DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA. 55 CHAP. 1864-66. The Middle Middle States had made to form a Union, which was to hold the balance between the two great Powers, proved that nothing could be expected of them. Particularist ideas were dominant with them; and it States. was impossible to hope that they would willingly surrender any portion of their sovereign rights for the sake of a United Germany. The unity of action which subsisted between Austria and Prussia during the war which had just ended, was no sign that they were being drawn closer together. In one question, and that the most important, they would always remain sharply antagonistic. The ingenuity of no statesman could devise means for bringing them to an understanding on the Constitution of Germany. Two powerful nations with totally irreconcilable ideas on a question the solution of which was postponed from day to day, but which was daily being brought forward, must sooner or later settle their differences by the sword. There could not be two kings in Brentford. Their union on the SlesvigHolstein question deceived no one. It was this very union that hastened the catastrophe. Prussia, Duchies. The danger of a common administration of a Autria, country by two nations, whose views are distinct, and is apparent to a child. The danger is increased when the governed country itself is eager to strike out a third line of policy. In undertaking with Austria the government of the Duchies, Prussia had but one object in view, the incorporation of these countries into her territory. Towards this end CHAP. Herr v. Bismarck was steadily working. IV. 1864-66. Austria desired to see a State formed in the North, which should attach itself to her policy, and form a source of annoyance to Prussia. But she did not desire to grant the Duchies the independence they demanded. The Duchies wished to free themselves entirely from the influence of the two great Powers, and to form an independent State, a member naturally of the German Confederation, under the rule of the Prince of Augustenburg. These three aims were so irreconcilable that it would require much tact and patience to avoid a collision. Of the three, that of the Duchies is the juster and more logical. By the law of the agnatic succession, which was in force in the Duchies before the introduction of the law of the cognate succession, the Duke of Augustenburg was the rightful heir to the Ducal Throne. The Treaty of London had, no doubt, settled the succession on King Christian, and had formed the Duchies and Denmark into one State, preserving to the former their political rights; but as this State had been dissolved, the Duchies would enter into the enjoyment of those laws which existed before their close union with Denmark. This latter country had ceded the Duchies to Austria and Prussia without reserve; and it would be an inconsequent act were these two countries to ignore those rights for which they had fought. The Duchies might say with force: You went to war to force Denmark to respect our ancient and traditional rights; now that you have been 6 victorious with our help you surely cannot avoid placing us in full possession and enjoyment of those rights. Holstein-Lauenburg has always formed part of the German Confederation, and there is no reason that she should cease to do so. Slesvig, however, is, and has been, in a different position. On no ground can the German Confederation lay any claim to her. She is willing to form one State with Holstein, and to enter the Confederation, but not as a vassal, to any Power.' For political reasons, however, it is clear that Prussia could not allow the formation of a new State in the North, which would almost inevitably, like the Middle and most of the smaller States, lean towards Austria, and add one more to the opponents of Prussian policy in Germany. It is equally clear that Austria could not permit the incorporation with Prussia of a country which would increase her seaboard and enable her to take a stronger and more menacing position. CHAP. IV. 1864-66, Each party worked actively in the Duchies in favour of their respective views. Prussia, forgetting her former statements, attacked the legitimacy of the claim of the Duke of Augustenburg, and prevented the assembling of the Provincial Diets. To place matters on a more satisfactory footing, an agreement was come to at Gastein (August 14, 1865) between Gastein the two Powers, by which it was settled that the tion. Duchies should be separated; that Prussia should be entrusted with the administration of Slesvig, and Conven CHAP. IV. 1864-66. Austria with that of Holstein. Austria further ceded Lauenburg to Prussia for the sum of 2,500,000 Danish dollars (about 250,000l.); and Prussia was also to have possession of Kiel, in order to commence building naval establishments there. The fortress of Rendsburg was to be garrisoned in common.1 Considerable excitement was produced in the Duchies by this compact. One of the chief complaints they had had against Denmark was her refusal to allow them to become united; and they now found their friends and protectors following the same line of policy. General Manteuffel was named Governor of Slesvig, and endeavoured to win the sympathies of the inhabitants. He met, however, with little success. The people of Slesvig had no desire to form part of the Prussian kingdom, and they were grieved to find that the hopes they had cherished were blasted. The Austrian Governor of Holstein, General von Gablenz, pursued a line of policy which was distasteful to Prussia, because it was successful in alienating the Duchy from her, and in making it look to Austria as its natural ally. Prussia had always been opposed to the meeting of the Provincial Diets, as she well knew that they would pass resolutions acknowledging the Duke of Augustenburg as their rightful ruler, and demanding the union and autonomy of the Duchies. In January 1866 a mass meeting was held at Altona, with the sanction of General von Gablenz, 1 Herr v. Bismarck was raised to the dignity of Count for his skill in obtaining possession of Slesvig. IV. Austria was 1864-66. Holstein convoca tion of Pro vincial tations of Represen Prussia. at which resolutions were passed demanding the CHAP. convocation of the Provincial Diets. perfectly ready to agree to these resolutions. Count Bismarck thereupon addressed a note to Count demands Mensdorff (the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs), in which a long series of complaints was made against Diets. the course which Austria was pursuing in Holstein, and which, if continued, would seriously endanger the good relations hitherto existing between the two Powers. Austria, who saw clearly the goal towards which Prussia was striving, replied that she would never consent to the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia, even at the cost of a rupture. It required but little foresight to see that war would very probably be the consequence, and the two Powers commenced their preparations. Austria applied to the Diet and to the Middle States to aid her in case of attack on the part of Prussia, and the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Army Corps were mobilized. Prussia addressed a circular note to the German States in which she begged them to inform her what course they would pursue, supposing she were attacked by Austria. The majority of these States referred her to the Diet. Prussia then endeavoured to arrive at a Prussian peaceful solution by making overtures at Vienna. She proposed that Austria should have the conduct of affairs in South Germany, if North Germany and Slesvig-Holstein were resigned to her. Austria declined the proposal, foreseeing that war was inevitable, and preferring that it should come sooner than later. Austria ap peals to the Diet. proposals. |