6.

posed that they must be placed in a new Limbo-half-way between admission and exclusion. However this deficiency had arisen, it was now discovered that the known deficiency of civil worth in the Roman catholics was, in principle, that deficiency which of necessity put them out of the enjoyment of this right. Now by this principle of civil worth, it was very clear that a man might shut out persons of the highest merits; he might shut out all those who were most eminently deserving of admission; and he might let in those who were the most worthless and the most unfit. If this new-fangled phrase of civil worth" was to be repeated, with a view to keep the catholics out, it might be well to know what it meant. It did not include all that had immortalized the worthies of English history; neither did it include the little accidents of birth, education, and virtue, nor the mere immaterial requisites of justice, probity, and honour. All these were shut out of civil worth; he (Mr. Plunkett) must suppose that they were, because the persons who possessed them all were shut out from this right of admission to the franchises of their fellow-subjects; while the man who was destitute of them might be admitted, on the contrary, by denying the civil worth of the others. The constitutions of theory, and those of nations, were very different. Those of men were not mere pedantry and extravagance, for, for all practical purposes they must be of necessity very distinct from the fanciful inventions of mere schoolmen; and therefore, when they thus heard, for the

first time, of a system which might shut out every thing that was good, at the same time that it admitted every thing which was bad, they might be very sure that it was a mere school-dream. (The right honourable gentleman here went on to combat, at great length, this proposition, through all its bearings, and to show that it was erroneous to imagine that the admission to, or exclusion from, the privileges secured to the subject by the constitution, depended upon the power of the crown; the inconveniences of which power he proceeded to demonstrate.) It had been said by Mr. Pitt, with a peculiar felicity of expression, that it is not an occasional uniformity, which the constitution of England affects; it is not by these petty abstract distinctions that we are to be governed; which distinctions are only fit for the cloister. There could be no doubt that in a free monarchy, policy and justice would extend to all its subjects the same system of franchises and privileges; and if they did not, it would not, in truth, be a free monarchy. Let him here remark that he used the word "franchise" in the same sense in which Mr. Burke used it in his speeches, when applied either to the privilege of sending members to parliament, or of voting in parliament. He spoke of franchises, derived not from any grant of the crown, nor from any separate law; but from those sources whence, in an earlier age, the principles of the British constitution itself were derived. And here he would take leave to state an opinion of lord Bacon's, and to read an extract from a part of the great works of that superior

being. After commenting on the different degrees of subjects in a state, he proceeds "The fourth and last degree is the naturalborn subject for in the laws of England there is nil ultra; there is no more sub-division beyond him. And herein it seemeth to me that the law of our nation is admirable both ways, both because it distinguisheth so far, and because it distinguisheth the opinions of that philosopher, no farther." Now the Roman law, beyond the "jus civitatum," had the "jus parium," &c. Such was that illustrious man who took a bird's eye view of every subject which the human mind could grasp. This principle of exclusion was an upstart, republican principle, hostile to the very soul of the constitution; it wrested the sceptre from the hands of the king, to strike at the rights of the king's subjects. It was the principle (as had often been laid down in that house) of those associations, which, while they affected to support the throne, only maintained an unjustifiable influence and separation. But it had been said, that these fundamental principles of the constitution had been altered at the period of the reformation. No period of Engligh history had been more falsified than that; and no principle upon which that reformation was established meant to exclude the Roman ca. tholics in this way. The act of supremacy was passed to distinguish those loyal men who were attached to the throne from those who were not attached to it. Queen Elizabeth expressly declared that such were her views upon the subject of that act, and the very preamble of the 5th of

