variously as with every other faculty. By good sense |
a man is enabled to discern, as it were intuitively, that
which requires another of less sense to ponder over
and study;

There's something previous ev'n to taste: 'tis sense,
Good sense; which only is the gift of heav'n,
And, though no science. fairly worth the seven;
A light within yourself you must perceive,
Jones and Le Notre have it not to give.-Pore.

By a solid judgement a man is enabled to avoid those errours in conduct, which one of a weak judgement is always falling into; In all instances, where our experience of the past has been extensive and uniform, our judgement concerning the future amounts to moral certainty.-BEATTIE. There is, however, this distinction between sense and judgment, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention; but a defect in the latter is to be supplied by no efforts of one's own. A man may improve his sense in proportion as he has the means of information; but a weakness of judgement, is an irreme

diable evil.

When employed as epithets, the term sensible and judicious serve still more clearly to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker is said to be sensible; I have been tired with accounts from sensible men, furnished with matters of fact, which have hap pened within their own knowledge.'-ADDISON. A friend, or an adviser, to be judicious; 'Your observations are so judicious, I wish you had not been so sparing of them.'-SIR W. JONES. The sense displays itself in the conversation, or the communication of one's ideas; the judgment in the propriety of one's actions. A sensible man may be an entertaining companion; but a judicious man, in any post of command, is an inestimable treasure. Sensible remarks are always calculated to please and interest sensible people; judicious measures have a sterling value in themselves, that is appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence, it is obvious, that to be sensible is a desirable thing; but to be judicious is an indispensable requisite.

DISCERNMENT, PENETRATION, DISCRIMI

towards discrimination; he who can discern the springs of human action, or penetrate the views of men, will be most fitted for discriminating between the characters of different men; Perhaps there is no character through all Shakspeare drawn with more spirit and just discrimination than Shylock's.'HENLEY.

Although judgement derives much assistance from the three former operations, it is a totally distinct it acts on external objects by seeing them: the latter power: the former only discover the things that are; is creative; it produces by deduction from that which are directed to that which is to be known, and are passes inwardly. The former are speculative; they confined to present objects; they serve to discover truth or falsehood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the latter is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connexions of things: it foresees their consequences and effects; 'I love him, I confess, extremely; but my affection does by no means prejudice my judgement.')—MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny).

Of discernment, we say that it is clear; it serves to remove all obscurity and confusion: of penetration, falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which being deceived: of discrimination, we say that it is nice; it renders our ideas accurate, and serves to prevent us from confounding objects: of judgement, we say that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct prudent, and prevents us from committing mistakes, or involving one's self in embarrassments.

of either persons or things, we exercise discernment; When the question is to estimate the real qualities Cool age advances venerably wise,

Turns on all hands its deep discerning eyes.-POPE. When it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise penetration; 'A penetration into the abstruse difficulties and depths of modern algebra and fluxions, is not worth the labour of those who design either of the three learned professions.'-WATTS. When the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use discrimination; A satire NATION, JUDGEMENT. should expose nothing but what is corrigible, and Discernment expresses the judgement or power of make a due discrimination between those who are, discerning, which, from the Latin discerno, or dis and and those who are not, proper objects of it.'-ADDISON terno, signifies to look at apart, so as to form a true When called upon to take any step, or act any part, estimate of things; penetration denotes the act or we must employ the judgement; Judgement, a cool and power of penetrating, from penetrate, in Latin pene-slow faculty, attends not a man in the rapture of poetitratus, participle of penetro and penitus, within, signifying to see into the interiour; discrimination denotes the act or power of discriminating, from discriminate, in Latin discriminatus, participle of discrimino, to make a difference; judgement denotes the power of judging, from judge, in Latin judico, compounded of jus and dico, signifying to pronounce right.

The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; namely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exerting the intellectual sight.

cal composition.'-DENNIS. Discernment is more or less indispensable for every man in private or public station; he who has the most promiscuous dealings Iwith men, has the greatest need of it: penetration is of peculiar importance for princes and statesmen: dis crimination is of great utility for commanders, and all who have the power of distributing rewards and punishments: judgement is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is intrusted.

