doctrine of transubstantiation a particular topic of denunciation and abhorrence? Beyond the objections which had been urged to that great measure, the necessity of which he was now endeavouring to enforce, beyond all those, to some of which he had adverted, it was asserted that the Roman catholics held the doctrine of actual transubstantiation; that there was an actual presence, at the sacrament, of the body of our Lord in the bread, and of his blood in the wine. He (Mr. Plunkett) could only say, if it were so -if such a doctrine were really held, it must be held in direct contradiction to the words of our Saviour and the dictates of common sense; for if men knew the elements before them to be bread and wine, it must be impossible that they could be the body and blood of the Redeemer. But what was the fact? The Roman catholics affirmed that they did not believe this actual transubstantiation, because they admitted that it was clearly impossible for the same body to be in two places at one time. In candour, however, he must admit, that in a sense the Roman catholics did believe in the transubstantiation, in a certain sense they did hold the doctrine; but what that sense was, it was impossible for him to say. And here he would observe that, not knowing, he would not attempt to describe it; for, to assume that it was that which it had been erroneously represented to be, a transubstantiation, in its nature opposed to common sense, was just as reasonable as if he should say that it was six feet high, or of a red colour. Those were not the opinions of queen

Elizabeth upon this subject-a subject which might be a fair one, indeed, for polemical discussion, but was not a proper object of legislative interference or political jealousy. Certain it was, that queen Elizabeth prohibited her chaplains from preaching about it in public; and they thought that she was too good a judge of polemical matters, or that she had too shrewd a sense of the interests and welfare of the state, not to pay the most implicit deference to her commands. He would take the liberty of reading a short extract upon this point from Dr. Burnet's celebrated book, "The history of the Reformation." There, he said, the chief desire of the queen's council was to unite the nation in one faith; and the greatest part of the nation continued to believe in such a presence (that is, the real presence). Therefore it was recommended to the divines to see that there should be no express definition made against it. "The queen and her council studied (as hath already been shown) to unite all into the communion of the church; and it was alleged that such an express definition against the real presence might drive from the church many who were still in that persuasion." So that it might be as a mere speculative opinion, not determined upon, but upon which every man was at liberty to indulge the impressions of his own mind. This, then, was really the opinion of queen Elizabeth, whom he might call the great foundress of the Reformation. There was, surely, no want of sincerity in her belief, none would impute such a want to that groat woman, for she more

than once hazarded her life and her throne in the defence of that belief. But she was profoundly acquainted with the true policy of the state; and she said, that although her own mind was made up on the subject, she would not make windows to look through into the hearts of her subjects, nor would she suffer them to be made by others. Accordingly, queen Elizabeth altered the Liturgy, as it then stood, and had existed from the reign of Edward the sixth; and excluded from it that part which denied the real presence. And so the Liturgy stood now; for the fact was, that in our communion service, at this moment, there was nothing which in terms did deny that doctrine, or which could even exclude a conscientious Roman catholic from participating in it. The house might be told that this was, perhaps, an intended encouragement, on that queen's part, to the religion of the church of Rome. They might be told that she did this to let in idolatry, as it were, by such a portal. He did not, however, believe, that any body who stood up for the high church and throne principles of the present day, would venture to tell queen Elizabeth, if she were present, that he was a better protestant than herself. He said that it was a proceeding contrary to the spirit of religion, an outrage upon the doctrines of christianity, an insult upon reason, an offence against piety, to say that they were called upon to give foul names to those who were not agreed with ourselves upon a subject of such a nature. But if polemics were interested in the settlement of this question,

