights, and this forced the evacuation of Boston. The British generals had to seek elbow-room elsewhere. They left Boston March 17, 1776, taking with them twelve hundred American loyalists, the bulk of what called itself "society" in New England. The navy went to Halifax, the army to New York, whither Washington soon took his Continental army also. Once there, he found new obstacles. From the very fact that they had not sent away their loyalists, there was less of unanimity among the New York people, nor had they been so well trained by the French and Indian wars. The New England army was now away from home; it was unused to marches or evolutions, but it had learned some confidence in itself and in its commander, though it did not always do credit to either. It was soon reinforced by troops from the Middle States, but a period of disaster fol