REASONABLE, RATIONAL,

Are both derived from the same Latin word ratio, reason, which, from ratus and reor, to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellectual vision as penetration; the former is a common faculty, the laiter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spite of all that intercepts the sight, and keeps the object out of view: a man of common discernment disReasonable signifies accordant with reason; rational cerns characters which are not concealed by any particular disguise; 'Great part of the country was aban-signifies having reason in it: the former is more comdoned to the spoils of the soldiers, who, not troubling monly applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, themselves to discern between a subject and a rebel, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense while their liberty lasted, made indifferently profit of of the word reason: hence we term a man reasonable both.-HAYWARD. A man of penetration is not to be who acts according to the principles of right reason; deceived by any artifice, however thoroughly cloaked and a being rational, who is possessed of the rational or secured, even from suspicion; He is as slow to or reasoning faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It decide as he is quick to apprehend, calmly and delibe- is to be lamented that there are much fewer reasonable rately weighing every opposite reason that is offered, than there are rational creatures. The same distinction and tracing it with a most judicious penetration.'-exists between them when applied to things; A law MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny).

Discernment and penetration serve for the discovery of individual things by their outward marks; discrimi nation is employed in the discovery of differences between two or more objects; the former consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison: discernment and penetration are great aids

may be reasonable in itself, although a man does not SWIFT. The evidence which is afforded for a future allow it, or does not know the reason of the lawgivers' state is sufficient for a rational ground of conduct. BLAIR.

• Vide Abbe Girard. "Discernement, jugement"

MENTAL, INTELLECTUAL. There is the same difference between mental and intellectual as between mind and intellect: the mind comprehends the thinking faculty in general with all its operations; the intellect includes only that part of it which consists in understanding and judgement: mental is therefore opposed to corporeal; intellectual is opposed to sensual or physical: mental exertions are not to be expected from all; intellectual enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts, &c. are denominated mental; To collect and reposite the various forms of things is far the most pleasing part of mental occupation.'-JOHNSON. Subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled intellectual; Man's more divine, the master of all these, Lord of the wide world, and wide wat'ry seas, Endued with intellectual sense and soul."

SHAKSPEARE.

It is not always easy to distinguish our mental pleasures from those corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes; the latter are however greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended in a society of well-informed persons the conversation will turn principally on intellectual subjects.

MEMORY, REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION,
REMINISCENCE.

Memory, in Latin memoria or memor, Greek pvhuwv and uváopat, comes, in all probability, from uevos, the mind, because memory is the principal faculty of the mind; remembrance, from the verb remember, contracted from re and memoro, to bring back to the mind, is a verbal substantive, denoting the exercise of that faculty; recollection, from recollect, compounded of re and collect, signifies collecting again, i. e. carefully, and from different quarters by an effort of the memory; reminiscence, in Latin reminiscentia, from reminiscor and memor, is the bringing back to the mind what was there before.

Memory is the power of recalling images once made on the mind; remembrance, recollection, and reminis cence, are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The memory is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will, or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the memory exerts itself, but we should not say that we have then any remembrance or recollection of objects.

The power of memory, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of remembering, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but recollection and reminiscence are exercises of the memory that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgement and understanding. To remember is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to recollect is to remember afresh, to remember what has been remem bered Lefore. Remembrance busies itself with objects that are at hand; recollection carries us back to distant periods: simple remembrance is engaged in things less easily to be recalled, and more or less faithfully to that have but just left the mind, which are more or be represented; but recollection tries to retrace the faint images of things that have been so long unthought of as to be almost obliterated from the memory. In this manner we are said to remember in one half hour what was told us in the preceding half hour, or to remember what passes from one day to another; but we recollect the incidents of childhood; we recollect what happened in our native place after many years' absence from it. The remembrance is that homely every-day exercise of the memory which renders it of essential service in the acquirement of knowledge, or in the performance of one's duties; 'Memory may be assisted by method, and the decays of knowledge repaired by stated times of recollection.'-JOHNSON. The recollection is that exalted exercise of the memory which affords us the purest of enjoyments, and serves the noblest of purposes; the recollection of all the minute incidents of childhood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford.

Reminiscence, if it deserve any notice as a word of English use, is altogether an abstract exercise of the memory, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas in distinction from those which are awakened by sensible objects; the mathematician makes use of reminiscence in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows; Reminiscence is the retrieving a thing at present forgot, or confusedly remembered, by setting the mind to hunt over all its notions.'-SOUTH.