Elizabeth proved this; that a certain class of her subjects were enumerated as Roman catholicsthat their loyalty was expressly mentioned; and that it was not at that time even intimated that they laboured under any such disabilities as it had been argued were first imposed upon them at the time of the reformation. He would recommend the house to read a memorable letter addressed by Walsingham, queen Elizabeth's secretary, to Pettil, in which the writer stated what was the intention of that act, (5th Elizabeth). He said it was never the intention of the act to meddle with consciences; that the queen did not wish to interfere upon that head with any political views, &c. The right honourable gentleman continued, that he hoped that the religious wisdom of the present possessor of the throne would induce him to apply the same liberal and equitable rule. During the reigns of Elizabeth, James the first, Charles the first, and down to the unfortunate reign of Charles the second, the crown continued to give the strongest proofs of its affection for protestant and Roman catholic subjects indifferently. He would now refer to a case which occurred in the reign of Charles the second. It was the case of sir Solomon Swale, in 1667, who was expelled from that house for contempt. He was expelled because he was a popish recusant convicted; it so appeared by the debates and resolutions of the house; and one of them was expressly, "that sir S. Swale being a convicted popish recusant, is disabled to sit in this house." The title of the act of Charles the second, was

most

most persuasive on the same point; it disabled papists from sitting in either house of parliament-not merely in the house of lords. It was not therefore, he apprehended, too much to say that he had brought down the principle of the constitution to the 30th of Chas. the second. At that time, let it be remembered, the king upon the throne was more than suspected of being a papist, and a papist in the most offensive sense of the word. His successor was notoriously so. Thus the fullest confirmation was afforded of lord Bacon's rule: the functions of the throne were then paralyzed, and if the king had been at liberty to pack a popish parliament, and to appoint papists to all the offices of the state, there could have been no safety for civil or religious liberty. But every man acquainted with the history of the time, knew that the act of Charles the second, was merely a substitution for a bill of exclusion; and if they could have carried a bill of exclusion, they would have done it. In that case no such test would have been proposed; so that, when properly understood, the act itself afforded a confirmation of the rule. But was it pretended that the 30th of Charles the second, was intended to remain a permanent, unalterable, and unrepealable law? Was it meant to be contended that it was to be regarded as one of the immoveable bulwarks of our constitution? He would demonstrate from the statutes and from the journals of parliament, that the very reverse was the fact. It might be asked why, when the inconvenience the act was intended to remedy was

removed---when a protestant prince was upon the throne-this, which he represented as a temporary substitute, was not repealed. He answered first, that the tenour of a popish dynasty continued long afterwards-that the danger of a popish succession hung over the country until even the accession of his late majesty. Bishop Burnet rested the law of the 30th of Charles the second upon the fact that the king was not a protestant: it was then the only security; but coming down to the days of king William and the revolution, when the unalterable and unalienable principles of the constitution were settled, was this law considered and made of them? No. The men of that day applied the remedy to the evil; there they left it; they declared that the king of these realms must be a protestant, and if he were not a protestant he must lose his crown; but they gave no opinion, no hint even at that glorious and memorable period, that this law of Charles the second, was to be perpetual and unalterable. Coming then to the revolution, he would state one or two facts not generally known, In the 4th and 5th of Anne, an act was introduced for enabling certain lords justices to act as commissioners in the event of the demise of the crown, and until the arrival of a successor. These persons were disabled from giving their assent to any statute repealing the act of uniformity, and why? because the act of uniformity was a perpetual and unalterable law.

But it was proposed in the commons (he believed it was in the lower house) also to introduce into the bill a clause

to

to disable the commissioners to repeal the 30th of Charles the second. What was done? It was rejected; yet we were now to be told that the 30th of Charles the second, was an original elementary and fundamental part of our constitution. What was the case of the act of Union on the following year? When it was passed, and the parliaments of both countries came to declare the laws, they did not venture to propose the 30th of Charles the second,they did not venture to propose the test act. In the commons it was suggested that the test and corporation acts should be made unalterable laws; but instead of being adopted it was rejected. The act, indeed, securing the churches of England and Scotland, the parliament declared should ever thereafter be held one of the fundamental laws of the union. But the 30th of Charles the second was mentioned in the act of union; but it was also mentioned that the declaration required by it should be taken "until the parliament of Great Britain should otherwise provide." Was not this a distinct recognition-a clear proof that they were keeping the constitution open to any change that might be thought necessary, and that they intended to prevent this law from being fastened for ever upon it? Next he came to the Irish union: what was done then? The legislatures of the two countries established it only" until parliament should otherwise provide." Now, then, (continued Mr. Plunkett) I call upon parliament "otherwise to provide." Backed by these clear proofs of the original nature of our constitution-backed by the

