as those of the glorious revolution of 1688, and were resisting the imposition of a foreign sovereign against their attachments and inclinations. He would say nothing of the proceedings of the Neapolitans in Sicily: he would say nothing of their severities or their confiscations. If they were not to be justified, he believed they might at least be excused. But the ministers of this country were not called on to give an opinion. But it might be said that we were bound to express our opposition to acts committed against our friends, the Sicilians. There might be something in this, if Ferdinand the Fourth had destroyed a free constitution which we had established in Sicily. But the government of Sicily, as well as of Naples, had been an absolute monarchy, and Ferdinand was the absolute sovereign of both kingdoms. The Neapolitans had reformed their government, and the king had agreed to a limited monarchy. This limited monarchy the absolute sovereign of Sicily offered to that part of his dominions. A rebellion ensued; and events, such as usually accompanied rebellion, followed. Those events were blamable, he admitted; but they called in no degree on his majesty's ministers for a declaration of their opinions. Suppose the emperor of Russia had committed acts of flagrant injustice and cruelty towards some of his subjects in Asia, were we called on to express our opinions, and to remonstrate in behalf of the Calmucs and the Tonguisses? If such interferences were justified, there would be no end to them. Suppose that some foreign government had com

plained of our conduct towards the catholics in Ireland, and remonstrated on the ground that we had provoked a rebellion, and then suppressed it, in order to effect a union with Great Britain, should we have endured such intermeddling with our conduct towards any of our dependencies? Upon what principle, then, could we consider ourselves called on to intermeddle with the conduct of the Neapolitan government towards Sicily? A great deal had been said of the Neapolitans having adopted the Spanish constitution. Pretexts of this kind were always at hand when despots coloured their unprincipled aggressions by appearances of necessity. The partition of Poland, of which every man in the world complained, had been defended by similar pretexts. That unhappy country had indeed been torn in pieces by those who first agitated her into factions, and afterwards divided her as a prey. But did it therefore follow that the partition which ensued was not as execrable as it was unwarranted? Sweden had been agitated by factions in foreign pay; but did it follow that Gustavus was warranted in assuming absolute power? Yes, if France had then sent forces to Stockholm, in order to support a faction and compel the king to relinquish his assumed authority, would not the other powers of Europe have condemned such a scandalous invasion of national independence? But the Neapolitans had adopted the Spanish the Spanish constitution. It seemed necessary to fix on some formal act as a point of union. When the nation called for a modified government from their

king, it was thought necessary to present something to him for his adoption as a test of sincerity. That was not a time for deliberate writing. There was no opportunity of making paper constitutions. But a rallying point was to be pointed out to the nation, and a test to be presented by which the king should be bound if any thing could bind him. The Neapolitans, for these purposes, chose the Spanish constitution. He would ask the noble lord (Castlereagh) whose fault it was that the Spanish constitution had been preferred as a rallying point? In 1811 the English constitution had been regarded as a model, and so it had continued to be regarded throughout Italy, till a new system of justice and liberty received the sauction and active co-operation of the ministers of England. The English constitution ceased not to be viewed with veneration till Genoa was betrayed till the small and innocent states of Lucca and Ragusa who had not the power of doing wrong, if disposed to do wrong, had been given up to powers to whom they had the greatest repugnance. The same treaty, he meant the treaty of Paris, had given up Parga to a savage barbarian. That conduct it was that had alienated Italy, and obliged the Neapolitans to take a far worse model for their political improvements. That conduct it was that had alienated the nations of Europe from us, and compelled them to regard our constitution no longer as a pattern for political amelioration, and as a model of liberty for mankind. The conduct of the noble lord and his colleagues had

stripped England of brighter glory than the most splendid victories could give-of greater strength than the largest armies could boast; and in return they had obtained nothing but an arraignment and condemnation from those to whom they had sacrificed the glory and strength of their country.

Having thus disposed of the two points which were the only pretexts for animating and encouraging the oppressors of liberty, by censuring those who were engaged in improving their political condition, he would now proceed to two or three other matters connected with this question.