Reminiscence among the disciples of Socrates was the remembrance of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowledge which the souls had had before their union with the body; while the memory was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses; there fore the Latins said that reminiscentia belonged exclusively to man, because it was purely intellectual, but that memory was common to all animals, because it was merely the depot of the senses; but this distinction, from what has been before observed, is only pre served as it respects the meaning of reminiscence.

Remembrance is the exercise of memory in a conscious agent; it is the calling a thing back to the mind Memory is a generic term, as has been already which has been there before, but has passed away; shown: it includes the common idea of reviving former Forgetfulness is necessary to remembrance.'-JOHN-impressions, but does not qualify the nature of the SON. This may be the effect of repetition or habit, as In the case of a child who remembers his lesson after having learned it several times; or of a horse who remembers the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to intelligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties; Remember thee!

Ah, thou poor ghost, while memory holds a seat
In this distracted globe.-SHAKSPEARE.

In these cases remembrance is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and remembers that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, remembers all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is however likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to remember what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who remembers the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind: nay indeed experience teaches us that scarcely any thing in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the memory; for it is now become almost a maxim to say, that one may remember whatever one wishes.

ideas revived: the term is however extended in its application to signify not merely a power, but also a seat or resting place, as is likewise remembrance and recollection; but still with this difference, that the memory is spacious, and contains every thing; the remembrance and recollection are partial, and compre hend only passing events: we treasure up knowledge in our memory; the occurrences of the preceding year are still fresh in our remembrance or recollection.

FORGETFULNESS, OBLIVION.

Forgetfulness characterizes the person, or that which is personal; oblivion the state of the thing: the former refers to him who forgets; I have read in ancient authors invitations to lay aside care and anxiety, and give a loose to that pleasing forgetfulness wherein men put off their characters of business.'-STEELE. The latter to that which is forgotten; O'er all the rest, an undistinguished crew, Her wing of deepest shade oblivion drew.-FALCONER We blame a person for his forgetfulness; but we some times bury things in oblivion

FANCY, IMAGINATION.

Fancy, considered as a power, simply brings the ob ject to the mind, or makes it appear, from the Latin phantasia, and the Greek φαντασίη and φαίνω, να

appear; but imagination, from image, in Latin imago, | be indifferently employed in general discourse for or imitago, or imitatio, is a power which presents the thought; but the former term does not on this account Images or likenesses of things. The fancy, therefore, lose its characteristic meaning. only employs itself about things without regarding their nature; but the imagination aims at tracing a resemblance, and getting a true copy;

And as imagination bodies forth

The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen Turns them to shape.-SHAKSPEARE. The fancy consequently forms combinations, either real or unreal, as chance may direct; but the imaginaion is seldomer led astray. The fancy is busy in treams, or when the mind is in a disordered state; There was a certain lady of thin airy shape, who was very active in this solemnity: her name was Fancy.-ADDISON. But the imagination is supposed to act when the intellectual powers are in full play. The fancy is employed on light and trivial objects, which are present to the senses; the imagination soars above all worldly objects, and carries us from the world of matter into the world of spirits, from time present to the time to come. A milliner or mantua-maker may employ her fancy in the decorations of a cap or gown; Philosophy! I say, and call it He;

For whatsoe'er the painter's fancy be, It a male virtue seems to me.-COWLEY. But the poet's imagination depicts every thing grand, every thing bold, and every thing remote; Whatever be his subject, Milton never fails to fill the imagination.-JOHNSON.

Although Mr. Addison has thought proper, for his convenience, to use the words fancy and imagination promiscuously when writing on this subject, yet the distinction, as above pointed out, has been observed both in familiar discourse and in writing. We say that we fancy, not that we imagine, that we see or hear something; the pleasures of the imagination, not of the fancy.

IDEA, THOUGHT, IMAGINATION. Idea, in Latin idea, Greek udén, signifies the form or Image of an object, from adéw to see, that is, the thing seen in the mind. Thought literally signifies the thing thought, and imagination the thing imagined.