why were states and legislatures to interfere with it? Why was a question of this abstract and undefined character to be made the cause of the exclusion from the common rights of their fellow countrymen, from the personal privileges and honours attainable by the rest of the nation, of so large and important a class of the great community? Then it was said, that while this doctrine was maintained, idolatry was in terror. But this was a libel on christianity-a reflection upon its truth, and a denial of its efficacy; for it went to say that its mighty ends were not obtained; it went to show that after the lapse of 1800 years from the period at which the blood of the Saviour was shed in the great expiatory sacrifice, nothing had been effected, but that the greater part of Europe should, at this day, be lost in abominable idolatry. But what had taken place, in fact, with respect to the Roman catholics of Ireland? What had the government done? Why, in Ireland, it was well known that they did admit Roman catholics to a participation of certain privileges: they might be grand jurors, and they might be magistrates. Now, let the house observe the necessary inconsistency which followed as a consequence; they made the grand juror or the magistrate take an oath, in a christian country, that he was one of these idolaters: before they returned him, they made him swear that he was a Roman catholic; so that the act of his appointment bore, that being an idolater, he was vested with powers intended for the preservation of the peace and welfare

and

and good government of a christian land. But they had done much more; they had permitted these idolaters to build schools, and to teach children; they had formed alliances with these idolaters; they had established them even in Canada. He hoped that if what he was now saying should get to the ears of a learned and right reverend person at the head of our religious establishmentand for whom he (Mr. Plunkett) always wished to speak with the consideration and even affectionate respect which was due to his character and to his office-he would not, in another place, when opportunity should offer, suffer this matter to remain any longer in such a state of misconception as that in which it had long been, He should now proceed to consider the question before them as it regarded the constitution, What he meant to contend for upon this part of the subject was, that the constitution intended to admit, and that justice as well as policy required them to admit, every person, performing the duties of a liege subject, to all the franchises and privileges of the subject. Such an admission he considered as their right; and that right, he should maintain, had not been touched even by the reformation, previous to which it had not been questioned. It was a right acknowledged, without doubt and without hesitation, until some events and some peculiar circumstances had rendered it necessary, in the opinion of the government of the country, that limitations and restraints should be imposed upon it, during the existence of those agitations which ensued soon after the reforma

tion. Since then we had formally acknowledged that these causes no longer existed; wherefore still to preserve such limitations and restraint-if that acknowledgment were truewas manifest injustice; it was more, it was an outrage on a constitution which had intended that every subject should enjoy that equal right. The dangers under which an infraction of that right had been considered expedient to be made had long ceased: the principle, however, was still in operation. The time was now come when it was absolutely necessary that they should sift and examine this principle; its importance admitted of no delay, and the necessity of determination of no compromise. It was a principle which was not to be got rid of by devices, but which must be stated and discussed; and if it was to be defended, and could be sustained, they must be prepared to adopt, and to act upon it. This was what was to be done. But they had first to inquire whether it was proper, constitutional, or equitable, upon a point of doctrine, to exclude so many of his majesty's liege subjects from the right of being admitted to the franchises and privileges and offices of the state, which were open to all other classes of subjects. Now here the question, as it affected the Roman catholics, must be "Are they, or are they not, the liege subjects of the king?" No one disputed that they were. What shut them out, then, from this general right? Nothing beyond this, that he (Mr. Plunkett) had ever heard ofthey asserted a spiritual supremacy in the pope. Now, when

men

men came forward with a desire to have a positive law repealed, they must be prepared to show upon what grounds the law had proceeded, and why its repeal was expedient. The whole of this he could not do. True it was, indeed, that the causes which had produced that law were now done away with. But, independently of this, a principle of the constitution which required this exclusion was found out. If there was such a principle, so independent of all that had been stated, it must have existed before the law against the Roman catholics was framed. If so, until the passing of the act of supre. macy, every man in the kingdom, almost, must have done an illegal act; because, before that statute, which was enacted in the reign of Henry VIII. the spiritual supremacy of the pope was always admitted in England. He claimed it with regard to the disposal of benefices; and though the kings of England frequently contended that point with him (not always by the bye, successfully,) his supremacy as head of the church was never questioned until that period. If the acknowledgment of that supremacy was contrary to a principle of the constitution or to the laws at that time, then the great body of illustrious nobles who secured the liberties of their native country by their unshaken intrepidity and their fearless perseverance were but rebels; then was magna charta gained by the illegal proceeding of a band of traitors; then were the barons of England not establishing freedom, but violating the constitution. Those gallant barons who were so well entitled

