Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy

Предна корица
Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki, Pauliina Remes
Springer Science & Business Media, 16.07.2007 г. - 366 страници
SARA HEINÄMAA,VILI LÄHTEENMÄKI AND PAULIINA REMES This book is about consciousness. It illuminates the concept in its complexity and richness, capturing its theoretical and philosophical significance as well as its problematic aspects. By taking a new look into the history of concepts, the collection questions several deep-seated assumptions about consciousness – assumptions both thematic and methodological. It argues that, even though our predecessors did not formulate their philosophical queries in terms of consciousness, they have much to offer to our current disputes concerning its central features, such as reflexivity, subjectivity and aboutness, as well as related themes, from selfhood to attention and embodiment. At the same time, the collection demonstrates that consciousness is not just an issue in the p- losophy of mind, but is bound to ontology, epistemology and moral theory. We can find premodern and early modern concepts and arguments that are interesting and even crucial to our own philosophical concerns, but we should not assume that these belong or contribute to any theory of mind isolated from metaphysical and ethical discussions: an argument that for us provides insightful descriptions of perception or self-awareness might to its writer have meant not just a theoretization of the soul or the mind, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a contribution to ethics or ontology.

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Съдържание

Intentionality
4
Reflexivity and Reflection
20
On Platos Lack of Consciousness
28
The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotles Psychology
49
Ownness of Conscious Experience in Ancient Philosophy
67
Before and After Avicenna
95
The Notion of Presentialitas
123
1
142
33
199
The Status of Consciousness in Spinozas Concept of Mind
203
41
218
49
230
The Living Consciousness of the German Idealists
245
The Heidelberg School and the Limits of Reflection
266
51
279
Contemporary Naturalism and the Concept of Consciousness
287

Augustine and Descartes on the Function of Attention
153
14
158
29
175
Bibliography
329
Name Index
355
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Страница 175 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he •calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things ; in this alone consists personal identity...
Страница 62 - ... number. A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (eg what instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (eg he may think his act will conduce to some one's safety), and how he is doing it (eg whether gently or violently).
Страница 203 - Consciousness is a word used by philosophers, to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in philosophical discourse.
Страница 65 - man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not
Страница 173 - ... partly in the fact that he is sensible in himself of a firm and constant resolution to use it well, that is to say, never to fail of his own will to undertake and execute all the things which he judges to be the best — which is to follow perfectly after virtue.33 In other words, generosity is the emotion which accompanies my sense of my human dignity.
Страница 50 - Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must be either by sight that one perceives that one sees or by another [sense].
Страница 168 - ... we shall only wonder at that which appears rare and extraordinary to us, and nothing can so appear excepting because we have been ignorant of it, or also because it is different from the things which we have known ; for it is this difference which causes it to be called extraordinary. Now although a thing which was unknown to us, presents itself anew to our understanding or our senses, we do not for all that retain it in our memory, unless the idea which we have of it is strengthened in our brain...
Страница 13 - But fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like for the organism.

Препратки към тази книга

Ancient Philosophy of the Self
Pauliina Remes,Juha Sihvola
Ограничен достъп - 2008

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