The imagination is not only the fruit of thought, but of peculiar thought: the thought may be another's; the imagination is one's own: the thought occurs and recurs; it comes and it goes; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the thinking being: the imagination is framed by special desire; it is cherished with the parbusied with the surrounding objects; the imaginations tiality of a parent for its offspring. The thoughts are are employed on distant and strange objects; hence the thoughts are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; the imaginations, wild and extravagant. The thoughts engage the mind as circumstances give rise to them; they are always supposed to have a foundation in some thing: the imaginations, on the other hand, are often the mere fruit of a disordered brain; they are always regarded as unsubstantial, if not unreal; they frequently owe their origin to the suggestions of the appe tites and passions; whence they are termed the imagi nations of the heart: 'Different climates produce in men, by a different mixture of the humours, a different and unequal course of imaginations and passions.'

-TEMPLE.

IDEAL, IMAGINARY.

Ideal does not strictly adhere to the sense of its pri mitive idea (v. Idea): the idea is the representation of a real object in the mind; but ideal signifies belonging to the idea independent of the reality or the external object. Imaginary preserves the signification of its primitive imagination (v. Fancy, also v. Idea), as denoting what is created by the mind itself.

The ideal is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the reality; There is not, perhaps, in all the stores of ideal anguish, a thought more painful than the consciousness of having propagated corruption.' -JOHNSON. The imaginary, on the other hand, is directly opposed to the reality; it is the unreal thing formed by the imagination; 'Superiour beings know well the vanity of those imaginary perfections that swell the heart of man.'-ADDISON. Ideal happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind, without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be real The idea is the simple representation of an object; ized; it may be above nature, but not in direct contrathe thought is the reflection; and the imagination isdiction to it: the imaginary is that which is opposite to the combination of ideas: we have ideas of the some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altothoughts on moral subjects; we have imaginationsgether imaginary. drawn from the ideas already existing in the mind. The ideas are formed; they are the rude materials with which the thinking faculty exerts itself: the thoughts INHERENT, INBRED, INBORN, INNATE. arise in the mind by means of association, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are The inherent, from hereo to stick, denotes a perma the materials with which the thinking faculty employs nent quality or property, as opposed to that which is itself: the imaginations are created by the mind's re-adventitious and transitory. Inbred denotes that pro action on itself; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks to enrich itself.

The word idea is not only the most general in sense, but the most universal in application; thought and imagination are particular terms used only in connexion with the agent thinking or imagining. All these words have therefore a distinct cffice, in which they cannot properly be confounded with each other. Idea is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that represents them: hence ideas are either clear or distinct; ideas are attached to words; ideas are analyzed, confounded, and the like; in which cases the word thought could not be substituted; Every one finds that many of the ideas which he desired to retain have slipped away irretrievably.' -JOHNSON. The thought belongs only to thinking and rational beings: the brutes may be said to have ideas, but not thoughts: hence thoughts are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, according to the nature of the mind in which they exist:

The warring passions, and tumultuous thoughts That rage within thee!-Rowe. Hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a thought, than to indulge an idea; to express one's thoughts, rather than one's ideas, on any subject: although the latter term idea, on account of its comprehensive use, may without violation of any express rule

perty which is derived principally from habit or by a
gradual process, as opposed to the one acquired by
actual efforts. Inborn denotes that which is purely
natural, in opposition to the artificial. Inherent is in
its sense the most general; for what is inbred and
inborn is naturally inherent; but all is not inbred and
inborn which is inherent. Inanimate objects have
inherent properties; but the inbred and inborn exist
only in that which receives life; solidity is an inherent,
but not an inbred or inborn property of matter: a love
of truth is an inborn property of the human mind: it
is consequently inherent, in as much as nothing can
totally destroy it;

When my new mind had no infusion known,
Thou gav'st so deep a tincture of thine own,
That ever since I vainly try

To wash away th' inherent dye.-COWLEY.
That which is inbred is bred or nurtured in us from our
birth; hence, likewise, the properties of animals are
inbred in them, in as much as they are derived through
the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes,
that which is inborn is simply born in us: a property
may be inborn, but not inbred; it cannot, however, be
inbred and not inborn. Habits which are ingrafted
into the natural disposition are properly inbred; whence
the vulgar proverb that what is bred in the bone will
never be out of the flesh;' to denote the influence

74

which parents have on the characters of their children, | Apprehending is a momentary or sudden act'; both physically and morally;

But he, my inbred enemy,

I nam'd them as they pass'd, and understood
Their nature, with such knowledge God indued
My sudden apprehension.—MILTON.