It had been said, as a grave charge against the Neapolitans, that the societies in which the revolution had originated had been secret. This was a most singular accusation. The Carbonari had been originally instituted against marshal Murat, and had been persecuted by him for the same reason as now by the noble lord. Marshal Murat had made the same objection to them, that they did not hold their meetings in public. Murat, a prince of a liberal mind and of enlarged principles, would give them every indulgence, provided only that their meetings were public, that they gave fair notice of their intended revolts, and that they proclaimed the day of their future march against his capital. Mar. shal Murat, in common with the noble lord, would have nothing arranged in secret. Literary critics had objected to the absurdity of getting up plots in dramatic compositions, and therefore the noble lord, as well as marshal Murat, charged the Carbonari with

the

the same absurdity in political plots as literary critics in dramatic criticism. He hoped if there were any members of secret societies in Great Britain-if there were any who kept up what ought to be kept up in secret-who commemorated a battle which gained a victory certainly over the strength of a brave nation, but which he thought gloriousif any commemorated the protestant hero of religious liberty, he hoped they would consider and take warning. But ministers cared not how secret societies against liberty might be held; the only societies whose secrecy incurred their censure, were societies for promoting the liberty of a nation. Another subject of severe censure was, that the army had taken part in the revolution. But of the Carbonari he had further to remark, that they consisted of members from every rank and order of men. If, therefore, the revolution originated with the Carbonari, it originated with the nation, the great majority of which were Carbonari. Of the co-operation of the army, he should say as little as possible, without neglecting any point of the argument. He could not help wondering that any minister should be so bold as to give a challenge to justify the co-operation of the army in any form, or their interference in a revolution on any principles, however good. Was it to be contended, that because the support of the army had been obtained, therefore the revolution was unjust? Was it to be argued that, because the revolution would have been unsuccessful without the support of the army, therefore it must be condemned?

A

On the first ground it was unnecessary to consider the question, because the acquiescence of the army in a successful revolution could not on any principle be censured. On the second ground it was impolitic to argue the question. The interference of any soldiers in a free state he reprobated. He abhorred as much as any man the passage of Cæsar's army over the Rubicon; but when a nation was struggling for freedom-when the alternative was liberty or slavery, the assistance of the military was of the highest value. "Et nomen pacis dulce est, et ipsa res salutaris; sed inter pacem et servitutem plurimum interest. Pax est tranquilla libertas; servitus malorum omnium postremum, non modo bello, sed morte etiam repellendum.' people were not only justified, they were called on to risk every thing, rather than suffer the malorum omnium extremum. Another question started on this subject was, whether the Carbonari were confined to the Neapolitan kingdom or extended to the neighbouring states. This was the only point in which ministers seemed doubtful as to the right of interference. If the Carbonari extended to neighbouring states, ministers said it was right to attack Naples. In 1812, when the Carbonari (he understood) had been founded, the wish for emancipation had not been confined to Naples. The Carbonari existed in Lombardy, in Etruria, in all parts of Italy, looking chiefly to England for encouragement. From England it was that they had derived their spirit; to England it was that they had looked for countenance and support. They had been encouraged

encouraged legitimately and wisely; for in such a war, such resistance was legitimate and wise; encouraged they had been to revolt against the common enemy of Europe; encouraged they had been by this country-he did not say as Carbonari, but as partisans for liberty. What, then, was the meaning of this complaint so mysteriously let out? If there are Carbonari in Lombardy, Etruria, and the Venetian states, were the Neapolitans answerable? Had the Neapolitans formed the Carbonari there? Did they now en courage them? If there were any Carbonari in those states, they had been encouraged by England in defence of their religion and their rights; and was it now a crime for which Naples was to be punished? The treaties of Paris and Vienna had alienated the lovers of liberty throughout Italy from England. The betraying of Genoa, of Lucca, of Ragusa, of Parga-these were the schools, these the lessons, by which the Italians had been taught that they were to expect nothing from England. A late member of that house, whose premature death he should never cease to lament, who entered with profound sagacity into the characters and views of nations, and who sometimes spoke out his convictions-he meant the late Mr. Horner had said in 1815, that Italy would remember the conduct of England to the last hour of her bondage. Mr. Horner's words were now prophetic. The Neapolitans had now forsaken the English model, and "hewn out tothem selves broken cisterns," which he feared would prove inadequate to the high purposes for which they were design

