CHAPTER II.

OF CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

What we mean by Conscience; and how Conscience admonishes us.

WHENEVER we do any thing, there must always be something with which we do it. Thus if we walk, we must have legs to walk with. If we see, we must have eyes to see with. If we hear, we must have ears to hear with; and so of a thousand cases.

This is equally true of our internal or mental actions. Thus if we either think, or feel, we must have a mind, to think or to feel with. If we remember, we must have a memory, to remember with.

Now, every one knows that he has the power of observing the difference between right and wrong in the actions of men; and that he also is subject to peculiar feelings, in consequence of the existence of such qualities in his own actions. We give the name con

science to that faculty which man has, but which brutes have not, by which we make this distinction, and suffer or enjoy these feelings.

If now, we will observe, we shall see, that this feeling of right and of wrong, belongs to our actions, whether they respect either God or man. If a boy tell a lie, though no one know it, or swear, though no one hear him, or break the holy sabbath, though no one see him, he feels guilty of a sin against God, and he justly fears that God will punish him. If he steal his neighbor's property, or cheat his play mates, or strike or abuse them, he feels guilty of injuring them, is ashamed to look them in the face, and is conscious that he deserves to be punished for his conduct.*

And hence we say, that conscience is that faculty of the mind, by which we distinguish between right and wrong in our actions, whether they have respect to our fellow men, or to God. And, as we form the same judgments respecting the actions of other men, as we do respecting our own, we say, that conscience is the faculty by which we distinguish between right and wrong in moral action. It is by the same faculty that we feel a sort of impulsion to do what we know to be right, and a sort of

*It may be added, that we are conscious of some of these feelings, when we abuse brute animals.

monition not to do what we know to be wrong; and also, that we in the one case feel pleasure, and in the other case feel pain.

Let us now reflect for a moment upon our feelings respecting right and wrong, that we may observe in what manner conscience admonishes us.

1. Suppose we are considering an action, in order to decide whether or not we shall do it. Let us take a case. Suppose a child were so wicked as to be angry with his father, and was considering whether he should strike him. He would probably think, first of all, that his father was stronger than he, and would punish him for it. This would show that it was unwise, for he would lose more than he would gain. But suppose his father was sick in bed, and so weak that he could not punish his child for doing wrong. If the child reflected for a moment, he would feel that it was wrong to strike his parent, and that it made no difference, whether his father could punish him or not. And if a child saw another child strike a sick father, instead of doing him all the good he could; he would say that the child had done a very wicked thing, and that he ought to be punished for it. And if the child, in attempting to strike his father, hurt himself badly, though every one would be sorry for him, yet

they would all say that it served him right, and that he deserved it.

Again, suppose a child to feel that it was wrong to strike his father; he would also feel something which seemed to tell him not to do it. If he were angry, there would be two kinds of feelings within him. His angry feelings would urge him to do it, and his conscience would say, you ought not to do it. And he would be a bad, or a good boy, just as he obeyed his angry passions, or as he obeyed his conscience. Or, to take another case. Suppose a boy had received some money which was given to him for the purpose of buying play-things for himself. As he was going to the toy shop, he met a poor woman, whose children were starving for want of something to eat. His love of play would urge him to buy the play-things. But his conscience would urge him to relieve the poor starving children. A selfish boy would yield to his love of toys, and leave the children to starve. A good boy would yield to his conscience, and deny himself, and give the money to the poor.

We may also learn how conscience admonishes us, by observing how we feel after an action has been performed. Thus, take the last case. If a boy had been benevolent, he would feel happy, he would approve of what

he had done. And, if he had seen such an action done by another, he would love him for it, and desire to see him rewarded. Thus if the benevolent boy, afterwards, in passing along the street, had found twice as much money as he gave away to the poor children, every one would be glad of it, and say that he deserved to be rewarded.

On the contrary, if a boy, instead of being kind to these children, had left them to perish, or more especially, if he had called them names, or had struck them; when he went away and thought upon his conduct, he would feel ashamed, sorry, and very unhappy, and be afraid that some misfortune would befal him. And if we should see any one act so wickedly, we should feel a dislike to him, we should not wish to associate with him, and we should say that he deserved to be punished.

This is one great reason why persons who have done wrong are so fearful and cowardly; and why those who have done well are so much bolder. He who has done wrong knows that he deserves to be punished; and hence he is afraid that every body is going to punish him. He who has done well, knows that he deserves to be rewarded, and hence he is afraid of no

one.

And this is one reason, why those who have