Conceiving, which is a process of nature, is often slow and gradual, as to conceive a design; "This man coninde-ceived the duke's death, but what was the motive of that felonious conception is in the clouds.'-WOLTON.

Forth issu'd, brandishing his fatal dart,
Made to destroy; I fled, and cry'd out death!
MILTON.
Propensities, on the other hand, which are totally
pendent of education or external circumstances, are
properly inborn, as an inborn love of freedom;
Despair, and secret shame, and conscious thought
Of inborn worth, his lab'ring soul oppress'd.

DRYDEN.

What is conceived, is conclusive or at least determinate; A state of innocence and happiness is so remote from all that we have ever seen, that although we can easily conceive it is possible, yet our specula tions upon it must be general and confused.'-JOHNSON. What is apprehended may be dubious or indetermi nate: hence the term apprehend is taken in the sense of fear;

Nothing is a misery,

Unless our weakness apprehend it so.

Inborn and innate, from the Latin natus born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted inborn; philosophy has adopted innate: genius is inborn in some men; nobleness is inborn in others: there is an inborn talent in some men to cominand, and Conceive and apprehend are exercises of the under an inborn fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say, there is no such thing as standing; suppose and imagine of the imagination; but the former commonly rests on some ground of innate ideas; and if they only mean that there are no sensible impressions on the soul, until it is acted upon reality, the latter may be the mere offspring of the by external objects, they may be right: but if they mean brain. Suppose is used in opposition to positive knowto say that there are no inborn characters or powers in ledge; no person supposes that, of which he is posi the soul, which predispose it for the reception of certain tively informed; It can scarce be supposed that the impressions, they contradict the experience of the mind is more vigorous when we sleep, than when we learned and the unlearned in all ages, who believe, and are awake.'-HAWKESWORTH. Imagine is employed that from close observation on themselves and others, for that which, in all probability, does not exist; we that man has, from his birth, not only the general cha-shall not imagine what is evident and undeniable; racter, which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristicks which distinguish individuals from their earliest infancy: all these characters or characteristicks are, therefore, not supposed to be produced, but elicited, by circumstances; and the ideas, which are but the sensible forms that the soul assumes in its connexion with the body, are, on that account, in vulgar language termed innate;

Grant these inventions of the crafty priest,
Yet such inventions never could subsist,
Unless some glimmerings of a future state
Were with the mind coeval and innate.

JENYNS.

TO CONCEIVE, APPREHEND, SUPPOSE,
IMAGINE.

To conceive, from the Latin concipio, or con and capio to put together, is to put an image together in the mind, or to form an idea; to apprehend, from appre hendo to lay hold of, is to seize with the understanding; to suppose, in French supposer, Latin supposui, perfect of suppono, or sub and pono to put one thing in the place of another, is to have one thing in one's mind in lieu of another; to imagine, in French imaginer, Latin imagino, from imago an image, signifies to reflect as an image or phantom in the mind.

Conceive, in the strict sense of the word, is the generick, the others the specifick terms: since in appre hending, imagining, and supposing, we always conceive or form an idea, but not vice versa; the difference consists in the mode and object of the action: we conceive of things as proper or improper, and just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad, this is an act of the judgement; Conceive of things clearly and distinctly in their own natures; conceive of things completely in all their own parts; conceive of things comprehensively in all their properties and relations; conceive of things extensively in all their kinds; conceive of things orderly, or in a proper method.'-WATTS. We apprehend the meaning of another; this is by the power of simple perception;

Yet this I apprehend not, why to those
Among whom God will deign to dwell on earth
So many and so various laws are given.-MILTON.
Apprehension is considered by logicians as the first
power or operation of the mind being employed on the
simplest objects; Simple apprehension denotes no
more than the soul's naked intellection of an object,
without either composition or deduction.'-GLANVILLE.
Conceiving is applied to objects of any magnitude
which are not above the stretch of human power;

O, what avails me now that honour high
To have conceived of God,or that salute
Hail highly favour'd, among women blest.-MILTON.