ed. The Neapolitans, in common with all Italy, had felt that they could not look for countenance or encouragement to England;-they had felt a conviction that they could look only to their own exertions if they would not submit to the worst form of despotic oppression. But it had been said that they ought to have presented a petition. praying for a revolution. They ought to have formed monstrations des droits. This petition of Naples would have been an extraordinary instrument for future imitation. "We, your majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, feeling that unlimited power in your majesty's hands has produced the greatest evils and caused the most grievous wrongs, pray that your majesty will be graciously pleased to impose restraints on yourself, to abdicate your prerogatives, to be harassed every day by members in opposition to your ministers, who will make vexatious motions, inquire into grants of money, interrupt cabinet dinners, and inveigh against the conduct of your government towards Genoa, Parga, Norway, Saxony, and we know not what." Such were the absurdities which had crept into the reasoning of his majesty's ministers on this subject. They had reasoned, thought, very profoundly and constitutionally, upon the conduct of the barons in obtaining Magna Charta, and of the parliament in claiming the bill of rights. But those proceedings had so taken place in England, because the government had been anteriorly free. free. In their desperation, ministers had slandered the government of their own country, which had never been but free, and represented

it as similar to that system of despotism which was the scourge, the stain, and the shame of Europe. Those then were the charges against the Neapolitans: First, they had extorted a constitution from their king: second, their conduct might encourage others in their vicinity to follow their example; third, they had not held a public meeting to deliberate on their grievances; and, fourth, the army had supported their measures. The noble lord limited the justification of interference which he had suggested to those powers whose territories might by possibility be affected by the vicinity of Naples. Of course, then he expected Russia and Prussia upon the very condition which might justify the interference of Austria, for they had no more right, interest, or duty in the interference than we had. Siberia was no more in danger from the revolution of Naples than from an eruption of Mount Vesuvius. The plea of vicinity, which was borrowed from Mr. Burke, was not the plea of the allied powers, but the noble lord's. Their plea was, any revolutionary movement in Europe. "No," said ministers, "that will not do; we offer you a justification; we say yours is too large; it will not do in England; it will not be heard in the House of Commons; they are not trained sufficiently for that; even the ladies will not like so well to walk through an army of cossacks in Hyde-park; only say that the Carbonari are not Neapolitans; do you give us the credit of the war? Quarrel with us, and we shall be liberal to you, and give you all the profit." If this mode of reasoning was quite satisfactory to

the house, he could not help it. Lord Castlereagh, an experienced barrister in such proceedings, had given a brief to his younger brother of Russia, because his own brief would not be endured by the judges who did not like to travel beyond the record. Ministers asserted, that if Lombardy or any parts of the Austrian territories in Italy were in danger, that it was just in Austria to interfere. But had they any evidence, any facts to prove the truth of this? Had they any overt acts, any correspondence, any judicial trials against state criminals in Lombardy? No, nil horum. They had only a possible case. Austria might have a just quarrel. The Carbonari might be active in Lombardy. It was a series of possibilities put by them in the hands of the allied powers, who disdained to take it in justification of being lords paramount over Europe. For this office they were candidates, and they acted already as if they had been long in possession. Before then this great war should rage in Europe-great it was in its principle, great it might be in its consequences-it was the duty of the house to inquire whether there was any reason or pretence for it. Upon the ground, that it apprehended danger it was open to any government in the world' to justify a war. Ministers did not censure the allied powers for

going to war," but they furnished them with a pretence for it ;--they provided for them a series of possibilities, the one dependent on the other, and the first without the shadow of foundation. The present emergency had been compared to the crisis of 1792.

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