plain object and scope of the reformation - by the plain object and scope of the revolution-by the provisions of both the unions-by the subsequent declarations of parliament, that the catholics are liege and loyal subjects-but,above all, backed by the practice of the last fifty years-by the whole course of the late reign, which, if the doctrines now maintained were true, would be an outrageous violation of the constitution; backed too by the declared opinions of all the great men who have lived since the agitation of this question-of Mr. Dunning, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Windham; in short, by the authority of every man whose name has had buoyancy enough to float upon the stream of time, have I not then triumphantly accomplished what I set out with asserting, viz., that the exclusion of the catholics was no fundamental part of the constitution? Yet, why do I say triumphantly? When I miss so many of the ornaments that illustrated this house when the subject was formerly agitated, I should feel any thing but triumph. Where is Whitbread, the incorruptible and sleepless sentinel of the constitution? Where the more than dawning virtues of Horner?--the matured excellence of Romilly, that steady light that threw a lustre, not merely on his profession and his country, but on every thing connected with the interest of our nature? Where is my illustrious friend Ponsonby, the constitutional leader of the ranks of opposition, revering alike the privileges. of the crown and the rights of its subject? Where is the lamented Elliot, as noble in his nature as

liberal

liberal in his sentiments, the model of a true and unaffected aristocrasy? Where is the firm constitutional integrity of Pigott; but, above all, how shall I deplore that overwhelming and inestimable loss last sustained, and with which I dare not trust myself? Missing the presence of all these, can I feel any thing like triumph? Walking before the sacred images of these illustrious dead, as in a public and solemn procession, shall we not dismiss all party feeling, all angry passions, and unworthy prejudices? I will not talk of triumph; I will not mix in this act of public justice any thing that can awaken personal animosity. I do submit, however, that I have established the point with which I started. I believe that many members are present who have never by their vote given an opinion upon this subject; many who have entered the house, anxious to be informed, and, if not deterred, anxious to render justice if justice shall appear to have been withheld. I trust that they will not allow themselves to be dictated to by any man who may choose to get up and assail their ears with such phrases as "the glorious principles of the constitution"-" the sacred principles of the reformation," without showing that they have either been infringed or violated. Will they not require that these historical facts should be met and disproved by historical facts? Are the catholics to be dismayed by one who gives them words instead of reasons, and who deals in gratuitous assertions instead of substantial arguments? I feel that I may be unreasonable in my demand upon the patience of the

house, but there is one part of the subject yet remaining to which I feel it necessary to advert. There are many who really think, and some who affect to think, that great dangers may result from concession to the establishment and to the constitution. I declare solemnly that if I could enter into that opinion-if I could see any thing of peril to the church or state, dear to my heart as are the interests of my fellow men, I would abandon these long-asserted claims, and range myself with their opponents. I therefore most earnestly entreat the dispassionate attention of gentlemen to this part of the question. And here I must particularly apply myself to the right honourable member for Oxford (Mr. Peel), and I assure him that in selecting him I do it with all the respect due to his talents, to his acquirements, to his integrity, and to his high principles as a statesman and a gentleman. I am well aware that there is no honourable member likely to be more influential on this subject, and I may add, that there is no person, whose being confirmed in what I must call unbounded prejudices, is likely to work more serious injury to the country. Do I mean to say that the established church is not in any danger? No; but I say that the danger, whatever it be, exists at this moment, It consists in this-in a disproportion between the population and the establishment-it lies in the narrowness of the basis; and I defy the art of man to find any other remedy than to take care that the interests of the population are connected with the state. The right honourable gentleman

asks