The Earl of Rivers did not imagine there could exist, in a human form, a mother that would ruin her own son without enriching herself.'-JOHNSON (Life of. Savage).

TO CONCEIVE, UNDERSTAND, COM

PREHEND.

These terms indicate the intellectual operations of forming ideas, that is, ideas of the complex kind in distinction from the simple ideas formed by the act of perception. To conceive, is to put together in the inind; to understand, is to stand under, or near to the mind; to comprehend, from the Latin com or cum and prehendo to take, signifies to seize or embrace in the mind.

Conception is the simplest operation of the three; when we conceive we may have but one idea, when we understand or comprehend we have all the ideas which the subject is capable of presenting. We cannot understand or comprehend without conceiving; but we may often conceive that which we neither understand nor comprehend; 'Whatever they cannot immediately conceive they consider as too high to be reached, or too extensive to be comprehended.'

JOHNSON.

That which we cannot conceive is to us nothing; but the conception of it gives it an existence, at least in our minds; but understanding or comprehending is not essential to the belief of a thing's existence. So long as we have reasons sufficient to conceive a thing as possible or probable, it is not necessary either to under stand or comprehend them in order to authorize our be lief. The mysteries of our holy religion are objects of conception, but not of comprehension;

Our finite knowledge cannot comprehend

The principles of an abounded sway.-SHIRLEY. We conceive that a thing may be done without under standing how it is done; we conceive that a thing may exist without comprehending the nature of its existence. We conceive clearly, understand fully, comprehend minutely.

Conception is a species of invention; it is the fruit of the mind's operation within itself; If, by a more noble and more adequate conception that be considered as wit which is at once natural and new, that which, though not obvious, is, upon its first production, acknowledged to be just; if it be that, which he that never found it, wonders how he missed; to wit of this kind the metaphysical poets have seldom risen.'JoHNSON. Understanding and comprehension are employed solely on external objects; we understand and comprehend that which actually exists before us, and presents itself to our observation; 'Swift pays no court to the passions; he excites neither surprise nor admi.

ration; he always understands himself, and his readers always understand him.'-JOHNSON. Conceiving is the office of the imagination, as well as the judgement; understanding and comprehension are the office of the reasoning faculties exclusively.

ception (v. To comprehend); the association of two or more ideas, so as to constitute it a decision, is a notion Perceptions are clear or confused, according to the state of the sensible organs, and the perceptive faculty, ideas are faint or vivid, vague or distinct, according to • Conceiving is employed with regard to matters of the nature of the perception, conceptions are gross of taste, to arrangements, designs, and projects; under-refined according to the number and extent of one's standing is employed on familiar objects which pre-ideas; notions are true or false, correct or incorrect, sent theinselves in the ordinary discourse and business of men; comprehending respects principles, lessons, and speculative knowledge in general. The artist conceives a design, and he who will execute it must understand it; the poet conceives that which is grand and sublime, and he who will enjoy the perusal of his conceptions must have refinement of mind, and capacity to comprehend the grand and sublime. The builder conceives plans, the scholar understands languages, the metaphysician comprehends subtle ques

tions.

A ready conception supplies us with a stock of ideas on all subjects; a quick understanding catches the intentions of others with half a word; a penetrating mind comprehends the abstrusest points. There are human beings involved in such profound ignorance, that they cannot conceive of the most ordinary things that exist in civilized life: there are those who, though slow at understanding words, will be quick at understanding looks and signs: and there are others who, though dull at conceiving or understanding common matters, will have a power for comprehending the abstruser parts of the mathematics.

CONCEPTION, NOTION.

Conception, from conceive (v. To conceive), signifies the thing conceived; notion, in French notion, Latin notio, from notus participle of nosco to know, signifies

the thing known.

according to the extent of one's knowledge. The perception which we have of remote objects is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a perception, but not an idea.

What can the fondest mother wish for more, Ev'n for her darling son, than solid sense, Perceptions clear, and flowing eloquence.-WYNNE. If we read the description of any object, we may have an idea of it; but we need not have any immediate perception: the idea in this case being complex, and formed of many images of which we have already had a perception; Imagination selects ideas from the treasures of remembrance.'-JOHNSON.