to assert their liberties did not think fit to refuse the acknowledgment of this spiritual supremacy. But then, it would be said, that after the act of supremacy, it was, that the circumstances occurred which made it proper to impose upon those who acknowledged that supremacy to reside in the pope certain restraints and exclusions. Surely, in the agitation of a question like the present, they would not lose sight of those circumstances. They would remember what they were; they would recollect the situation of Europe, and the designs of Spain, and they would perceive how entirely different were the principles upon which the policy of imposing such restraints on those who persisted to acknowledge the supremacy of the pope might be pleaded then, from any defence of them which would be offered now. He would, however, very soon explain himself upon this subject of spiritual supremacy: the Roman catholics acknowledged all the principles of the constitution: they acknowledged and obeyed the statute laws; and therefore it was almost needless to say, that they did not attribute to the pope any absolute power, or any temporal authority as interfering with that constitution and those laws. They vested him with no authority which could in the slightest degree affect those considerations; the supremacy which they acknowledged in the pope was purely spiritual. The pope exercised a sort of influence among them in cases of conscience; if a person, for instance, was doubtful upon some particular case, he referred himself to the pope as possessing such a spiritual supremacy

supremacy; and he decided upon it. So with respect to marriages. It was held by our church that persons within certain degrees of affinity were entitled to marry: the Roman catholics said they were not. We held that such a marriage was lawful; they main tained that it was a sort of sin; and, perhaps, might pass a special censure upon the parties, as guilty of such a species of sin. But they did no more: the Roman catholics did not deny, nor attempt to deny, the legality of that marriage; they did not deny the rights of that marriage, as affected the husband, the wife, or the children. The Roman catholics held, neither that there was a spiritual, nor a temporal, nor any other jurisdiction on the part of the pope, with respect to the constitution of this country; and even with regard to their own sect, they disclaimed all such jurisdiction or supremacy, excepting only in matters of conscience. It was, therefore, with extreme regret that he (Mr. Plunkett) had heard, in another place, a right reverend prelate, eminent for his learning and ability, (and the same individual to whom he had before alluded,) lay down the doctrines which he held upon the subject of the spiritual supremacy of the pope. That right reverend prelate admitted, "that speaking candidly his own sentiments, and looking at this as a mere religious opinion, he had no uneasiness about it, nor any doubt, so far as applied to what might happen at any future time. But as the Roman catholics allowed to the pope that spiritual authority which the protestants of the established church allowed to the king," (and

which the protestants of the Scottish church acknowledged in no earthly power whatever,) the right rev. prelate inferred that there was a difficulty upon what he called their "civil worth?" Upon this he finally determined "that their present exclusion was expedient and proper." This sort of argument was an example of that which Mr. Locke described, as "saying a little-presuming a great deal-and so, jumping to a conclusion." The right reverend individual he spoke of inferred, it should seem, that there was a difference between the spiritual authority acknowledged by the Protestants, in the king, and that which was held by the Roman catholics to reside in the pope; and he inferred that it was impossible but that the spiritual authority allowed to be vested in the pope should be inore dangerous and more extensive than that which was conceded by protestants to the sovereign. Surely some reasons should be alleged, some argument made out, of a graver character than this, in order to warrant the drawing of such a line of demarcation between two classes of his majesty's subjects, as puts one of them out of the pale as it were, excluding them from all participation in the most valuable pri vileges of the rest of the people. With respect to what was said, about the non-orthodox divines in Scotland and England, and their disabilities, it did much credit to ingenuity and to the faculty of drawing nice distinctions. The same individual (as we understood) had observed that "they did not amount to quite an exclusion." This was a strange situation to be sure; he (Mr. Plunkett) sup

posed