If we present objects to our minds, according to dif ferent images which have already been impressed, we are said to have a conception of them: in this case, however, it is not necessary for the objects really to exist; they may be the offspring of the mind's operation within itself; It is not a head that is filled with extravagant conceptions, which is capable of furnishing the world with diversions of this nature (from humour).'-ADDISON. But with regard to notions it is different, for they are formed respecting objects that do really exist, although perhaps the properties or circumstances which we assign to them are not real; "Those notions which are to be collected by reason, in opposimind, but be treasured in the remoter repositories of tion to the senses, will seldom stand forward in the the memory.'-JOHNSON. If I look at the moon, I have a perception of it; if it disappear from my sight, and the impression remains, I have an idea of it; if an object, differing in shape and colour from that or any thing else which I may have seen, present itself to my mind, it is a conception; if of this moon I conceive that it is no bigger than what it appears to my eye, is a notion, which in the present instance, assigns an unreal property to a real object.

this

TO THINK, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE, BELIEVE,

DEEM.

Conception is the mind's own work, what it pictures to itself from the exercise of its own powers; Words signify not immediately and primely things themselves, but the conceptions of the mind concerning things.' SOUTH. Notion is the representation of objects as they are drawn from observation; The story of Telemachus is formed altogether in the spirit of Homer, and will give an unlearned reader a notion of that great poet's manner of writing.'-ADDISON. Conceptions are the fruit of the imagination; It is natural for the imaginations of men who lead their lives in too solitary a manner to prey upon themselves, and form from their own conceptions beings and things which To think, in Saxon thincan, Gerinan denken, &c. have no place in nature.'-STEELE. Notions are the from the Hebrew to rule or judge, is the generick result of reflection and experience; 'Considering that term. It expresses, in common with the other terms, the happiness of the other world is to be the happiness the act of having a particular idea in the mind; but it of the whole man, who can question, but there is an is indefinite as to the mode and the object of the infinite variety in those pleasures we are speaking of? action. To think may be the act of the understand Revelation, likewise, very much confirms this notion ing, or merely of the imagination: to suppose and under the different views it gives us of our future hap-imagine are rather the acts of the imagination than of piness.-ADDISON. Conceptions are formed; notions are entertained. Conceptions are either grand or mean, gross or sublime, either clear or indistinct, crude or distinct; notions are either true or false, just or absurd. Intellectual culture serves to elevate the conceptions; the extersion of knowledge serves to correct and refine the notions.

Some heathen philosophers had an indistinct conception of the Deity, whose attributes and character are unfolded to us in his revelation: the ignorant have often false notions of their duty and obligations to their superiours. The unenlightened express their gross and crude conceptions of a Superiour Being by some material and visible object: the vulgar notion of ghosts and spirits is not entirely banished from the most cultivated parts of England.

PERCEPTION, IDEA, CONCEPTION, NOTION. Perception expresses either the act of perceiving or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an idea (v. Idea). The impression of an object that is present to us is termed a perception; the revival of that impression, when the object is reinoved, is an idea. A combination of ideas by which any image is presented to the mind is a con* Vide Abbe Girard: "Entendre, comprendre, concevoir."

the understanding. To think, that is, to have any
thought or opinion upon a subject, requires reflection;
it is the work of time;

If to conceive how any thing can be
From shape extracted, and locality,

Is hard: what think you of the Deity ?-JENYNS. To suppose and imagine may be the acts of the moment. We think a thing right or wrong; we suppose it to be true or false; It is absurd to suppose that while the relations, in which we stand to our fellowcreatures, naturally call forth certain sentiments and affections, there should be none to correspond to the first and greatest of all beings.'-BLAIR. We imagine it to be real or unreal. To think is employed promiscuously in regard to all objects, whether actually existing or not: to suppose applies to those which are uncertain or precarious; imagine, to those which are unreal; "How ridiculous must it be to imagine that the clergy of England favour popery, when they cannot be clergymen without renouncing it.'-BEVERIDGE. Think and imagine are said of that which affects the senses. immediately; suppose is only said of that which oc cupies the mind." We think that we hear a noise as soon as the sound catches our attention; in certain states of the body or mind we imagine we hear noises which were never made: we think that a person will come to-day, because he has informed us that he in tends to do so; we suppose that he will come to-day